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Max Weber’s analysis in his prominent book The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism has prompted a generation of research that observes the role and impact of religion in 
world affairs. The core of Weber’s thesis is his argument that religious teachings have imposed 
psychological sanctions in individuals, and in turn, these sanctions have affected people’s 
behavior in worldly affairs. Guided by this argument, this thesis explores religious influence in 
the political and economic domain and seeks to understand the dynamics through which these 
influences materialize in people’s behavior and attitudes. In both domains, this thesis finds 
evidence that it is the threat to the ontological security of actors that elicits the enactment of 
religious norms, which in turn affect people’s behavior and attitudes in the political and 
economic spheres. The evidence in this thesis is drawn from a case study of Christian Orthodoxy 
and a field study in Macedonia. Drawing from field surveys, religious doctrines, and the existent 
literature, I delineate Christian Orthodox norms in respect to political and economic behavior and 
empirically test the extent to which these norms are manifested in the behavior of Christian 
Orthodox adherents. Influence of Christian Orthodox norms are found in both the political and 
economic domains in the case of Macedonia. Moreover, this thesis detects an intricate interplay 







Perusal of historical records reveals that there are only few examples of organized 
societies and communities that have not developed affinities towards religious practices.1 We 
understand religion to be a powerful phenomenon that has been used to give rise to and destroy 
societies. Through its ability to provide unity, uniformity, and security to individuals, religion 
has been given a prominent spot in the analysis of development of societies.  
This thesis contributes to the literature by drawing upon classic social theories and recent 
social scientific research to investigate religious norms, rules, institutions, and practices and their 
implications on world affairs. Specifically, this thesis examines how religious norms, rules, 
institutions, and practices influence the peculiar political and economic developments in one 
society. While the primary research question of this thesis is analyzing the role of religious 
elements in political and economic developments, the thesis also includes a conversation on the 
process of norm conformation and the phenomenon of norm conflict in societies in order to 
better understand the way religion affects world affairs. In this secondary analysis, evidence 
suggests that individuals’ enactment of religious elements is due to the ability of religion to 
provide stability and security in times when the individual fears for its existence in his earthly 
life and for his salvation in the afterlife.   
After providing the overarching theoretical discussion on norm conformation and norm 
conflict, as well as the predominant arguments that I gather from the theoretical discussion, I 
                                               
1 Max Weber, Methodology of Social Sciences, trans. ed. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (New York, NY: 
Routledge 2017): 6.  
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introduce a case study that I use to test the theories and arguments I establish. The purpose of the 
thesis is to first depict how religious elements fortify their influence in a society, and then 
observe the effects of these elements in one society. The main argument that this thesis seeks to 
support is that to understand the political and economic developments in one country, one needs 
to thoroughly analyze the historical, cultural, and social heritage of that country. Only then 
would we be able to advance effective policies in the political and economic domain that are in 
concert with the ideologies already existent in that society.  
Empirical Background 
 
In the political domain, religion is often viewed as a solidifier in nationalistic 
movements.2 Considering the rise in religious movements around the world, as well as the 
violent means some movements utilize in achieving their goals, religion has developed an 
unfavorable reputation in some global communities and conversations. Moreover, the practice of 
religious nationalism in some states, instead of the secular nationalism prevalent in the West, is 
creating concerns for politicians and policymakers; these concerns arise from notions that 
religious nationalists lean towards violence and disregard for democracy and human rights.3 The 
above observations are indicators that religion mainly has negative connotations in the political 
domain. By deconstructing religion into its fundamental units and relating them to the creation of 
national identity and the rise of nationalism, one's perception of religious influence in these 
political phenomena may become more nuanced. I investigate the existing research on the 
                                               
2 Rogers Brubaker, “Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches,” Nations and Nationalism 18, no. 1 (November 
2011): 2-20, accessed December 1, 2017, doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8129.2011.00486.x; Sabrina R. Ramet, Religion and 
Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics (Duke University Press Books 1988); Barbara-Anne J. Rieffer, 
“Religion and Nationalism: Understanding the Consequences of a Complex Relationship,” Ethnicities 3, no. 2 (June 
2003): 215-242, accessed December 1, 2017. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796803003002003 
3 Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War?: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press 2007) 
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relationship through a literature review, and then I test the same with empirical evidence from a 
case study of Macedonia.4 I find that, consistent with the literature, different groups in 
Macedonia are utilizing religious norms, rules, institutions, and practices to protect and secure 
the ontological identity of the country. Additionally, I find that the extent to which these 
different groups utilize religion to protect the country’s ontological security in contrast to 
securing their own physical and ontological securities is conditional on their interests and 
circumstances.  
I also investigate a related, but separate question of religious norms and economic 
behavior. The relationship between religion and economic outcomes has been analyzed from a 
number of different perspectives— relationships with economic growth, economic performance, 
economic attitudes and behavior are some of these perspectives that the literature includes.5 This 
thesis elaborates on the angle that examines the economic consequences of individual attitudes 
and behavior as influenced by religious norms, a view mainly influenced by Max Weber and his 
work in the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Specifically, this thesis builds upon the 
Weberian findings by contrasting his findings on the Protestant denomination and material 
culture with the norms of the Christian Orthodox denomination. Therefore, this thesis applies the 
Weberian model to a new set of religious norms, the Christian Orthodox norms, and attempts to 
bridge some dividing points in the existing literature on this relationship with a concentrated 
research design.  
                                               
4 The country’s official and constitutional name is the Republic of Macedonia. The country is also known as the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, a provisional name that is used by international organizations such as the 
European Union and the United Nations due to an ongoing name dispute with Macedonia’s southern neighbor, 
Greece. This thesis will refer to the country by its official and constitutional name, the Republic of Macedonia or 
Macedonia.  
5 Robert J. Barro and Rachel M. McCleary, “Religion and Economy,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20, no. 2 
(Spring 2006): 49-72; Robin Grier, “The Effect of Religion on Economic Development: A Cross-National Study of 
63 Former Colonies,” Kyklos 50, no.1 (February 1997): 47-62, accessed May 2017, doi: 10.1111/1467-6435.00003. 
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The empirical evidence in this analysis also come from a case study of Macedonia, a 
predominantly Christian Orthodox country, where evidence of Christian Orthodox norms as well 
as the implications of these norms on the individuals of that society is gathered. The analysis 
discovered that Christian Orthodox norms, compared to the Protestant norms in regard to their 
guidance for adherents’ appropriate economic behavior, discourage working in excess of the 
subsistence level, encourage giving to the community rather than saving, and are distrustful of 
wealth-multiplying techniques in the economic models. Together with other norms that I 
discovered in the analysis, I constructed four hypotheses that, based on the Christian Orthodox 
norms, suggested what one should expect to observe in the economic attitudes and behavior of 
Christian Orthodox adherents. With the data I gathered from respondents’ answers to a survey, I 
was able to confirm three out of the four hypotheses with a sufficient level of confidence.   
Field Research and Methodology 
 
The evidence used in this thesis was collected during field research in Macedonia in the 
summer of 2017. I chose Macedonia as a case study as it is a country with a long religious 
history and a country where religious norms and practices are still highly pertinent according to a 
study conducted in December of 2016.6 Therefore, Macedonia presents an excellent case study to 
observe the relationships of religion, politics, and economics. Macedonia's dominant religion is 
Christian Orthodoxy, and the majority of the thesis is dedicated to discerning Christian Orthodox 
norms rules, institutions, and social practices and their effects on political and economic 
behavior. Considering that empirical evidence on Christian Orthodox values and Christian 
                                               
6 Vladimir Bozhinovski and Marjan Nikolovski, “The Perceptions of the Citizens on Religion and its Role in the 
Multiconfessional Society [Перцепцијата на граѓаните за религијата и нејзината улога во 
мултиконфесионалните општества,” Trans. by author, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (December 19, 2016), accessed 
December 1, 2017, http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_47556-1522-2-30.pdf?161227140211 
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Orthodox adherents' behavior is limited in the literature, this element of the study is a valuable 
addition to the literature as it provides data on Christian Orthodox values and surveys the 
behavior of Christian Orthodox adherents.   
The IRB-approved field research consisted of two parts. I first conducted semi-structured 
interviews over a period of one month with religious leaders from the major religious 
denominations in the country. Through the interviews, I sought to understand two things: (1) the 
religious climate and its interaction with the political forces in the country, and (2) the religious 
norms regarding work ethic as professed by the different religious denominations. As previously 
mentioned, due to the magnitude and significance of Christian Orthodoxy in the county, the 
majority of the interviews were conducted with Christian Orthodox priests and most of the 
collected information was on Christian Orthodox norms. I will seek to further explore other 
religions in similar ways with further research. During the first part of the field research, I 
conducted ten interviews7 and managed to access a number of primary and secondary sources 
with studies, opinions, and reports on issues related to my topics of interest. I used evidence from 
the interviewees’ key points and quotes as support in my case study analysis.  
The second part of the field research consisted of survey distribution among the 
Macedonian population. The survey was constructed in a way that measured the influence of 
religious norms in peoples' lives and their economic behavior. With the surveys, I was able to 
observe the following: (1) the extent to which Christian Orthodox adherents enact the religious 
norms of their faith, and (2) the economic behavioral tendencies of Christian Orthodox 
adherents. Over a period of two months, I collected 612 surveys. I analyzed the data from the 
surveys by employing both OLS and binary logistic regressions. 
                                               




The field research and the subsequent case study confirmed the expected findings and 
yielded the following conclusions:  
(1) Concerning the influence of religious values on the formation of national identity and 
nationalism, the literature argues that religious values are evoked and become part of the 
national identity in times of existential crisis and state of instability.8 Consequently, there is 
a collective urge to retain the stability, the cohesion, and "the truth" that religion offers. This 
collective urge is perceived as an effort to secure and protect the ontological identity of the 
individual, the various subnational groups, and the nation, respectively. This collective urge 
is reflected in the rise of nationalistic movements, a quintessential example of efforts to 
sustain one society’s physical and ontological identity. I find empirical evidence of this 
process in the case study of Macedonia. In other words, I find that in times of crisis, 
different groups find comfort, cohesion, and security in the salience of religious values.  
(2) Regarding the influence of religion in the economic sphere, due to the historically long 
prevalence of Christian Orthodoxy in Macedonia, as well as the continuous interdependence 
of religion and secular affairs in the country, Christian Orthodox norms are still prevalent in 
the society and reflected in the adherents’ attitudes and behavior. In this analysis, I discern 
influences of other societal forces throughout the years as well as individual characteristics of 
Christian Orthodox followers, and I find that religious norms have separate and independent 
effect on the behavior of Christian Orthodox adherents. Moreover, since Christian Orthodoxy 
belongs in the traditional, mystic, and inner-focused religions, I find that the attitudes and 
behavior of Christian Orthodox adherents to be more conservative in the economic sphere.  
                                               
8 Catarina Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological 
Security,” Political Psychology 25, no. 5 (October 2004): 743. 
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(3) Finally, the historical and societal analysis in the case study of Macedonia, and the findings 
from this analysis support the overall argument of this thesis. Namely, the deep roots of 
religion in the historical development of the country, the recurrent crises to Macedonia’s 
nationhood and security, and the struggle for identity should explain the stronghold that 
religion has in the Macedonian secular affairs. Additionally, the enduring presence of 
Christian Orthodoxy in the country suggests that its norms are embedded in the society 
despite the convoluted processes of norm confirmation and norm conflict. I find that 
Christian Orthodox norms in regard to economic attitudes and behavior are still present and 
practiced, consciously or subconsciously, by the Christian Orthodox adherents.   
Significance 
 
The contribution of this study to the literature on religion and worldly activities is manifold. 
By applying in-depth interdisciplinary analysis, and combining classic social theories with recent 
social scientific research, this study contributes to the literature in the following ways: 
(1) Looking closely at the processes of conformation and evolution of religious norms, rules, 
institutions and social practices allows for a more focused analysis on the interaction between 
these phenomena and world activities. This investigation is especially critical in the political 
domain as violent religious movements have influenced opinions that religious factors as 
inherently violent. This study presents an analysis that will hopefully create a more objective 
perspective on the issue. 
(2) With the empirical evidence on religion and economic behavior, I expand on Max Weber’s 
model and apply his logic of analysis to another set of religious norms, the Christian 
Orthodox norms. Considering the importance of Weber’s theory, expanding the model to 
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other religions allows for discovering novel relationships between other religious norms and 
economic attitudes.  
(3) The data I gathered from the field research on economic behavior by Christian Orthodox 
adherents fills a gap in the literature. The literature often blends Christian Orthodoxy with 
post-communist dummies or other Eastern religions.9 The collected data enables a close 
analysis of the relationship between Christian Orthodox adherents’ normative and economic 
behavior.  
(4) This study confirms the anticipated findings and provides robust evidence of an influence of 
certain historical and societal developments in the case of Macedonia, therefore this case 
study should serve as an example that every country has its own historical and cultural 
heritage that influences political and economic developments in the same. Before we use a 
sweeping argument and label all religious movements as violent, or conservative behavior as 
primitive, scholars and policy makers should devote more time to finding the underlying 
reasons for such developments. Only then we would be able to implement and enact policies 
that improve the conditions of countries, while also recognizing and adapting to existing 
cultures and institutions in the respective societies. After all, we should be aware that ideas 
do not operate in an ideological vacuum.  
Chapter Overview 
 
The remainder of the thesis is organized in three chapters. The first chapter frames the 
thesis within the constructivist approach, provides working definitions of concepts used 
                                               
9 Christian Bjørnskov, “Determinants of Generalized Trust: A Cross-Country Comparison,” Public Choice 130, 





throughout the thesis, and introduces debates within the constructivist literature, such as norm 
conformation and norm conflict, that are also applicable in the thesis. In the same chapter, I 
include historical and current-day information on the presence of religion in Macedonia. By 
doing so, I aim to present the suitability of using Macedonia as a case study.  
The second chapter is dedicated to observing the relationship between religion and 
political developments. The first half extrapolates findings from the literature on this 
relationship. It includes general discussion on conformation to religious norms, and the role of 
religion in the building of a national identity, nationalism and connection to ontological security 
of different actors. The second half of this chapter first presents a brief overview of the stand of 
the Christian Orthodox church’s position with regard to the nation, nationhood, and nationalism, 
and then, presents evidence from the case study. Throughout the chapter, I make a connection 
between the findings of the literature about the theorized relationship between religion, nation-
building, and nationalism and the evidence from the case study.  
The third chapter presents analysis on religion and economic developments in the 
country. Specifically, I observe the economic attitudes and behavior of the members of the 
society in order to understand why certain economic developments are not well adapted and 
enacted in the country. The first half of the chapter analyzes the Weberian model and his 
findings on the relationship between Protestantism and the material culture and provides a 
literature review of studies that have previously attempted to quantify Weber’s findings. I then 
frame my study and the study design within the existing literature. Finally, I exhibit the findings 
from my study. I first present Christian Orthodox norms in regard to economic behavior as found 
in the Serbian, Greek, and Russian literature. Then I reveal the Christian Orthodox norms as 
deduced from the field interviews and the perusal of the doctrines and popular Christian 
10 
 
Orthodox literature during the field research in Macedonia. In continuation to the norm 
discussion, I present the results from the survey data and I discuss the implications of the survey 
data and findings on the preceding theoretical conclusions.  
In the conclusion, I complete the discussion in this thesis by tying together the arguments 
made throughout the thesis, providing suggestions for future research, and discussing the 





















Chapter I: Theoretical Framework and Case Study 
 
“For when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to 
dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern 
economic order.”- Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 
Introduction 
Commencing the chapter on religious norms, rules, institutions and social practices with 
Weber’s overarching conclusion in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism seems 
fitting as this chapter investigates the influence religious norms, rules, institutions and social 
practices have on the development of political and economic phenomena. More specifically, this 
chapter observes how religious ideas, norms, and institutions form and progress through history 
while interacting with and consequentially shaping the world’s political and economic 
developments. The constructivist approach will guide this chapter’s analysis as it is an approach 
that precisely argues that "reality is socially constructed by cognitive structures that give 
meaning to the material world.”10 Constructivism is based on the argument that the material 
world is not only based on individual preferences and rational choices, but it is constructed by 
the behavior of the people within it— their shared knowledge, the collective meaning they 
attribute to the world, their authority and legitimacy, the rules, institutions and material resources 
employed in their existence and behavior, and their practices and concerted activities.11 Max 
Weber, as one of the originators of this approach, emphasizes the importance of social factors in 
human action by stating: "We are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take 
                                               
10 Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in Worldly Affairs,” European Journal of 
International Relations 3, no.3 (September 1997): 320, accessed November 10, 2017, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066197003003003 
11 Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground...”, 321 
12 
 
a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance.”12 Fittingly, Weber’s model of 
idea evolution and its effectiveness in history is a pertinent framework in this thesis. 
Religion has been a significant and enduring force since the early days of civilization. 
This system of norms, rules, institutions and practices can undeniably be analyzed through the 
constructivist lens; the religious system and its evolution through the ages pose an excellent case 
study where the interactions of people within the system can be observed and analyzed for 
effects of the interaction between the respective units in the system on the material world. The 
strength of the following project is also in its empirical value in providing analysis of a religion 
other than Protestantism; this is especially valuable considering the prevalence of economic 
stagnation and political instability throughout much of the Orthodox world. The remainder of 
this chapter is organized by first defining terms that will be used throughout the rest of the thesis, 
followed by an introduction of the overarching theoretical framework that I will use in the case 
study. Following that, I present my case study by providing a historical analysis of the religious 
presence in the country of Macedonia and by delivering the modern pertinence of religion in the 
Macedonian society— by doing so, I attempt to convince the reader of the suitability of using 
Macedonia as a case study for this project.    
Definitions 
To provide clarity to the language and terms that I will use throughout the thesis, in 
continuation, I define several of the most frequently discussed terms. 
Religion is often in the center of people’s system of values, yet definitions of religion are 
wide-ranging. For this thesis, I will be using Durkheim's definition of religion that states 
"[religion is] a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, 
                                               
12 Max Weber, Methodology of Social Sciences, 81  
13 
 
things set apart and forbidden--beliefs and practices which unite in one single moral community 
called a Church, all those who adhere to them.”13 The three major and notable elements of this 
definition are ‘a system of beliefs and practices’, ‘sacred things,’ and ‘moral community.’ This 
definition encompasses the idea that, in social analysis, religion should not be only approached 
as a body of ideas and theological viewpoints, but also as a formal organization and as a social 
group where ideas are exchanged, shaped, and reshaped.14 Within this context, it is also 
imperative that I make a distinction between religion and spirituality. While there are an ongoing 
debate and confounding definitions of the meaning of a spiritual person and its distinction from a 
religious one, for this thesis, spirituality is defined as “private, emergent, emotional, and 
individual,” while religious is a person who adheres to a certain organized religion, that is 
“corporate, public, and stable.”15 The primary focus of this chapter and the overall thesis is 
Christian Orthodoxy, one of the three main Christian religions, with the other two being 
Catholicism and Protestantism.  
Norms are central to constructivism. Fortunately, there is a general agreement on the 
definition of a norm. A norm is a "standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given 
identity.”16 Therefore, adherents to a specific organized religion, i.e., Christian Orthodoxy, have 
norms shared by the community of Christian Orthodox adherents that may or may not be shared 
by followers of other organized religion. However, the fact that there are set of norms shared by 
one community does not necessarily mean that they are equally interpreted or applied by every 
                                               
13 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, ed. Joseph Ward Swain (Mineola, NY: Dover 
Publications, Inc., 2008), 47. 
14 Jeff Haynes, “Religion, Secularisation and Politics: A Postmodern Conspectus,” Third World Quarterly 18, no. 4 
(September 1997): 710, accessed November 10, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993213 
15 Courtney Bender, "Religion and Spirituality: History, Discourse, Measurement,” Social Science Research Council 
(January 2007), accessed November 10, 2017, http://religion.ssrc.org/reforum/Bender.pdf 
16 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International 




member of the community; each member can specify the shared ruleset in slightly divergent 
manner.17 Norms specific to Christian Orthodoxy are analyzed later in the thesis.  
Rules can take different definitions depending on the discipline in which they are 
promoted, but in this case, rules are used synonymously with social rules. Some scholars have 
the tendency of viewing rules “simply as outcomes, chosen by actors for their utility in reducing 
transaction and information costs,” however, this view is being challenged by academics like 
Sandholtz, who argue that while actors do modify rules, “the rules also shape the range of 
strategic and discursive options available to actors.”18 Moreover, Sandholtz argues that rules are 
not only enacted for actors’ utility, but also due to actors’ belief in the appropriateness of norms. 
The next section observes this debate closely. Therefore, in this thesis, I treat rules as outcomes 
chosen by actors for their utility or their belief in the norm appropriateness but are continuously 
reshaped by the same actors due to the effect rules have in shaping the actors’ conduct.  
Another debate in the literature is in regard to the difference between norms and rules. 
While some constructivists view rules as distinct from norms as they believe rules are formalized 
and written, others use norms and rules interchangeably and argue that both norms and rules 
have the same meaning, and can be both written and formal, or understood and informal.19 While 
I certainly agree that rules are more frequently associated with formal and written guidelines, I 
find the latter approach of using norms and rules interchangeably more suitable in the religious 
context; through anecdotes and field interviews, I have discovered that many followers adhere to 
                                               
17 Wayne Sandholtz, “Dynamics of International Norm Change: Wars against Wartime Plunder,” European Journal 
of International Relations 14, no. 1 (March 2008): 101-131, accessed November 15, 2017, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066107087766 
18 Ibid 
19 Friedrich, Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions. On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in 
International Relations and Domestic Affairs (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 1989): 26-32; Nicholas 
Greenwood Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia, 
SC: South Carolina Press 1989): 36-43  
15 
 
certain religious rules, but do not necessarily attend religious services or read religious texts. 
Therefore, regardless of whether the standard of appropriate behavior is disseminated in the 
society through an informal or formal channel, it essentially denotes the same thing. Henceforth, 
I use the terms rules and norms interchangeably.     
Social practices are easily confused with the concepts of behavior and action, but there is 
a distinction between these three concepts. Cook and Brown assist in making this distinction by 
conceiving them as a gradation; in an illustrative manner, they pose that any doing is a behavior, 
behavior with imbued meaning is an action, and practice is "action informed by meaning drawn 
from a particular group context.”20 Keeping this distinction in mind, I use the following 
definition when explaining practices: "Practices are socially meaningful patterns of action, 
which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and 
possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world.”21 Therefore, 
religious practices are taken as socially meaningful actions with religious motivation and 
background knowledge that is reflected in the material world, political and economic included. 
One key word in the definition of practices is background knowledge, and the treatment of 
background knowledge as a major factor in the way social practices are portrayed in the material 
world. As important as the argument about background knowledge is, Adler and Pouliot do not 
provide precise explanation of what background knowledge entails. I find that an explanation to 
this omission is provided by Muller, who argues that background knowledge is not an 
“individualistic construction of the actors,” as rationalist theory would suggest, but instead it is 
the rules and norms shaped by cultural and social factors that form the background knowledge, 
                                               
20 Scott D. N. Cook and John Seely Brown, “Bridging Epistemologies: The Generative Dance between 
Organizational Knowledge and Organizational Knowing,” Organization Science 10, no. 4 (July 1999): 387, 
accessed November 15, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2640362 
21 Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, “International Practices,” International Theory 3, no. 1 (February 2011): 1-
36, accessed October 12, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1017/S175297191000031X  
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and subsequently, the social practices.22 Moreover, the same construction of background 
knowledge serves as a paradigm through which the practices are evaluated by the actors’ 
audience, in addition to it being an explanation to the actors’ practices. This conclusion 
inevitably serves as another argument why observing religious norms is important in evaluating 
people’s attitudes in the political and economic sphere.     
Friedrich Kratochwil strongly defends the idea of not treating religion as only “terms of 
ideas or a doctrine,” but including practices when considering religion as a phenomenon; his 
argument is that treating norms or ideas in isolation of practices creates a fallacy since in a given 
situation there are a multitude of conclusions that are logically possible, but only through 
application we can truly observe the intent. Thus, in order for a situation to be truly understood 
there needs to be “analysis and justification beyond logic and even ‘the law’ (or the scripture)”.23 
I agree with Kratochwil’s argument and apply it in my study by analyzing the practices that 
different actors utilize while using religious norms and rules to justify their application.      
Institutions are defined in the literature as "a relatively stable collection of practices and 
rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations.”24 
Scholars have revealed similarities between the definition of institutions and norms. However, 
they have also found the difference in the aggregation, meaning unlike the single standards of 
behavior that defines a norm, "institutions emphasize the way in which behavioral rules are 
                                               
22 Harald Muller, “Arguing, Bargaining, and All That: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory, and the Logic of 
Appropriateness in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 10, no.3 (September, 
2004): 399, accessed February 20, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066104045542 
23 Friedrich Kratochwil, “Religion and (Inter)National Politics: On the Heuristics of Identities, Structures, and 
Agents,” Alternatives Global Local, Political 30, no.2 (April 2005): 113-140, accessed November 10, 2017, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/030437540503000201 
24 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” International 
Organizations 52, no. 4 (1998): 948, accessed November 15, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601363  
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structured together and interrelate."25 While the object of worship is likely the first thing that 
comes to mind when referring to religious institutions, it is essential to emphasize the social 
meaning behind it, i.e., the religious practices and rules that define the behavior of adherents of a 
particular religious group in situations such as political and economic changes. 
Having considered the definitions of commonly used concepts in the thesis, next, I 
discuss the broader theoretical framework and overarching arguments that will guide the analysis 
of the subsequent case study.   
Theoretical Framework 
 Since the principal research question in this thesis is the role of religion in political and 
economic developments in one country, it is necessary that I frame the question within an overall 
argument that it is threaded throughout the chapters. A number of constructivists, especially in 
the poststructuralist school, have noted that to understand the development of one society, one 
needs to observe the historical, collective, and cultural traits of a society.26 The fundamentals of 
this school lay in the belief of continuities of history and complexity of societies, and in the 
emphasis of histories of local struggles, and humans as socially constructed individuals with 
discrete cultural and social heritages.27 As such, scholars in this field view conventional 
development as constraining, and advocate for development that aligns with societies’ own 
trajectories. I would argue that this thesis is fitting within the poststructuralist framework as it 
considers the historically and socially embedded set of norms of a particular religion in the 
Macedonian society and it examines the interaction of those norms with political and economic 
modern developments. In other words, this thesis attempts to provide evidence for the school’s 
                                               
25 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 891.  
26 Richard Peet and Elaine Hartwick, Theories of Development, (New York, NY: The Guliford Press 2015): 222  
27 Ibid, 223, 234 
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arguments by showing that certain social and cultural factors, such as religion, influence people’s 
attitudes and behavior that is not reflective of the attitudes and behavior of people in other 
modern societies. Providing evidence for this argument will suggest that Macedonia, a society 
with highly prevalent Christian Orthodox values, follows its own trajectory of development and 
adaptation to economic and political changes. This framework is suitable in guiding my analysis 
and answering what is the overall question of this thesis, assessing the influence of Christian 
Orthodox religious norms, rules, institutions, and social practices in political and economic 
developments in Macedonia.  
To be able to answer the posed research question and evaluate the role of religion in the 
secular affairs of Macedonia, an important step in the process is analyzing the reasons why 
people conform to norms, i.e. religious norms in this case; understanding the reasons behind 
conformation to norms helps us in better evaluating the power of religion on political and 
economic developments. Fortunately, this is an aspect that the constructivist literature has paid 
significant attention.  
In the constructivist literature on norm conformation and evolution, one often finds a 
debate among scholars who believe in strictly rational behavior that drives norm-formation and 
norm-conformation, and scholars who believe that actors engage in norm-formation and norm-
conforming behavior “because they understand the behavior to be good, desirable, and 
appropriate,” or else called the “logic of appropriateness.”28 Therefore, the debate amounts to 
whether actors create and enact norms due to utility maximization or because they believe in the 
goodness of norms. Based on this debate, there are several questions that arise in this thesis: 
Does the formation of new religious thoughts and norms happen due to the elites’ self-interest in 
                                               
28 Finnemore, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 912 
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getting what they want or because they truly believe in the appropriateness of these norms, or 
perhaps due to a combination of both or as a result of a third factor? Do adherents of religious 
schools conform to their norms because they believe in the sacredness of these norms or because 
they also want to maximize their utilization of world affairs? Or perhaps it is the fear of being 
judged by the community for not choosing certain norms? I do not claim to be able to find 
definitive answers to these questions that reduce the conformation to norms to one specific 
reason, nonetheless, my thesis reveals evidence in the case of Macedonia that support one or 
multiple explanation to the argument. The answers to these questions assist in establishing the 
impact of religious norms on political and economic development as understanding the 
mechanism through which these norms become effective in world activities is essential in 
assessing the effects. In the political domain, I will seek the answers to these questions by 
observing the enactment of Christian Orthodox religious norms and their influence in the 
formation of national identity and nationalism in Macedonia. In the economic domain, I will 
explore Christian Orthodox norms and I will seek to explain how these norms are practiced in the 
society, and subsequently, how they impact the economic behavior of Christian Orthodox 
adherents.  
 A similar debate between rationality and norms centers on the question of whether actors 
adhere to norms out of choice or due to the social structure— norms of behavior, social 
institutions, and the values, roles, and rules they represent, hence, the influence from the broader 
social and cultural environment.29 The difference of opinions on this issue in this literature is still 
prevalent, and while there is a consensus that both kind of processes matter in norm enactment, a 
definitive answer of their relatedness has not been established. While my analysis of religious 
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norms may not produce clear determination to one side of the debate or other, it is intriguing to 
explore whether enduring religious norms in a country are still practiced due to peoples’ 
conscious choice or due to these religious norms being “internalized” in people by the power of 
the social structure. Alternatively, both of these effects can be possible and relevant causally. My 
analysis provides evidence for the latter.  
 To conclude the review on the debate on norm formation and conformation, I highlight 
several arguments from the above analysis that assisted in forming my expectations of the 
forthcoming case study in regard to norms conformation, evolution, and subsequent effects on 
political and economic developments. As previously mentioned, I avoid making definitive claims 
about causes that reduce the reasons why a person or a certain group of people chooses to adhere 
to forms to solely one reason. This is because there are many confounding factors that make the 
analysis more nuanced than one that provides one answer. For instance, the motivations behind 
norm formation and conformation can be different dependent on the unit of analysis; in other 
words, one cannot expect that the motivations of the political elites, the religious elites, and the 
ordinary adherent are the same. Moreover, one cannot expect that different individuals within 
these groups have the same motivations. Contrary to the teachings of rationalist theory, I do not 
believe that all members across these three groups are driven by self-interest. Despite the 
persuasiveness of the “logic of appropriateness,” claiming that all actors choose norms because 
they believe in the goodness of the same is also unwise. As the below case study analysis would 
show, there are religious adherents that choose to affiliate with a certain religion as part of his or 
her national identity and national affirmation over other groups, and there are those that firmly 
believe that religion should be practiced separately from secular activities, and as such they 
practice religion devotedly for religious reasons. I expect the motivation behind the enactment of 
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religious norms to be different at the most, or some motivations to be more prevalent than the 
others at the least.  
 Finally, in regard to the debate on actors’ choice of norm conformation due to their 
choice or due to the effects of the social structure, once again, it would be difficult to determine 
that it is one factor over the other. The difficulty lays in the issue of subjectivity when actors are 
questioned about their motivations. However, the question I posed does not necessarily seek a 
definitive answer of one factor over the other, but instead explores both forces in norm 
formation. Nonetheless, because of the high interdependence of religion and secular affairs, as 
well as the long history of religion in Macedonia, I expect to find strong influence of the social 
structures on peoples’ adherence to religious norms.  
In addition to exploring the norm conformation and evolution in one society, the 
constructivist literature also includes the phenomenon of norm conflict. As one would expect, 
there are a multitude of sets of norms that are circulating in today’s society. While religious sets 
of norms are one of them, there are certainly subsets of this set that align with norms from 
different religious denominations. These sets of norms interact with continuously emerging and 
constantly evolving norms from different social spheres. Additionally, constructivists argue that 
there are no set of norms that cover every contingency, and as such, disputes arise internally and 
between different sets of rules in regard to which norms apply in certain developments.30 
Sandholtz argues that as a result of the tension between norms, norms follow a cyclical change 
that modifies the existing norms.31 
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In his book, Weber also contrasts Protestant work ethic with Catholic work ethic in parts 
of the book. The contrast he presents triggers an analysis of the interaction between religions 
norms and the norms and values of capitalism, and hence, serves as an example of interaction 
between two seemingly different sets of values. The third chapter of this thesis will also examine 
the relationship between religious norms, the Christian Orthodox norms, and an increasingly 
penetrating economic system, capitalism. It is intriguing to analyze whether and how the two 
separate sets of norms interact and are modified in the case of Christian Orthodoxy and 
capitalism. One evidence of this interaction is the issue of “A Code of Moral Principles and 
Rules in Economic Activity” by the World’s Russian People Council, a document that served as 
a moral and religious response to the modern economic developments.32 Although the 
Macedonian Christian Orthodox Church has not issued such code yet, field interviews with 
Christian Orthodox reveal that similar principles are taught by the Macedonian Church as well. 
In the third chapter, I analyze if, and to what extent, the capitalistic set of norms have modified 
the preexisting Christian Orthodox values in the Macedonian society.   
To conclude, the debates and arguments I outlined above will guide the analysis of the 
case study of Macedonia. The case study provides evidence that indeed historical and societal 
developments of religious adherence shape the society’s response to the building of a nation and 
the rise of nationalism in the political sphere, and the attitudes and behavior of the society’s 
members in the economic sphere. The subsequent chapters will provide the “expected” behavior 
of a religious society in nation building and nationalism, and economic attitudes and behavior as 
observed in the literature, and then they will present evidence of the Macedonian case study to 
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compare and contrast the existing literature. Additionally, the case study also suggests that the 
debate on norm conformation and norm conflict is indeed nuanced, and attempts to capture 
motivations behind norm conformation and evidence and evolution from norm conflict when 
possible.  
Macedonia as a Case Study 
 
The following two sections provide an overview of the religious endurance and presence 
in Macedonia through its history and in today’s society. I do this to illustrate the appropriateness 
of using Macedonia as a case study where the role of religion in world affairs can be adequately 
studied.  
History of Religion in Macedonia  
Macedonia has a rich religious history that has shaped the society and its cultural heritage 
through the centuries. Macedonia has 29 religions, religious groups, and religious communities. 
Five of these, the Christian Orthodox Church, the Islamic religious community, the Catholic 
Church, the United Methodist Church, and the Jewish community, compose the majority of the 
religious adherents in Macedonia, and these same five religious groups are included in the 
Macedonian Constitution (Устав на Република Македонија).33 A trait of the Macedonian 
society is that religious division is the same as ethnic division in the society; the ethnic 
Macedonians are predominantly Christian Orthodox, while the Albanians, the largest minority in 
the country, are Muslim.34 Although there is a significant amount of adherents of the other 
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religions, and there is historical evidence of their presence in Macedonia, for this thesis, I focus 
on the primary religion in Macedonia, Christian Orthodoxy.35 The following historical overview 
focuses on Christian Orthodoxy, however it does reference other religions for comparison.  
  The roots of Christian Orthodoxy in Macedonia can be traced back to the second half of 
the first century when Saint Paul the Apostle began to spread Christianity in Macedonia and the 
wider Balkan region.36 During the early and middle centuries, Christianity flourished on 
Macedonian land. Remnants from these years are present in almost every city, reflected in the 
hundreds of churches and monasteries that carry the spirit from those ages. During the Byzantine 
years, emperor Justinian I, who was originally from a town in Macedonia, was eminent in the 
strengthening of Christian religion in the region and the foundation of a formal Christian church. 
It is important to note that during this period is when we trace back the trail of religious influence 
in the political affairs of the country as the laws of God were imported to serve as laws of men in 
the so-called Orthodox Empire.37 In the second half of the 10th century, the autocephalous Ohrid 
Archdiocese was established with the rank of patriarchate, a significant milestone for the formal 
Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC) as this rank made the Ohrid Archiocese equal to the rank 
of other Christian Orthodox churches in the region.38  
With the arrival of the Ottoman Empire in Macedonia in the 14th century, Christianity 
began to experience turbulent years. With the penetration of Turks and Muslims, many Christian 
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churches were subdued by the spread of Islam; churches were made into mosques or destroyed to 
make space for the emerging mosques. Some churches still bear witness of these years with icons 
in a number of churches being partially or completely destroyed. In 1767, a Turkish sultan 
abolished the Ohrid Archdiocese, an action that was a significant setback for the Macedonian 
Christian Orthodox Church.39 However, the Ottoman Empire was not only dismissive to the 
formal church, but also to the local church and customs. Much like folklore stories from other 
historical occupations, folklore stories in Macedonia recite events when the Turks forced 
Macedonian Christian girls to marry Turks and convert to Islam. Some write about Macedonian 
Christians voluntarily converting to Islam to avoid the high taxes they were charged due to their 
religion.40 Folklore also reveals events of Macedonian Christians placing a permanent tattoo of a 
cross on their male children’s foreheads in order to avoid the Turks taking them for devshirme41 
and converting them to Islam. Five centuries of Ottoman rule caused deep changes in 
Macedonian society and Christian Orthodoxy. The Ottoman era is the principal contributor to the 
multireligiosity and multiethnicity prevailing in Macedonia today. During the Ottoman empire, a 
large inflow of Albanians inhabited Macedonia. Since Albanians were mainly of Islamic faith or 
converted to Islam during their assimilation with the Turks, Islam became the second largest 
religion in Macedonia. Additionally, the pluralistic theocracy of the Ottoman Empire, and the 
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Ottoman Empire practice to equalize religious affiliation with citizenship and nationality 
contributed to the later overall presence of ethnic and religious cleavages in Macedonia.42  
During the late 19th and early 20th century, Ottoman rule in the Balkans had started to 
weaken; this was demonstrated by the liberation of Macedonia’s neighboring countries —Serbia, 
Bulgaria, and Greece. Invoking Christian Orthodoxy as a common religion, these countries 
united under the slogan “Let’s save our Christian brothers!” and mobilized to liberate Macedonia 
from the Turks.43 With the help of its neighbors, Macedonia was liberated from a five-century 
occupation; this liberation brought hope to Macedonians for a reestablishment of their nation and 
revitalizing their culture, however, information about secret annexes emerged revealing that the 
call in religion’s name for liberalization of Macedonia by its neighbors was just a pretext for the 
Balkan countries to expand into Macedonia territorially.44 The economically weak and politically 
unstable Macedonia was not prepared to defend against its neighbors, and was likely to fall 
victim to the secret plans of its Balkan “allies” during the Balkan Wars. However, the internal 
misunderstanding between the other Balkan countries did not allow for the fulfillment of their 
agreement in entirety and brought an end to the Balkan Wars (1912-1913).  
Following the Balkan wars, Macedonia lost parts of its territory to Greece, Serbia, 
Bulgaria and Albania. Even though significant damage was done geographically, the forced 
assimilation of the Macedonian people to the culture of the people under whose jurisdiction they 
were apportioned was more consequential. Macedonians in the seceded parts were not allowed to 
use Macedonian language, practice Macedonian traditions, or affiliate with Macedonian history 
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or culture. In regard to religion, despite the shared Christian Orthodox religion, a substantial 
number of Christians were killed or were forced to flee when the allies fell out. However, the 
people of Islamic faith that lived within the former borders of Macedonia were the ones that 
experienced the largest suffering during the Balkan Wars. Most of the Muslim people, Turks and 
Albanians, were either killed or forced into exile. A number of Muslim villages were destroyed, 
and thousands of Muslims were massacred. Estimates suggest that 632,000, or 27% of the 
Muslims of Ottoman Europe, died during the Balkan Wars, in Macedonia and elsewhere.45 
Although smaller in numbers, the Jewish members of the community, who migrated with the 
movement of people in the Ottoman Empire, also suffered during the Balkan Wars. About 
120,000 Jews were separated from the former Ottoman empire in which they relished tolerance 
to a certain degree. Jewish communities were exhausted from their economic resources, were 
used as soldiers, and were killed for non-cooperation.46  
While World War I and II were raging on the European fronts, the Balkan countries were 
undergoing different geographical assemblies, which eventually led to the formation of the 
Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (later Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) in 
1945. In the course of socialist development and distribution of the population due to 
industrialization, the population experienced many geographical and social transformations.47 
Yugoslavia became a multinational community with a variety of cultures, languages and ethnic 
characteristics. In addition to the great diversity of national, cultural, ethnic, and linguistic traits, 
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Yugoslavia was a land with various religious denominations: Christian Orthodox, Roman 
Catholic, Protestant, Muslim and Jewish along with minor groups of Baptists, Adventists and 
others.48 During this time, the public manifestation of Christian Orthodoxy in Macedonia and 
other Balkan countries with predominantly Christian Orthodox populations, was largely 
suppressed. Such attitude towards Christian Orthodoxy was due to the fact that Marxist atheism 
was religiously practiced by the Yugoslavian communist regime, but also because Josip Broz 
Tito recognized the power of the Christian Orthodox church in evoking nationalistic spirit in the 
respective countries; subduing the church’s power was to the advantage of the influential politics 
of Tito’s rule.49  
The first efforts to re-establish the Ohrid Archidiocese as the official Macedonian 
Christian Orthodox Church started in 1945, but these efforts did not come to any fruition until 
1967 due to continued conflicts with the Serbian Orthodox Church and its unwillingness to give 
Macedonia an independent jurisdiction over its religious community.50 The reasons for such 
delay in allowing a separate Macedonian church are manifold, however, one can argue that the 
fear of having a separate church that has the potential of assembling adherents and vitalizing the 
fragile Macedonian national spirit was a major reason for the Serbian unwillingness for 
cooperation. The Macedonian Orthodox Church has been autocephalous since July 19, 1967; 
however, it is yet to be officially recognized and canonized by the other Christian Orthodox 
Churches.  
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The Macedonian Orthodox Church has maintained its presence ever since. Today, the 
Church consists of eleven dioceses, eight of which are within Macedonian borders and three of 
them have jurisdiction over the Macedonian diaspora.51 There is a copious number of religious 
properties in the country, and new ones are emerging each year. There are 1,842 Christian 
Orthodox churches and monasteries, 578 mosques, 30 Catholic churches, 12 Evangelist-
Methodist churches, and 3 Jewish religious properties in Macedonia. Reports show that there is 
one church or mosque per 831 residents, almost 15 times more than the European average of 
religious buildings per residents.52 Out of the 29 recognized religious communities in 
Macedonia, the Macedonian Orthodox Church reportedly has 1,310,184 followers. The other 
religious communities are the Islamic Community in the Republic of Macedonia with 674,015 
followers, the Catholic Church with 7,008 followers, and other smaller Christian groups 
(Protestant, Adventists, Baptists, Evangelists, Evangelist-Methodists, Reformers, and Jehovah 
witnesses) with 19,679 followers.53  
The Macedonian Orthodox Church continues to play an immense role in Macedonian 
society. It is an active voice in the societal, cultural, and political matters of the country. Despite 
its designation as being separate from the state, some argue that Macedonia is, in fact, a semi-
secular state, meaning that religion does influence secular matters in the country; this claim will 
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be further analyzed in the section on religion and national identity in Macedonia.54 The following 
segment analyzes the magnitude of religious presence in the modern Macedonian society.   
Religiosity of the Modern Macedonian Society  
The brief religious history in the previous section already provides a preliminary picture 
of the religious presence in Macedonian society. In this section, I provide an analysis of the 
extent to which the historical presence and significance of religion in Macedonia has penetrated 
into the society and has influenced the citizens’ outlook on religion. Understanding the 
religiosity of one society, including the prevalent religious norms, rules, institutions, and social 
practices, will help the analysis of religious involvement and effect in world affairs. In other 
words, one would expect that the more religious the society is, and the more present religious 
norms are in the society, the more influence they would have in the attitudes and behavior of that 
society’s members. I utilize evidence from studies conducted in Macedonia to assess the level of 
religiosity in the country, as well as some reoccurring religious norms, rules, and practices in 
regard to the construction of the Macedonian national identity and nationalism in Macedonia.    
A study that was first conducted in 2006 and then improved and repeated in 2016 covers 
the topic of religiosity of the Macedonian people and derives results that are representative of the 
overall religiosity in the country.55 Next, I present some of the findings of the study that pertain 
to Christian Orthodoxy, but I also include some statistics on Islam followers in Macedonia, 
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mainly as a comparison that will assist in understanding political situations included later in the 
thesis.  
The study finds that 75% of the respondents declare themselves as Christian Orthodox, 
while 21.6% are Muslim, 0.4% are Catholic, and 0.2% belong to other undetermined religion.56 
Only 2.4% declared themselves to be atheist. From the Macedonian respondents, 95.8% are 
Christian Orthodox, while 98.3% and 1.7% of the Albanians are Muslim and Christian Orthodox, 
respectively. While almost 98% of the respondents declared affiliation with a religion, only 83% 
stated they are religious or somewhat religious. This is a discrepancy that I also find in the results 
of my survey data; a possible explanation for such result is respondents using religious affiliation 
as part of their national identity, while not necessarily practicing religion. The fact that only 
44.8% of the Macedonian respondents have read the bible also reinforces the claim that religious 
practice is not high among the Macedonian Christians. Rates of church attendance are also 
relatively low when compared to the high percentage of religious affiliation and religiosity; 
namely, only 47.3% of the Macedonian Christians attend church several times a month, with 
only 9.8% attending weekly. In contrast, 80.8% of the Albanians have read the Quran, 
suggesting that intensity of religious practice is significantly higher among Albanians.   
Despite the low percentage of religious practice among Macedonians, 69.2% have 
declared that they believe in God, and 50.7% responded that religion has a significant or 
somewhat significant influence in their lives. Moreover, when asked whether religious or ethnic 
affiliation is more important to the respondent, 44.4% of the Macedonian Christians stated 
religion is more important than ethnicity. In the Albanian pool, 74.1% of the respondents have 
                                               
56 The percentage of Christian Orthodox is higher than the percentage that was earlier reported (64.8%). This 
number is dependent on the data source.  
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answered that religion has significant or somewhat significant influence in their lives, and 32.5% 
of them stated that religion is more important to them than ethnic affiliation.  
The above data suggests that overall, the Albanian Muslim population in Macedonia has 
higher religious practice rates and deem religion as an important influence in their lives 
significantly more than Macedonians. However, despite the low religious practice rates among 
Macedonians, 83% of them declared themselves as religious, 50.7% responded that religion is 
important or somewhat important to them, and to 44.4% religion is more important than 
ethnicity; these numbers still suggest that religion is relevant in the Macedonian society, 
Macedonian Christian and Albanian Muslim included.  
The field study I conducted in Macedonia also examined some of the above questions. 
The findings of my study are consistent with the findings of the above study. Out of the 612 
respondents, 75% identified themselves with a religion, and 73% as religious or somewhat 
religious. Only 6% of the Christian Orthodox followers attend church every week, but 66% 
attend several times a year and on important religious holidays. 14% of the respondents reported 
that religion has a big difference in their lives, while 40% responded that the influence is 
moderate.57 Unfortunately, my sample on Muslim respondents is rather limited and the findings 
from that pool are not significant to be listed.  
One can also notice the religious presence in the country from observations of the daily 
life in Macedonia. A field study conducted in 2009 on an analogous topic in Macedonia found 
that “for most of [his] informants below 35 years of age, showing that they were Orthodox 
Christians was important. A majority of them wore small praying chains, with small knots tied 
                                               
57 Nela Mrchkovska, “Religious Norms, Rules, Institutions, and Social Practices” (master’s thesis, University of 
Oklahoma, 2018), x. 
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together by a cross as a bracelet to show their allegiance to the Church.”58 During my research in 
the country, I also noticed this outward display of religious affiliation that was rather common 
among Macedonian people. Besides wearing religious bracelets and necklaces, another common 
appearance was taxi drivers hanging crosses in their cars as a way to distinguish themselves from 
the other drivers and perhaps attract customers that hold similar views as themselves. While one 
can argue that this observation is not an indication of religiosity, but rather an evidence of 
cultural belonging, I would still argue that the high presence of religious symbols, traditions, and 
customs can have an affect people’s attitudes and behavior.  
The findings from the studies mentioned above align with, and complement, each other, 
thus suggesting that the picture they all provide on the religiosity of the Macedonian society is 
consistent with reality. Following from the presented statistical findings from the above studies, 
one can conclude that religion is generally present in Macedonia. However, the finding that 
95.8% of the Macedonians identify as Christian Orthodox, but only 44.8% of them have declared 
themselves religious, also suggests that for Macedonians religion is more part of people’s 
identity, cultural heritage and tradition rather than a belief system. Nonetheless, as I argued 
above, Macedonians paradoxically may not be highly religious, as religiosity is defined in the 
literature, but religion still strongly influences political and economic behavior. Religious norms 
and beliefs, although embedded in the broader cultural context, are nevertheless present and 
influential.  
The general findings on the religiosity of Macedonian society suggest that Macedonia is a 
rather intriguing case to study on the topic of religion. Religion as a complex phenomenon is 
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multidimensional, and as such can take many forms and multiple roles. From the above analysis, 
it can be concluded that religion in Macedonia is (1) a set of beliefs and practices, (2) a national 
and ethnic identity, and (3) an indistinguishable part in the set of cultural values and practices. 
These three roles depict the integrative function of religion, where religion functions in a way 
that unites the cultural, social, and personal value systems in one element.59 By fulfilling this 
function, religion becomes an important aspect of the person’s identity that grows into a 
collective identity. Therefore, the substantial role that religion plays in someone’s life is not 
always the role of religious dedication to a certain system of beliefs, but it can also be embedded 
in the cultural values of a nation and carry considerable significance. These religious roots 
subsequently affect people’s choices, both in the political and economic spheres, and shape 
people’s behavior.  
Above, I discussed a debate among constructivists in regard to the question of why actors 
adhere to norms— the debate was whether adherence happens out of actors’ choice or due to the 
social structure. If one considers reading the holy text and regularly attending religious services 
to be indicators for people’s conscious choice of studying and following religious norms, then 
the above analysis and the adherents’ responses may certainly suggest that the social structure is 
very much, if not more, relevant in people’s choices to identify themselves with a certain religion 
and adhere to the norms circulated among those similar to them in the case of Macedonia. More 
specifically, my argument is that if a person does not practice religion in a traditional manner, i.e. 
by reading the holy text or attending religious services where these religious norms and rules are 
being preached, but still responds that religion has influence in his or her life (over 50% of 
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Christian Orthodox responded that religion has a significant or somewhat significant influence in 
their lives), and even considers religion to be more important than their ethnicity, then one can 
conclude that they receive these norms and rules from the social structures around them.60 This 
does not necessarily mean that they do not adhere to them because they choose to do so, but it is 




This chapter serves as a foreword to the subsequent two chapters and the case study in 
this thesis. The main purpose of this chapter was to introduce the theoretical approach within 
which this thesis is grounded; specifically, I introduced the constructivist approach as the most 
suitable framework as this thesis is based on the argument that norms, rules, institutions and 
social practices shape and give meaning to the reality. This thesis observes the religious norms, 
rules, institutions, and social practices, specifically, and the way they shape political and 
economic developments. Guided by the constructivist argument that societal developments are 
best understood when each society is studied within its own historical and cultural context, I 
chose to include a case study where this argument is tested with empirical evidence.  
Within the constructivist approach, I then discovered several arguments on norm 
conformation, norm evolution, and norm conflict that are necessary derivatives in the process 
from norm formation to norm effects in the society. The literature on these arguments revealed a 
rather nuanced relationship, where the motivation behind norm conformation, the process of 
norm evolution, and the consequences of norm conflict are not linear and definitive. With the 
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case study and analyses in the next two chapter, I observe this relationship and find evidence for 
these nuanced relationships.   
Finally, in the last two sections, I presented the case study I chose to test the above 
arguments and answer the overall research question. I found deep religious roots in the history of 
Macedonia, strong interdependent relationship between religion and secular affairs in 
Macedonia, and intricate religious traits of the modern Macedonian society. These characteristics 
make Macedonia a well-rounded case study for the question posed in this thesis. Moreover, the 
fact that the primary religion in question is Christian Orthodoxy serves as a comparison analysis 


















Chapter II: Religion and Political Affairs in Macedonia 
 
“After the fall of man, the man feels insecurity, fear, and agony due to his mortality in the 
earthly life. It is natural for man to feel confident in his own language and his own kind, which 
he sees as a projection of himself and his family in his unnatural life. He cannot love others more 
than he loves himself, he cannot contribute to the community by sacrificing his family, he cannot 
overcome phyletism” 
- Metropolitan of Navpaktos Jerotej Vlahos 
Introduction 
 The above quote by Metropolitan Naypaktos Jerotej Vlahos captures the essence of the 
argument I present in this chapter. Namely, the metropolitan is critical of phyletism, an 
ecclesiological heresy that conflates the Church and its ecclesiastical affairs with nationalism, 
and attributed the rise of this phenomenon to man’s “insecurity, fear, and agony due to his 
mortality”. The insecurity, fear, and agony that a man feels as a result of the unknown prompts 
his behavior to look for those alike him, to confide in and to relate to in his earthly life. As 
metropolitan Vlahos argues in the remainder of his message, the Church does not approve of the 
existence and spread of phyletism, or the use of the Church’s name and doctrines for the purpose 
of accomplishing nationalistic goals, as the purpose of the Church is to unite Christians and erase 
any limitations of time and space. While such statement is characteristic of the Christian 
Orthodox Church doctrines, normatively, Christian Orthodoxy has been used to promote division 
among people from different ethnicities and nationalities by church leaders and politicians alike. 
The remainder of this chapter presents evidence for this claim.   
 The first part of this chapter provides a review of the existing literature on religion and 
political affairs, including the current arguments surrounding the conformation to religious 
norms and the role of religion in the building of national identity and the formation of 
nationalism. The findings from the review align with metropolitan Vlahos claims, religious 
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norms seem to be indeed enacted when the ontological security of groups is threatened. Namely, 
ontological security is a need experienced on multiple levels, from the individual to the state 
level. On the individual level, it is “the need to experience oneself as a whole, continuous person 
in time—as being rather than constantly changing— in order to realize a sense of agency”.61 The 
sense of agency is inherently in need of a stable cognitive environment that becomes unstable 
when an actor is faced with uncertainty that does not allow for the actor to “systematically relate 
ends to means”.62 In other words, this uncertainty becomes a threat to the ontological security of 
the individual. To achieve stability, a cognitive and behavioral certainty, theorists of ontological 
security individual identity argue that individuals form and sustain relationships and establish 
routines.63 The religious institutions, as well as the religious practices, norms, and rules are 
certainly a quintessential example of foundations that provide and foster relationships, and seek 
answers to the unknown. 
This need for ontological security can be observed not only on individual level, but also 
on subnational and national level as well. Scholars in the international relations field have come 
to the understanding that states and inter-societal groups do not seek only physical security, but 
ontological security as well. One of the rationales used to justify this understanding is the fact 
that a state and a society, both units that are composed of members, seek ways to maintain 
distinctiveness of one group or state from another group or state by maintaining identity 
coherence for each group.64 Similarly, as both the state and different inter-societal groups are 
composed of members, the states and subgroups are reflecting images of the ontological security 
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of their members and as such, the states and subgroups seek ontological security as well.65 
Therefore, states and subgroups also act as protectors of the ontological security of their group, 
as their members do within.  
The latter part of this chapter looks closely at the case of Macedonia. Specifically, it 
observes the role of Christian Orthodoxy in building of the Macedonian national identity after its 
independence in 1991. It also observes the enactment of religious values by different groups— 
the Church, the government elite, and the civilians— in times of crisis such as the 2001 
insurgency in Macedonia. The case study reveals that dependent on the societal circumstances, 
these three different groups conform, influence, shape, and change religious norms in the society. 
Through this analysis, I also depict the role of religion in arousing nationalistic sentiments in a 
multireligious and multiethnic society such as Macedonia. The analysis of the case study in this 
chapter reflects the claims above and the findings from the literature review that follows, and 
reveals that different groups endorse religious norms, rules, institutions, and social practices 
dependent on their respective situations and the perceived threat to their existence, and their level 
of insecurity. By providing the empirical evidence with the case study, I enrich the literature on 
norm conformation, norm evolution, and norm conflict with empirical evidence.  
  I conclude this chapter with a discussion on the findings in the Macedonian case, and 
with a connection between the existing literature and the findings. Moreover, based on the 
analysis performed in this chapter, I suggest explanations of Macedonia’s current political 
development challenges, as well as implications for future developments in the political sphere. 
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Religion and Political Affairs in Literature 
 
 The global resurgence of religious movements around the world has caused an intense 
debate among scholars and politicians on the issue of whether these religious movements are 
indicators of political change, isolated occurrences that do not significantly impede the process 
of secularization, or signs of revolted societies whose norms are in conflict with “modern” sets of 
norms. To be able to understand and meaningfully participate in the debate on this issue, and 
recognize how religious norms, rules, institutions and practices affect sociopolitical 
developments, it is essential that we understand first why these religious movements form, and 
how they disperse. Understanding this process will allow us to determine whether religious 
movements in modern times are indeed isolated cases of unsatisfied groups or if they are 
phenomena that have the potential of penetrating the broader society and thus, influence larger 
political change. In the following section, I attempt to answer the questions above by observing 
religion as a building block of national identity conception and the influence of religion and its 
components on nationalism.   
Religion as Part of a National Identity Formation 
Prior to the analysis of the relationship between religion and the formation of national 
identity, there is a need for an established working definition of national identity. Finding an all-
encompassing definition of a concept as intricate and multi-dimensional as national identity is 
certainly not an easy task, however, I pull elements from a few definitions to formulate one. To 
derive the definition of national identity, one first needs to understand the concept of nation as 
different from an often-confounded term, state. Nation, as defined by Nye and Welch, is "a group 
of people who have some combination of common language, culture, religion, history, 
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mythology, identity, or sense of destiny."66 It is an "essentially irrational, psychological bond 
that binds fellow nationals together.”67 The nation is what Benedict Anderson calls “an imagined 
community,” as despite the fact that members of one community may never see, meet or hear of 
all members of that community, “yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion”.68 
These imagined communities, as a matter of fact, are what allowed for Homo sapiens to survive 
obstacles through history; anthropologists argue that the large-scale human cooperation that 
allowed for the survival of our species lays in the “common myths that exist only in people’s 
collective imagination”.69 These common myths have evolved through history as religion, 
culture, and mythology; via horizontal comradeship and the use of language, symbols, and 
traditions, these myths create a nation with a unique national identity. Therefore, national 
identity is the maintenance and continuous reproduction of the language, culture, religion, 
history, mythology, as well as, symbols, memories, and traditions that comprise peculiarities of 
nations and bind peoples within.70  
One cannot dispute the fact that religion, in some kind of shape or form, has been one of 
the most common myths circulated among members of the community. Whether it is a belief in 
multiple gods, in animals, in one God, or in a sage, religion has been said to be a common thread 
that holds communities together. In his book, The Sociology of Religion, Max Weber claims that 
there is no known society in human history "without its special god.”71 Much like a state flag, or 
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a hymn, or a language, religious symbols and beliefs make two people that do not know each 
other to believe in their common purpose within the community. However, I would argue that 
religious beliefs often have deeper sociological influence on people as they help in making sense 
of otherwise rationally unexplainable occurrences. While a flag and a language are binding 
factors for one community, they are also tangible and concrete. Religion, on the other side, is a 
social construct that was created to explain phenomena that tangible elements could not explain. 
Henceforth, with the Cognitive Revolution and the ability of people to transmit these beliefs to 
future generations through language, story-telling and behavior, religion maintained its 
abstractness and importance, eventually creating devoted believers who found tools to explain 
the unexplainable in times of uncertainty and insecurity.72 Moreover, these beliefs also created 
fearing individuals, which in turn, influenced the psychology and behavior of its followers.  
One would think that with the Scientific revolution, the increased importance of science 
and technology, and the continuous seminal explanations of things that were previously 
unexplained, the pervasiveness of religious beliefs will diminish. This was certainly the thinking 
of the nineteenth century social thinkers, who even created the secularization theory, the thesis of 
“slow and steady death of religion” due to modernization in the industrialized countries.73 
However, we are witnesses of resurgence of religious movements in recent years, the push back 
against the secular state by religious groups, and the persistent presence of religious explanations 
in an increasingly modernized and scientific world. Perhaps the reason for such a robust nature 
of religion lays in its ability to provide stability in uncertain and insecure times. I can observe 
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this if I consider events in the modern world that, even if not unexplainable, still serve as a 
destabilizing force that creates uncertainty and insecurity. 
One such destabilizing force is certainly globalization. The “increased [and rapid] 
movement of goods, services, technology, borders, ideas and people" that characterizes 
globalization creates anxiety from the new and unknown, prompting people to search for 
"constant time- and space-bound identities.”74 The consequences of the fast-paced and 
impersonal globalization are very well explained in the words of Giddens, who writes: "the 
individual feels bereft and alone in a world in which he or she lacks the psychological support 
and the sense of security provided by more traditional settings.”75 The individual’s search for 
such psychological support, stability, and fundamental sense of safety can indeed be found 
within the premises of the nation and national identity, a paramount example of time- and space-
bound identity. Similarly, religion then is also an effective rallying point than other elements 
because it provides the needed stability and unity.76 More specifically, religion provides the 
following traits in times of chaos and uncertainty: (1) it provides answers to the existence itself 
by utilizing the rules set by God, eliminating the responsibility of having to choose for oneself in 
a chaotic world, (2) it has an established and consistent structure that, together with the ability to 
provide existential answers, it provides stability, and lastly (3) it creates the space for 
rediscovery, reintervention, and reconceptualization of past events based on fixed religious 
interpretation; this ability creates linkages with past events, symbols, or objects and allows the 
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human to return to something known.77 In other words, both nation and religion strengthen the 
ontological security of individuals as it makes them feel secure and accepted.  
Therefore, religion with its power of influence in uncertain times has almost curative 
abilities on the individuals’ capability to deal with uncertainty and state of insecurity. As such, 
one could establish that religious norms and ideas are formed due to an unconscious self-interest 
in making oneself better adapted to one’s environment, but ultimately maintained because of 
one’s belief in the goodness of these norms and ideas. However, without further empirical 
evidence, this argument should be qualified by an observation that Kratochwil also makes: “as 
outside observers [we can assume] the true interests of a person,” but in reality, the person is the 
only “judge of his or her interests [in adopting a religious norm].”78  
 Taking the above points in consideration, it is apparent why religion has such a 
stronghold in the identity of one nation, and why I expect to observe peculiar attitudes and 
behaviors of believers in a nation with prevailing religious beliefs in my study. In addition to the 
deep historical religious roots in Macedonia, as well as Macedonia being a host of Christian 
Orthodoxy, a religious denomination that is deemed as traditional when compared to other 
Christian religions, Macedonia, as a society and economy in transition, has been facing with a 
number of existential crises. Therefore, I would argue that the above points can be effectively 
tested in a case study of Macedonia.  
Religion and Nationalism  
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Where this discussion becomes more intricate is in the institutionalization of religious 
identities. For the religion to maintain itself, it has to "have some superior claim to a particular 
notion of truth and mode of earthly existence.”79 Thus, religions take the “earthy” shape of 
religious objects, symbols, institutions, and religious norms are shared through a “sense of 
belonging” and “a fellow feeling” among the adherents of the same religion.80 This is where the 
concept of nationalism becomes relevant as the “fellow feeling” and the “sense of belonging” is 
what gives power to nationalistic movements. It would help the discussion in this section if I 
provide a working definition of nationalism as well.  
In this discussion, nationalism takes the definition of the "subdued expressions of 
identity-based on shared assumptions why a community constitutes a nation and why the state 
that rules it is legitimate," not the acute "xenophobic extremes of patriotism.”81 As Anderson 
defines nationalism in his book Imagined Communities, as simply “invent[ing] nations where 
they do not exist”.82 Similarly, the religious institutions, still believers in the one truth they 
profess, and their norms, rules, and practices do not take extreme measures in retaining and 
spreading the same. This is the approach that Juergensmeyer takes in his book on religious 
nationalism and the secular state, The New Cold War. Juergensmeyer discusses "new religious 
revolutionaries," who do not necessarily rally against the political structures that are emerging, 
such as the democratic procedures of a nation-state, but rather reject the Western notion that 
"nationalism can be defined solely as a matter of secular contact.”83 Instead, they believe in 
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nation-state with political ideology based on traditional principles of religion that are also 
encompassed in their national identity. In this regard, religious nationalism is understood as a 
system of values that are based on religious and traditionalistic principles idiosyncratic to those 
nation-states that practice it.  
The moment religious beliefs surpass the personal level of faith, it becomes more difficult 
to observe whether individuals join and mobilize into religious institutions because of their belief 
in the goodness of these institutions and community building or because of their intentions to use 
the atavistic emotions of the religious masses in pursuit of self-interested quests. Indeed, the 
atrocities committed in the name of religion in nationalistic pursuits make for a substantial 
evidence for those sentiments; 9/11 in the United States, the Bosnian genocide, and the number 
of ISIS terrorist attacks in the name of religion are well-documented. However, one needs to take 
into account the fact that these groups belong to a movement that takes an extreme meaning of 
religion, fundamentalism, and these individuals are likely part of a well-situated elites in the 
social setting. Arguing that religious extremists and fundamentalists choose to mobilize religious 
institutions because of their belief in the goodness of their faith is arguable and this topic has 
certainly received attention from the research community. Some evidence shows that the 
majority of attacks in the name of religion have a politically strategic purpose, however, these 
studies cannot claim that the motivations of individuals within these groups. 84 Therefore, the 
reason for the mobilization and spread of such religious fundamentalism can certainly be argued 
that it is due to material and self-interested pursuits, but it is also important to emphasize that this 
argument does not necessarily apply to the individual and his or her initial reason to join the 
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religious institution, but rather the intentions of elites that gain control of these religious 
institutions in need of leadership.  
Additionally, as previously argued, different groups have divergent motivation to enact 
religious norms. Another group of observation is religious leaders and their call of religion for 
nationalistic purposes; the discussion is whether the motivation lays in the leaders’ profound 
belief in the values they profess and practice or is it a matter of embodying an ideology that 
allows them to maximize their utility, i.e., better control of their people. As previously discussed, 
the security that people of a community seek in changing times is provided partly by religious 
values, therefore, embodying religious nationalism may allow for a nation-state to use these traits 
in better controlling its people. I do not attempt to find a conclusive answer to the posed question 
since doing so would be outside of the scope of this thesis. However, I argue that exploring this 
question would reveal the channel through which religious norms affect political behavior. I 
apply the dilemma of why religious norms are enacted in nationalistic movements and how they 
affect the same on a case study of Macedonia and base my answer on empirical evidence 
collected during field research. By doing so, I hope to provide an answer that, although may not 
be definitive or generalizable, is supported by empirical evidence and provides an analysis that 
can be applied to other case studies in further research.   
 Above, I have attempted to gather existing arguments in the literature on the role of 
religion in the creation of national identity and nationalism. To understand why religious 
movements form in first place and why people conform to religious norms, I analyzed its 
building unit, the religious norm, and the reason for the mobilization of religious norms. I 
discovered that religious norms are intensified and reemployed when the ontological security of 
the individual is threatened; this claim is especially pertinent in societies where there is a close 
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link between religion and national identity. The threat of globalization and modernization can, 
therefore, be linked to the reappearance of religious movements around the world. The answer to 
the second question, how do religious movements form, was derived from the same logic, but 
this time, the power of the “fellow feeling” and the “sense of belonging” is what accounted for 
the transformation of a religious norm of the private realm into collective religious practices and 
movements. Finally, I observed how religious norms and their institutionalized forms affect 
nationalism. In this analysis, I found two opposing views. One views religion’s role in 
nationalism as destructive and one, understanding the notion that religion is not inherently 
violent, views religion as a system of values that is embodied in some national identities more 
than others. In those societies, as religious values are part of their identity cohesion, members are 
more likely to invoke religion in their nationalistic pursuit. Once again, I observe the threat to 
ontological security in play on the group level as well. 
 In the pursuit of answering the above points, I also sought to discover whether people 
employ and adhere to religious norms due to their self-interest and utility maximization, or due 
to their belief in the appropriateness of the norms. I argued that although the individual may 
initially conform to religious norms in self-interest, i.e., to preserve oneself in a state of 
insecurity, he or she continues to adhere to them because of his or her belief in the norms' 
appropriateness. However, the discussion becomes more complex once we analyze norm 
conformation on the group level, as well as when we consider people in different societal roles; 
civilians, religious leaders, and government leaders have their own group-specific motivations. 
Nonetheless, the analysis revealed that the threat to each of these groups’ ontological security is 
often the motivation and cause behind their norm conformation. I attempt to explore the question 
further in a case study presented later in the thesis. 
49 
 
Christian Orthodox Norms and Rules on Political Secular Matters 
In the introduction of this chapter, I briefly referenced a message from metropolitan 
Vlahos, who stated that the Church’s does not support using Christian Orthodoxy for the pursuit 
of secular objectives, a principle the Church calls phyletism, and imputed any such behavior as 
heresy and contrary to the Christian Orthodox doctrines.85 However, it is more common than not 
that Christian Orthodox adherents, as well as Christian Orthodox leaders, use religion in the 
pursuit of nationalistic objectives rather than using it as “realization and manifestation of the 
unity and catholicity of the Church”.86 In addition to the Church’s doctrines of unity and 
catholicity, both indicating principles that surpass ethnic and national borders, Christian 
Orthodoxy also practices the supranational religious creed, a principle that once again is 
reflective of a religion that should not be concerned with secular affairs, especially in the 
political domain.  
Scholars have discovered in many cases that the Christian Orthodox Church has diverted 
from the above doctrines, and has instead turned to religion that is highly intertwined with 
national identities and nationalism.87 This finding is precisely what constructivists have 
discovered to be internal contradictions within complex rule systems, where the interpretation 
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and application of these rules are subjective to different groups and individuals.88 The following 
case study on Macedonia adds to this literature by providing evidence that the Macedonian 
Christian Orthodox Church is another institution where there are factions within the institutions 
that practice the opposite of what the Christian Orthodox doctrines claim. The analysis in the 
case study discovers and provides evidence that, as suggested by the literature, it is the threat to 
the ontological security of the Macedonian Christian Orthodox Church, the Macedonians, and 
the political parties that prompts religious leaders, political leaders, and citizens to create a 
symbiotic relationship in which they use religious sentiment to protect the security of their 
respective groups and that of the country. As previously argued, this propensity rises under times 
of uncertainty and stress, where groups vie to mobilize religious norms and rules to provide 
comfort and response to the anxiety that people feel— an action that would, if successful, 
increase the groups’ own security. Next, I present the evidence in the case of Macedonia.  
Christian Orthodoxy, National Identity, and Nationalism in the Case of Macedonia 
 
The controversial debate of the role of nationalism during the aftermath of the 
Yugoslavian dissolution in 1990s has been raised many times in the literature.89 However, there 
is also a deep connection between religion and the creation of nationalist tendencies in the ex-
Yugoslavian countries; while this connection is more evident in some countries and events, such 
as the role of Christoslavism in the Bosnian genocide and the fight for Kosovo, a number of 
other ex-Yugoslavian countries have a substantial presence of religious sentiments that played a 
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role in the years of their nation-building and nationalistic movement through the years.90 
Macedonia is one of them.  
It is important to note that in the following analysis on this topic and elsewhere in the 
thesis, I continue to use the definition of nationalism that I provided at the beginning of this 
chapter, and that is “not the xenophobic extremes of patriotism, but the subdued expressions of 
identity based on shared assumptions why a community constitutes a nation and why the state 
that rules is legitimate”.91 This definition will ensure that any conclusion that I establish in the 
analysis does not suggest that certain religions, such as Christian Orthodoxy, are violent or that 
xenophobic extremes are inherent in Christian Orthodoxy, but rather my conclusions may 
suggest that Orthodox norms and principles may evoke intense collective and patriotic feelings 
that in turn may be a factor in the rise of nationalism.  
The influence of religion in the building of the nation after Macedonia’s independence in 
1991 is evident in many instances. In the beginning of its nation-building, Macedonia took a 
definitive democratic direction on the question of religion. The relation between the government 
and the religious groups in the country, as established in the Constitution, was based on two 
principles: (1) separation of religion and the state, and (2) guarantee for freedom of religious 
expression.92 However, as reality showed in the following years, the execution of these principles 
was rather challenging; the religious influence in state affairs was significant and numerous 
religious communities did not all get equal treatment from the secular state. The reason for such 
challenges was the difficulty in finding a balance among three important factors in the “new” 
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Macedonian society: (1) the country’s efforts to adopt international western standards, (2) the 
traditional Orthodox values present in the majority of Macedonians, and (3) the realities from 
existing religious diversity.93 Although each of these factors carries its weight in the process, I 
would argue that the presence of traditional Orthodox values made the efforts to isolate religion 
from the state especially difficult.  
I discern that, in addition to the immense historical presence of Orthodoxy, the reason 
why this factor is especially relevant in the discussion of nation-building is due to the need to 
preserve these traditional values after centuries of efforts for an independent national identity. In 
other words, these values are like a thread that connects the many years of struggle to achieve 
nationhood; detaching from them would mean dishonoring the numerous ancestors who fought 
to liberate Macedonia from oppressors that harmed Macedonian people and did not share the 
same values. The changes that were happening after the independence of Macedonia, to some, 
was an attack to the ontological security of Macedonia; the Christian Orthodox identity had been 
an integral part of the society, and the pursuit of Western-based ideas and secularization was 
perceived as a threat to the stability of the Macedonian identity. An interview from 2017 with the 
former premier Nikola Gruevski, a controversial and conservative, yet exceptionally influential 
figure in Macedonian politics for 10 years, was quoted saying: “Remember one thing: As long as 
in one country heroes from the past and celebrated and cherished, that country will bear new 
heroes”.94 This message is also reflected in his party’s Doctrine from 2009, where it is stated: 
“Spirituality, religion, and faith are the eternal food of the Macedonian identity during all the 
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turmoil that the Macedonian people have endured...therefore, an exceptional place in the 
Macedonian state and society is given to the Macedonian Orthodox Church”.95 The Orthodox 
religion and its traditional values carry the same weight as the fight for an independent 
Macedonian language, and the continued struggle for recognition of a Macedonian state by its 
neighbors.  
I would also argue that despite the complexities that arise from multireligiosity and 
multiculturalism in a country, the same are intensified and exaggerated when there is one or 
multiple religious communities whose past struggles resonate strongly in the present. The fact 
that the battles for a Macedonian nation, unified under the same language, culture, religion, and a 
recognized country name still persist only intensifies the patriotic and nationalistic feeling of 
traditional ethnic Macedonians today. Evidence from interviews, recording and newspapers 
presented later in this chapter confirm this sentiment in the Macedonian society.  
This kind of sentiment becomes particularly present in times of instability. At the 
beginning of this chapter, my review of the literature revealed that individuals call upon their 
religious feelings when their stability and security is shaken; it is argued that the same can be 
concluded for the group, or a nation, in times of increased threat to collective security and 
identity.96 In the Macedonian case, this was evident during the 2001 insurgency. The causes of 
the 2001 insurgency are contested. While some argue that Macedonia’s treaty with Serbia to 
secure their common frontier against Albanian guerillas and the implementation of tougher 
border controls caused the uprisings in 2001, others argue that it was the existential threat from 
the Albanian guerillas that prompted the Macedonian government to take precautionary steps 
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that later developed in a murderous war.97 Whatever the cause for the war, it is undisputed what 
became the goal of the war. As the Christian Science Monitor reported in 2001: “To ethnic 
Albanians, 95 percent of whom are Muslim, the conflict is about gaining constitutional equality 
as a minority; to ethnic Macedonians, it is about clinging to a fragile national identity as 
Orthodox Christians”.98 The events during the war bolstered the nationalistic spirit, and 
nationalistic rhetoric used during and after the war had significant and increasing presence of 
religious markings. Diplomats like Tihomir Ilievski used this rhetoric in their public addresses: 
"Macedonians as a people have been threatened by Muslim domination for centuries, and it is the 
church that held our people together...The church is the basis for our history, traditions - and the 
future of our state".99 Interviewed citizens during this period also evoked religious feelings in 
their evaluation of the situation; one citizen is recorded saying “The Church means everything to 
Macedonians...There is no Macedonian people without the Orthodox Church”.100  
The Church and its leaders also had their say and influence during this period as well. For 
instance, the Church was a proponent of “fighting the Albanian guerillas” as that was perceived 
as a way to defend and protect “the dignity, status, position, and role of the Church in the 
Constitution”.101 The Church was also a vehement opponent of the Ohrid Framework Agreement 
after the 2001 insurgency.102 The Ohrid Framework Agreement was established to resolve the 
disputes mainly between the Macedonian majority and Albanian minority, however, the 
agreement brought changes to the Constitution that equalized the role of the Macedonian 
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Orthodox Church with other religious communities. To this, prominent bishops from the 
Macedonian Orthodox Church harshly criticized the political parties, and even accused then-
president Boris Trajkovski of being the ringleader of “Protestant conspiracy” as a Methodist.103  
During this period, an increase in attendance at religious services have been noted as 
well, suggesting that the messages that were spread from both sides were appealing to 
followers.104 Although we cannot establish a causal relationship, it is possible that these 
messages have encouraged destructive behavior that brought the annihilation and destruction of 
28 churches and 16 mosques.105 These religious properties, it turns out, were used as ideological 
weapons during the war, and are yet another evidence of how this war was seen as a threat to the 
ontological security of both groups; in their attempt to secure their own identities, both groups 
use extreme elements to destabilize the opposing identity group.  
The war ended and amends between the two parties were completed, but the use of 
religious sentiment for political objectives continues to this day. The cities are saturated with 
religious properties, and new ones are being built every year. It is not uncommon for one to see 
churches and mosques standing tall within a few square miles of each other. Religious leaders 
claim that the reason for the increase in religious objects is because there is a need; however, 
many pundits argue that the real reason lays in the desire to “seal ethnic divisions”.106 A 
prominent religious leader in the Macedonian Christian Orthodox Church, Fr Boban Mitevski, is 
quoted in a local newspaper as confirming that the construction of new churches is a response to 
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the “invading tendencies” of the Albanian Muslims, who “mark [the conquered territory] with 
religious objects even when in reality there are no people or believers living on that territory”.107  
The aforementioned evidence suggests that the combination of religiously heavy history, 
the clinging to traditional values, as well as the existential threats in modern history makes for a 
state that is highly attached to its religious identity. However, these traits also reveal clear 
preference towards one religion in a pluralistic society. The preference of the Macedonian 
Christian Orthodox Church (MOC) is evident in many instances. The government’s favoritism of 
MOC was even apparent in the Constitution of Macedonia before its amendment in 2001. For 
instance, Article 19 of the Constitution clearly favored the Macedonian Christian Orthodox 
church by stating “The Macedonian Orthodox Church, as well as other religious communities 
and religious groups are independent of the state and equal by law”.108  However, with the 
establishment of the Ohrid Framework Agreement after the 2001 insurgency, certain parts of the 
Constitution were revised in order to reflect the aforementioned two principles more accurately; 
article 19 of the Constitution now states: “The Macedonian Orthodox Church, as well as the 
Islamic Community in the Republic of Macedonia, the Catholic Church, the United Methodist 
Church, and other religious communities and religious groups...”109 Although the mentioned 
Constitution change and other article modifications that took place during the same period did 
not grant any additional legal rights to any of the groups, the changes contributed to an 
ideological satisfaction and equal treatment of all major religious communities in the country.  
This preference for the Christian Orthodox Church is also reflected in the leading parties’ 
platforms. Namely, despite the abovementioned Article 19 which states that “religious 
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communities and groups are separate from the state and equal before the law,” the political 
parties in Macedonia have included the Macedonian Orthodox Church as part of their respective 
doctrines or have underlined the importance of the history of the Church in their party platforms. 
The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian 
National Unity/Внатрешна Македонска Револуционерна Организација - Демократска 
Партија за Македонско Национално Единство (IMRO-DPMN/ВМРО-ДПМНЕ), known for 
its conservative values, shows clear preference for the Macedonian Orthodox Church in its 
doctrine by stating the following and similar principles: “...the Church is of an essential support 
to the country,” and “the Macedonian Orthodox Church takes an exceptional place in the 
Macedonian country and the Macedonian society.”110 The second largest political party in the 
country, the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia/Социјал-демократскиот Сојуз на 
Македонија (SDUM/СДСМ), shows less favoritism towards the Macedonian church, and in the 
past, it has advocated for a more secular state.111 However, in their party platforms they have 
also recognized the Church as a “key historical factor in the development and fortification of the 
Macedonian national identity”.112 The fact that even the political party that is often regarded as 
progressive, Western-oriented, and more secular has acknowledged and given the Macedonian 
church a prominent place in their platform is also telling of the importance of the Macedonian 
Orthodox Church in the Macedonian society.  
The relationship between the government and the Macedonian Orthodox Church caused 
public unrest and scrutiny from the wider public in 2009 when the state’s support of building a 
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church on the main square in the capital of the country caused protests around the city, increased 
interethnic tensions, and raised questions about the separation between church and state.113 The 
church was eventually built and it is located on the main square of the capital city, Skopje; this 
was accomplished mainly due to the support that MOC enjoyed from the ruling party at that 
time—another evidence of the close relationship between religion and the state. Religious 
leaders are also continuously present during political rallies or other political events. At an event 
in 2002, then-premier Ljupcho Georgievski and then-minister of interior affairs Ljube 
Bohskovski presented honor medals to the Macedonian special forces by having a religious 
ceremony where Archbishop Stefan blessed the special forces and honored them with Jesus-
faced medals.114 The event enraged the Albanian community as they believed such actions by the 
Macedonian authorities contributed to the “divisions of state organs on religious and national 
basis.”115 The relationship between the church and the state continues to be cautiously close. 
Religious leaders from the Macedonian Christian Orthodox Church believe that Macedonia can 
never be completely secular due to “centuries-old interweaving of culture, tradition and history 
with religion,” however, others argue that such a close relationship alienates its citizens from one 
another and further deepens the religious and ethnic cleavages in the country.116 Two of the 
priests I interviewed during my field study shared the first opinion, and added: “The Church and 
the state are indivisible. The same people constitute both the church and the state.”117 
The 2012 International Religious Freedom Report also reported favorable treatment of 
the MOC by the ruling government at the time. The report cites concerns by other religious 
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communities over the government’s “granting [the Church] public properties free of charge, 
providing funding for the construction of new Orthodox churches, and inviting representatives of 
the MOC - OA [Macedonian Orthodox Church- Ohrid Archdiocese] but not of other groups to 
attend groundbreaking ceremonies and other functions”.118 During my field interviews, a 
religious leader from the Catholic community expressed similar concerns. He said that the 
government’s preference of the MOC hurt the Catholic community when a prominent spot in the 
city where a Catholic Church once stood was given to MOC for construction of an Orthodox 
church.119  
The 2012 report on religious freedom reveals another aspect of the government’s relation 
to MOC. The report accuses the then-ruling party, which was mainly composed of ethnic 
Macedonians, of “politicizing religious issues for its own political gain by appealing to the 
religious beliefs and identity of the country’s majority and by using the MOC - OA [Macedonian 
Orthodox Church- Ohrid Archdiocese as a tool to that end”.120 This conclusion has been a 
concern for other monitoring bodies in the country as well. 
One study that was conducted in December 2017 examined the use of religious rhetoric 
in the political campaigns before the elections in 2016, another politically and socially turbulent 
period in Macedonia.121 The study reports that during the parties’ campaigning, it was a common 
occurrence for politicians to visit churches or mosques and include these visits in their campaign 
messages and advertisements. The study also lists some of the common religious undertones 
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used in the parties’ messages; messages such as “Allah has decided that all Albanians should live 
united,” used by the Albanian political parties and “God protects the Macedonian identity,” used 
by the Macedonian political parties were frequent in political public events and campaign 
materials.122 One interesting finding was that 35.9% of the respondents agreed that religious 
undertones were used more in the 2016 elections than before, and 30.3% said that these kind of 
messages were used as much as in previous elections; 59.5% of the respondents agreed that the 
political parties use religion to achieve their political goals.123 However, one interesting, and 
rather surprising finding, is that the inclusion of religious messages and symbols did not have an 
effect on the respondents’ party choice in the elections (73.5% of the respondents answered 
negatively to the question, while only approximately 14% responded that it does influence their 
choice).  
Even though one would expect that religious messages would influence respondents’ 
opinion since religion is such an important factor in the society and is a cultural marker for the 
Macedonians, I would argue that this contradiction can be attributed to the low trust of 
Macedonians in the political parties rather than a deflation of the previous conclusion of religion 
being a cultural marker; the level of religiosity in Macedonia, as presented in the previous 
chapter, suggests that people have high regards of religion, therefore, it is more likely that the 
low trust in political parties is a bigger factor in people’s indifference towards religious messages 
by these political parties. 124  The goal of the study was to assess the use and abuse of religious 
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sentiment for political gains of the leading parties. The findings delivered quantitative evidence 
for the interdependence of religion and politics from the citizens’ perspective, and the same 
revealed telling results.   
The report on religious freedom previously mentioned, as well as the findings of the 
study, can be analyzed through a debate on norms conformation that I introduced in the previous 
chapter— the debate between norm conformation due to the “logic of appropriateness” or utility 
maximization. In the first chapter, I posed a question: Does the formation of new religious 
thoughts and norms happen due to the elites’ self-interest in getting what they want or because 
they truly believe in the appropriateness of these norms? As suggested in the theoretical answer 
to this question, an either/or answer is not possible nor desired, but the above analysis suggests 
that there is definitely evidence of the political parties’ exploitation of religious undertones for 
utility maximization. For instance, Christian Orthodox doctrines, as portrayed in the message by 
Metropolitan of Navpaktos Jerotej Vlahos, profess peace and faith with no national boundaries,  
however, as I noted above, the message by the prominent Christian Orthodox religious leader 
who during the war years encouraged fighting to defend the dignity of the Church is a commonly 
found message in popular literature and communication.125 This example, as well as other ones 
mentioned above, suggest that defending the Church’s prominence in the country was perhaps 
more important to its leadership rather than preserving the principles their religion espouses.   
Discussion and Conclusion 
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The analysis above covered the process of nation-building and the role of religion during 
this process. It followed the genesis of the modern nation from Macedonia’s early establishment 
of the nation and its Constitution, to the Constitution’s revisions, and the societal and political 
impacts of these changes. It also covered the evolution of the role of religion in times of 
instability, the 2001 insurgency. The conclusion from the analysis and the presented empirical 
evidence from the literature, the media, various speeches, government publications and other 
primary resources should be apparent— political developments in Macedonia are historically 
founded on religion. One would expect that such strong interdependence between religion and 
the political developments, and especially the preference of one religious community, would 
instigate high prevalence of religious norms in the emergence of nationalism. The case of 
Macedonia validated this claim as the above analysis provided evidence of the use of religious 
sentiments in nationalistic remarks from politicians, religious leaders, and citizens alike.  
I discerned two potential reasons why religion has such a distinctive role in the political 
developments of Macedonia: (1) the historical presence of Christian Orthodoxy, and (2) the 
emotional attachment to the events and people that have historically fought for the perseverance 
of the traditional values, which are tightly connected to the Orthodox ones. These two factors 
have given religion a profound spot in the political developments in Macedonia— in the building 
and the preservation of the nation. The inevitable conclusion from the analysis of the 
Macedonian case is that despite the efforts Macedonia has made to separate religion from the 
functions of the state, it will still take time until Macedonia learns to balance the country’s 
efforts to adopt international western standards, the traditional Orthodox values present in the 
majority of Macedonians, and the realities from the existing religious diversity in the functions 
of the state. The deep roots of religious traditions in the country and the strong desire to build a 
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national identity that has been suppressed for centuries make it hard to detach religion from the 
secular affairs. 
Nevertheless, I would argue that the aforementioned two factors are not unique to the 
historical developments of Macedonia. Religion has been a present and influential element in the 
development of many nations, and every nation has heroes that evoke patriotic sentiments in its 
people. However, Christian Orthodoxy seems to have shown endurance and agility in the 
pressure of secularization and modernization. The international pattern of international state 
religions reveals that states with Orthodoxy as a state religion, together with Islam, are the only 
ones that have witnessed an increase in number from year 1900 to year 2000.126 My analysis in 
this chapter suggested that the possible explanation for the enduring and increasing adherence to 
Christian Orthodoxy is a response to the ongoing threat to Macedonia’s ontological security. The 
same trend cannot be observed for Catholicism and Protestantism, which as the other two main 
Christian religions, have experienced a decline in the number of states with these religions as 
state religions.127 While having a state religion does not measure the influence of religion in 
countries’ political development in its entirety, it is still an indicator of high prevalence of 
religion in these countries.  
One can also conclude that having a state religion is, in turn, an instrumental factor in 
nationalistic tendencies. As the aforementioned analysis showed ethnic Macedonian nationalism 
has been historically connected to the Macedonian Christian Orthodox Church.128 However, 
Macedonia is not the only state where the Christian Orthodox Church has been linked to the 
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presence of nationalism. For instance, Russia is a state where linkage between the Russian 
Orthodox Church and nationalism is particularly strong; many view the “notion of Russian 
brotherhood central to Russian national chauvinism”.129 Serbia is another state where Christian 
Orthodoxy is the single largest religious faith, and similarly, the Serbian Orthodox Church and 
its followers are often cited for revealing nationalistic propensities; evidence of this claim are 
convincingly present in the deconstruction of events during the Bosnian War.130 The Helleno-
Christian nationalism in Greece has also gained substantial attention, prompting scholars to 
analyze the politicization of religion and religious nationalism in Greece.131 Therefore, 
Macedonia is not the only country where the linkage between Christian Orthodoxy and 
nationalism has been observed, proving that the relationship between Christian Orthodoxy and 
nationalism is operational even outside of a country context.  
The above observations beg the question whether there is something inherent in Christian 
Orthodox norms, rules, institutions, and practices that stimulate nationalistic sentiments, or it is 
the historical circumstances of countries that yield similar occurrences in relation to the Christian 
Orthodox Church and the state. Exploring the suggested question in detail is outside of the scope 
of this thesis as this thesis focuses on Christian Orthodoxy and nationalism in the case of 
Macedonia and provides explanations that is applicable in the Macedonian case. However, I 
advance several general observations on the topic of Christian Orthodox norms, rules, 
institutions, and practices and nationalistic propensities.  
                                               
129 Zoe Katrina Knowx. Russian Society and the Orthodox Church Religion in Russia after Communism. 1st ed. 
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130 Michael Sells, The Bridge Betrayed (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press 1998) 
131 Nikos Chrysoloras, “Why Orthodoxy? Religion and Nationalism in Greek Political Culture,” Studies in Ethnicity 
and Nationalism 4, no.1, accessed March 30, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-9469.2004.tb00057.x 
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The first chapter introduced a perspective on norm change and norm conflict. I wrote that 
constructivists argue that there are every set of norms changes through internal and external 
tensions, and as such, norms are subject to conflict and eventually, to modification.132 
Consequently, I would argue that there are different degrees to which distinctive sets of norms 
are amenable to change. Moreover, norms that are perceived to be a significant part of a valued 
identity may be unlikely to change when certain event challenge and threaten that identity. 
Christian Orthodox norms and their traditional and conservative nature clash with the “modern” 
set of norms— a set of norms that is characterized by traits opposite of those of Orthodoxy, traits 
like individualism, diversity, and pluralism. A priest that I interviewed was quick to provide an 
answer to my question on the relationship between Orthodoxy and modernity: “The religion will 
endure the distractions of the modern times, but not by a way of compromise, but by a way of 
adaptation of the modern tools to disseminate the truth and bring people on the true path”.133 
Therefore, perhaps it is the rigidity of Christian Orthodoxy that does not allow for easy 
adaptation to the characteristics of the modern time, and it may be these conservative and 
traditional Orthodox values that provide comfort when people are faced with the unknowns of 
the modern time providing Orthodoxy the spotlight it possesses in the traditional society. I do not 
attempt to argue that Christian Orthodoxy is the only religion that embodies rigid and 
conservative set of values for one can argue that every set of religious values possesses these 
characteristics inherently. However, it seems that Christian Orthodox norms have persisted and 
endured inflexibility in certain aspects; it is an intriguing question for future research to delineate 
whether it is the historical factor of less stable countries that are also predominantly Christian 
                                               
132 Wayne Sandholzt, “Dynamics of International Norm Change: Wars against Wartime Plunder,” 6. 
133 Interview with a Christian Orthodox priest from a local Orthodox church, July 03, 2017. 
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Orthodox that vitalizes this trait, or there is perhaps a peculiarity in Christian Orthodox norms 
and teachings.  
One can contrast the evolution of Christian Orthodox rigidity with that of Catholicism. 
Catholicism was historically rather rigid in its practices and beliefs; the actions of the Inquisition 
is sufficient evidence for the extreme measure they took to prevent any deviation from their 
norms. However, even the Catholics eventually allowed for a change of attitude and behavior 
towards members that challenge Catholic norms. Curious about the possible reasons why the 
Christian Orthodox community seem to be unyielding in changing times, I asked one of my 
interviewees who responded by claiming that the difference lays in the practical nature of 
Catholicism and in contrast, the mysticism and sacrifice embedded in Christian Orthodox nature. 
As an example of this difference, he mentioned the way the Catholic practice of confession has 
changed through the years; while both the Orthodox and Catholic practice of confession require 
face-to-face confession with a priest, when the Catholic priests realized that the frequency of 
confessions decreases, they introduced the confessional box to encourage adherents to confess 
without the pressure of face-to-face conversation.134 The Christian Orthodox practice of 
confession has retained its traditional character and adherents confess stringently face-to-face 
with the priest. Although this statement is anecdotal, and it needs to be supported with further 
research into the matter, it still provides an idea of the reasons for the differences of norm 
rigidity in two historically rigid religions.  
One other issue that is apparent from the evidence in the analysis in this chapter is the 
different interpretations of religious norms by diverse groups. The fact that a number of religious 
leaders use rhetoric that is not supported by Christian Orthodox norms and rules as established 
                                               
134 Interview with a Catholic priest from a local Catholic church, June 30, 2017. 
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by the Church as institutions suggests that there is another factor that influences such attitudes 
and behavior of prominent religious leaders.  
 Recognizing the existence of nationalism in the Christian Orthodox communities, some 
prominent leaders in the Christian Orthodox Church have addressed the teachings of the Church 
regarding nationalism. For instance, Metropolitan of Navpaktos Jerotej Vlahos, in a discussion of 
nationalism as a phenomenon, writes: “Nationalism is a heresy of Orthodoxy, and that means 
that every nationalism is a gulf, spreading division on the account of harmony...Orthodoxy in 
itself is ‘uber-national,’ it does not divide people by their nations”.135 He uses quotes from the 
Bible and references historic Orthodox leaders to support his claims.136 However, in the analysis 
above, I discovered substantial evidence that reveals attitudes of religious leaders that are 
different than the words shared by the Metropolitan and those before him. Those words seem to 
create the rift that Christian Orthodoxy in its basic principles is trying to eradicate. Therefore, 
one conclusion I draw is that, once again, the threat and challenge to the Macedonian society’s 
ontological security is what drives the current religious community to use nationalist 
interpretation of the Orthodox faith rather than the cosmopolitan one as suggested by the 
Metropolitan and other principles written in the Orthodox doctrines and records.  
When asked about the prevailing nationalistic rhetoric among Orthodox leaders in 
Macedonia as well as in other predominantly Christian Orthodox countries, one of the 
interviewees during my field research claimed that such rhetoric has emerged as a result of the 
Church’s efforts to preserve itself: “Through history, many have attempted to dissolve the 
Christian Orthodox Church, and as a response, the instinct to survive emerges among the 
                                               




supporters of the Church. We realize that to survive, we ought to raise a nation to support us”.137 
This is an interesting perspective that suggests self-interest does play a role into the formation 
and conformation to norms by institutions as well.  However, more importantly, this self-interest 
is motivated by the threat to the ontological security of the Church and the faith itself.  
I recognize that the above observations would benefit from more evidence and further 
research into the question. I encourage additional exploration on the topic of Christian Orthodox 
norms, rules, institutions and practices and nationalism outside of a country context. In addition 
to providing some suggestive evidence on the topic of Christian Orthodoxy and nationalism, 
these observations and the previous analysis provide some insight into the norm conformation, 
norm evolution, and norm conflict. 
The constructivist literature argues that people form and conform to religious norms in 
times of instability and existential crises. In the case of Macedonia, I found evidence that 
supports this claim. The rhetoric during the 2001 insurgency provided evidence that indeed 
resilient religious rhetoric was much more present during these times of instability in Macedonia. 
Even though during this event the political and social turbulences in the society were at their 
height, one could argue that Macedonia has been facing with challenges to its existence for 
centuries and is yet to emerge from the existential insecurity it finds itself. In such a climate, as 
expected, one finds a high prevalence of religious sentiment. To the Macedonian people, 
Christian Orthodoxy has been the institutionalized force that brings them together in unity in the 
building of their nation. The desire to be seen as a recognized nation, as people with historical 
culture and traditions, and as defenders of their ancestors’ battles, motivates them to hang on to 
every thread that binds them; religion is one of them. To the Macedonian politicians, evidence 
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shows that religion is used as a tool that helps them achieve their political goals and ambitions. 
Arguing that the politicians’ enactment of religious norms, institutions and practices is solely due 
to self-interest is speculative, nonetheless, evidence suggest that indeed self-interest is a factor in 
this process. To the Christian Orthodox Church and its leadership, the need for security and 
existential survival seem to prevail in the everyday religious discourse; religious leaders use 
religious norms and institutions to fortify the nation, in the process abandoning the uber-national 
nature of Christian Orthodoxy.  
Finally, norms are best studied when we evaluate the effects they have on society. In this 
chapter, I reconciled the role of religion in building a national identity and in raising nationalism. 
From the historical, sociological, and political analysis above, I conclude that religion has a 
significant role in the building of the Macedonian nation and the resurgence of religious 
nationalism since the collapse of Yugoslavia. Evidence from the Constitution, from political 
parties’ platforms, interviews, as well as daily media, reveal high interdependence of religion and 
the Macedonian state. Even though there have been significant efforts to adapt to western 
standards and secularize the country, the historically embedded Orthodox values do not allow for 
complete abandonment of these traditional values and as such, they are highly prevalent in the 
nationhood of Macedonia.  
Other influential factor in Macedonian society is the diverse religious community. This 
diversity is seen as a threat to the Macedonian national cohesiveness. The 2001 insurgency, as 
well as remaining religious and ethnic tensions, enhance the rhetoric that diversity is disruptive 
to the building of the nation. As a result, religious sentiments also contribute to the rise of 
nationalism in the country. The construction of religious objects that are used as ideological 
weapons or as territory inscriptions, and the statements of prominent religious leaders, are just 
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two ways that portray the relationship between religion and nationalism. Even though it was 
outside of the scope of this thesis to discover the root of this connection, the previous chapter 
included some suggestive observations that would benefit from further research on the topic.  
Through the case analysis of Macedonia, this chapter first reviewed the literature on why 
religious norms, rules, institutions and practices are formed and accepted in the society and how 
they interact with phenomena such as the building of a nation and nationhood, and nationalism. 
The chapter then presented evidence from the case study of Macedonia that confirmed some 
findings of the literature, and also added idiosyncratic historical elements that aided in 
understanding the occurrences in the Macedonian politics. Finally, the chapter tied the findings 
from the literature and the case study to establish and complete the overall argument.  
Similarly, Chapter 3 observes the Christian Orthodox norms, rules, institutions, and 















Chapter III: Religion and Economic Affairs in Macedonia 
 
“‘Somali men are not lazy,’ he protested. ‘We are very proud people. We are descendants of 
Abraham, and if you descend from Abraham, you don’t do manual labor. We don’t cook. We 
don’t make tea. We don’t clean or sweep. We don’t do construction or garbage collection. Our 
only business is animal herding’” 
- Nina Munk, The Idealist 
Introduction 
The discussion of religion and economic development has gained significant attention in 
the literature ever since Max Weber published his work on the protestant ethic and the spirit of 
capitalism. Weber, together with Durkheim, observed closely the effects of religion from a 
sociological perspective. I draw from these scholars’ work and emphasize their argument that the 
power of religion is in its ability to psychologically influence how adherents behave in secular 
affairs. The relationship with individuals’ economic behavior is especially intriguing and a 
subject of research by many scholars, as I show later in this chapter.  
The first part of this chapter introduces the Weberian model and the ways in which 
Weber’s analysis has influenced my approach in this thesis. Namely, I draw from Weber’s 
inquiry into how ideas become effective forces and construct my question of how religious 
norms, rules, institutions, and social practices are formed and followed in the society. 
Additionally, Weber’s investigation of religious influences on the formation and expansion of 
the material culture embedded in the capitalistic system, prompted what is perhaps the 
overarching research question in this chapter— the Christian Orthodox norms and ethics, and 
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their influence on human attitudes towards the material world and economic activity. In a way, 
this thesis and the research question I explore serves as a comparative analysis to Weber’s model 
by analyzing Christian Orthodoxy and economic attitudes as compared to Weber’s Protestant 
ethic and economic attitudes.  
In addition to introducing Weber’s analysis, I include his findings, and the implications 
of his findings. One of his most notable arguments is that the economic ethics that are professed 
by a particular religion are not necessarily ethics that are found in the theological textbooks but 
are a product of the psychological sanctions that are placed by a religious context as a whole; 
these psychological sanctions, in turn, influence people’s attitudes. I make a similar argument in 
this chapter as well. I argue that the historical presence of Christian Orthodoxy and the 
interconnectedness of religion and secular affairs in Macedonia have created and fostered 
religious norms that influence people’s attitudes, behavior and practices in the economic domain. 
In other words, even though one may not find formal Christian Orthodox rules of conduct, there 
are existing norms created through social interactions in a religious context that have remained in 
circulation in the society. Moreover, one may not recognize that his or her attitude is influenced 
by Christian Orthodoxy, but I would argue that these residual norms are being subconsciously 
utilized in the formation of attitudes and practices of people who have been exposed to these 
social interactions.  
Taking in consideration that the above argument is rather complicated and elusive in 
nature, I argue that the most effective way to measure whether my argument holds ground is by 
capturing the effects that Christian Orthodox norms have in the society. I do this by examining 
Christian Orthodox adherents’ attitudes, behavior, and practices in the economic sphere in order 
to be able to identify the interaction between the Christian Orthodox norms and their effects on 
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the society. I examined whether what we know about the Christian Orthodox norms has 
implications for Christian Orthodox adherents’ attitudes and behavior by distributing a survey 
that was designed to capture their attitudes, beliefs, and their practices in the economic sphere. 
The design of the survey was constructed by drawing upon studies that have already attempted to 
observe the same phenomenon, as well as from accounts from religious leaders regarding 
Christian Orthodox norms and ethics in the economic sphere that I collected during field 
interviews in Macedonia.  
After providing an introduction to the Weberian model, I provide an extensive literature 
review of studies that have attempted to quantify Weber’s findings. In addition to discerning the 
techniques and findings of these studies, I credit several studies that I used to design the study for 
this thesis. Despite the valuable findings that have resulted from studies on the relationship 
between religion and economic performance, economic growth, and economic attitudes, studies 
from both the macro and micro economic approaches have drawbacks and limitations. I outline 
these limitations and I argue that my study seeks to address some of these limitations. My 
study’s main contribution in this regard is providing empirical evidence of a religious 
denomination, Christian Orthodoxy which is often overlooked in the data literature. Moreover, 
my study does what the studies I cite in the literature review have called for— it connects 
specific religious norms to adherents’ behavior.  
Following the literature review, I provide a brief overview of the Christian Orthodox 
principles and rules as found in the literature. The literature is narrow in this respect, as once 
again, not many scholars have observed Christian Orthodoxy in this manner specifically; 
however, I draw from the Russian, Serbian, and Greek literature and find several studies that 
contribute to the description of generally accepted Christian Orthodox norms. Following the 
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synopsis of the broader Christian Orthodox principles is the overview of the Christian Orthodox 
norms, rules, and practices as observed in the Macedonian society. In this part, I provide a 
detailed account of the field interviews I conducted with religious leaders in Macedonia. I 
conducted ten interviews in total. 138 Six of the ten interviewees were prominent priests from the 
main Macedonian Orthodox Church and other local churches in Skopje, Macedonia. One of the 
interviewees was a Catholic priest from a local Catholic Church in Skopje, Macedonia. Another 
one of the interviewees was a Christian Orthodox monk from a rural town in Eastern Macedonia, 
and two interviewees are priests from the rural areas of Western Macedonia. I intentionally 
included a diverse group of religious leaders, some that are closer and some more distant to the 
mainstream religious institutions, as to ensure that the answers were controlled for the politics 
and the conventional discourse of the Church.  
The answers I gathered from the interviews helped me in learning the norms and rules of 
the Macedonian Christian Orthodox Church in regard to economic activity. I then used what I 
learned from the interviews in constructing survey questions that attempted to capture the extent 
to which these norms professed by Christian Orthodox leaders are being respected and practiced 
by the Macedonian people who have been exposed to the doctrine. In continuation of this 
chapter, I present and explain in detail the questions that I used in the survey and what norm, 
behavior, or practice each of the questions were constructed to capture. In the same section, I 
offer the conceptual framework that links religious norms and rules with economic activity. The 
subsequent three sections provide a detailed account of the data, the empirical strategy used in 
the survey analysis, and the findings of the analysis. The last section binds the initial argument 
with the data findings and provides a conclusion.  
                                               
138 All interviews were confidential, and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. I provide 
the semi-structured questions I used for the interview in Appendix I at the end of this chapter. 
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Religion and Economic Affairs in the Literature 
 
 When investigating the topic of religion and economic affairs one must consider the 
theses posed by Max Weber in his research on the relationship between religious ideas and the 
economic characteristics of human conduct. Weber’s work in the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit 
of Capitalism prompted intellectuals from various fields, economic historians to sociologists and 
anthropologists, to account for the Protestant ethic in their respective fields of research on 
development.139 Weber’s idea of analyzing the relationship between one’s conceptualization of 
the divine and his or her action in the social domain is profound, and his arguments on the same 
are well-rounded and supported. I find Weber’s work most valuable and relevant to my work in 
the following ways:  
(1) With his study, Weber contributes to the “understanding of the manner in which ideas 
become effective forces in history.”140 In my study, Weber’s ideas are more specifically 
observed as norms, rules, institutions and social practices. Analogously, through my analysis 
and later case study, I also observe how norms, rules, institutions and social practices are 
formed and followed in the society.  
(2) Weber’s most profound work is his investigation into religious forces created during the 
Reformation and their contribution to the "qualitative formation and the quantitative 
expansion of [the capitalistic] spirit over the world.”141 More specifically, he is interested in 
how forms of religious beliefs and religious movements correlate with practical morals and 
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the material culture. Even though Weber is aware of the intricacies involved in establishing a 
causal relationship between the Protestant Ethic and the materialistic culture, he still finds 
qualitative evidence of correlation between the Protestant ethic and capitalism.142 I follow the 
same argument but use the religious beliefs and religious norms from the Christian Orthodox 
doctrines to observe the same relationship as did Weber.  
(3) Finally, as mentioned above, one of Weber’s argument that I facilitate in my study is the 
argument that people’s behavior, in the economic sphere in this case, is a product of a 
psychological sanctions that are constructed and professed by the religious structures. One of 
the most influential religious elements on the person’s psychology is the process of salvation 
and the way in which a person achieves redemption in the afterlife. While most religions 
prior to the Reformation have professed monastic asceticism, the Protestant doctrine, in 
contrast gave birth to the notion of “the calling,” defined as “a life-task, a definite field in 
which to work”.143 The birth of “the calling” gave a new meaning to what “living acceptably 
to God” and achieving redemption in the afterlife entailed: it was not “to surpass worldly 
mortality in monastic asceticism,” but instead it was “solely through the fulfillment of the 
obligations imposed upon the individual by the position in his world”.144 In my thesis, I 
contrast the concept of “the calling” from the Protestant school with the “monastic 
asceticism” of Christian Orthodoxy, which in the modern church is labeled with the words 
“sacrifice,” “obedience,” and “humility,” and observe how these teachings could have 
possibly affected Christian Orthodox adherents’ psychology inversely that would in turn, 
influence their behavior in the economic sphere differently.   
                                               
142 Weber, The Protestant Ethic, 38; Weber scrupulously qualifies his analysis by stating that it is not his intent to 
claim that capitalism has evolved because of certain religious beliefs formed during the Reformation 
143 Weber, 37 
144 Weber, 38 
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In addition to utilizing the Weberian model to observe the above three points, in this chapter, 
I also continue the discussion of norm conformation, norm evolution, and norm conflict from the 
previous chapters.  
The course of norm conformation in the economic sphere follows the same pattern as the 
norm conformation I discussed in the political sphere in the previous chapter; norm conformation 
is a process that is different depending on the group of members that is adopting certain sets of 
norms. In the economic sphere, perhaps one of the most suitable case studies have been the 
enactment of various developmentalism policies in Latin America.145 Constructivists have 
followed the success of developmentalism ideas and institutions development, conformation, and 
dispersion in Latin America.146 In particular, constructivists have observed ideas that are related 
to economic development of the periphery, and institutions that have assisted with the dispersion 
of these ideas.147 Two findings that are relevant and related to my thesis have emerged from 
these studies: Similarly to my findings in the political sphere, in this literature, scholars find that 
the policy makers and the political elite have different ideas and motivations to enact economic 
policies when compared to the broader social census.148 Secondly, scholars argue that the newly 
emerged ideas “do not enter an ideological vacuum,” arguing that in order for the economic 
development ideas to become accepted and effective, they need to fit within the “existing 
[historically formed] ideologies of important economic and social groups”.149 This second point 
reiterates my overall argument of considering the historical, cultural, and social context of one 
society in explaining its adaptation to new norms, rules, institutions, and practices. Specifically, I 
                                               
145 Developmentalism is an economic theory that emerged after the Cold War, and aimed to develop underdeveloped 
countries by introducing new policies that were based on the capitalist model.  
146 Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina, (Los Angeles, CA: Cornell 
University, 2012). 
147 Ibid, 1.  
148 Ibid, 2. 
149 Ibid, 2.  
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argue that in the adaptation to new policies, the religious heritage of a society needs to be 
considered as this heritage harmoniously influences the way people perceive new ideas or 
policies. The second point also highlights the process of norm conflict and outlines one reason of 
why norm conflicts emerge.  
Finally, one last argument from the constructivist literature on developmentalism that is 
worth mentioning and also related to the arguments in this thesis is the motivations behind the 
conformation to norms. The initial question I posed in this thesis was whether people conform to 
norms due to self-interest or due to their belief in the goodness of norms, also called the “logic of 
appropriateness”. In the analysis of norms in the political sphere, I found that the motivations are 
dependent on the group of members, but it is also nuanced and seldom absolute of one 
motivation over the other. Scholars that have pondered the same question agree that ideas (or as I 
more specifically define them in this thesis as norms and rules) can be utilized by actors to 
“mystify and legitimize taken in their own self-interest” and can be enacted due to their nature 
and meaning and therefore, have autonomous effects on outcomes in the society.150 Therefore, 
scholars find that both political (self-interest) and ideological (normative) factors influence the 
conformation to ideas, or norms. The analysis of my study follows the same logic and finds 
evidence for this, and the previous points made above.  
In the next section, I provide a literature review of the studies that have attempted to 
quantify Weber’s previously mentioned thesis. 151 There have also been studies that have applied 
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Weber’s model to different religions.152 Weber’s occasional contrast with the Catholic religion in 
his book has sparked the interest to investigate whether other forms of religious beliefs are 
potentially not compatible with capitalistic values. In continuation, I provide a brief overview of 
these studies. Then, I extend onto Weber’s model and add to the existing literature by 
investigating Christian Orthodox norms in relation to the work ethic professed by the Christian 
Orthodox institution. I do this to qualitatively present what I quantitatively test later in the thesis 
by analyzing data from a field research where I collected survey responses from Christian 
Orthodox adherents.  
Literature Review 
 The goal of the literature review in this section is to assess studies that examine the 
relationship in question in this thesis. In addition to identifying the gap in these studies, I also 
emphasize and credit studies that I draw from to construct my study design.  
 In the literature, the relationship between religion and the economy has been investigated 
in a number of ways. For instance, one approach has been observing religion as a dependent 
variable and the effect of economic development as an independent variable with aims to 
establish how economic development affects religious beliefs and attitudes.153 Conversely, 
studies have investigated the economic consequences of religious beliefs and attitudes; this is the 
category where Weber’s analysis belongs and where this thesis seeks to contribute.154 
                                               
152 Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response, (New York,NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2002);  Platteau, Jean-Philippe. "Religion, politics, and development: Lessons from the lands of 
Islam." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 68 (2008): 329-251., William Form and Fred C. Pampel. 
"Social Stratification and the Development of Urban Labor Markets in India," Social Forces 57.1 (1978): 119-135. 
153 Robert J. Barro and Rachel M. McCleary, “Religion and Economy,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20, no. 2 
(Spring 2006): 49-72. 
154 Robin Grier, “The Effect of Religion on Economic Development: A Cross-National Study of 63 Former 
Colonies,” Kyklos 50, no.1 (February 1997): 47-62, accessed May 2017, doi: 10.1111/1467-6435.00003; Robert J. 
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Additionally, there is the field of religious economics that consists of studies that observe 
economic policies from a religious perspective.155 Every perspective brings valuable contribution 
to the understanding of the relationship between religion and the economy, but this thesis focuses 
on the second one, the investigation of economic consequences of religious norms, rules, 
institutions and social practices. 
 The majority of the studies examining the economic consequences of religion do so by 
using a macroeconomic approach in cross-national studies. For instance, Grier conducts a cross-
national study of 63 former colonies and seeks to investigate whether Spanish ex-colonies with 
Catholicism as their historically largest religion perform markedly worse than their British 
counterparts with Protestantism as a predominant religion.156 Although Grier finds a strong 
positive statistical relationship between Protestantism and economic growth, she also calls for 
more research on the link between specific religious values and economic development to find 
the "true basis for the correlation between Protestantism and growth.”157 In Barro and McCleary, 
the authors use international data on religiosity and investigate the impacts of church attendance 
and religious beliefs on economic growth.158 One finding from the study is that the causal effect 
flows from religion to economic growth based on the measurements of instrumental variables, 
and another that economic growth depends on the extent of believing relative to belonging, 
meaning that respondents’ answers to questions regarding believing in religious elements are 
                                                                                                                                                       
Barro and Rachel M. McCleary, “Religion and Economic Growth across Countries,” American Sociological Review 
68, no. 5 (October 2003): 760-781, accessed May 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1519761; Marcus Noland, 
“Religion and Economic Performance,” World Development 33, no.8 (August 2005): 1215-1232, accessed May 
2017, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.03.006 
155 Laurence R. Iannaccone, “Introduction to the Economics of Religion,” Journal of Economic Literature 36, no. 3 
(September 1998): 1465-1495. 
156 Robin Grier, “The Effect of Religion on Economic Development: A Cross-National Study of 63 Former 
Colonies,” 55. 
157 Ibid, 57. 
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more indicative of country’s economic growth than respondents’ answer to religious 
affiliation.159 However, they also call for further research into channels such as religious beliefs 
and their influence on work ethic, thrift and other economically conducive factors at a country-
wide level with subnational data. Barro and McCleary conduct another study in 2006. They use 
the same international data as before, and they expand the same with measures of religiosity such 
as the extent of religious beliefs and the rate of attendance at religious services.160 They also 
compare these religiosity measures across the major religions. Their most noteworthy finding 
from this study is the importance of including religiosity measures in understanding the link 
between religion and economic growth.161  Guiso et al.  examine individual behavior based on 
their religion in a cross-country study and find significant results in relationships that vindicate 
Weber to some extent.162  
However, as Noland points out, although the cross-national data are suggestive, they are 
"subject to distortion arising from the inability to adequately control for country-specific 
economic, political, and institutional influences.”163 Due to the limitations posed by 
macroeconomic studies on the subject, academics have turned their focus to the use of 
subnational data and microeconomic approach in their studies. Noland conducts a study using 
subnational data from three countries to examine the relationship between Islam as a religious 
affiliation and economic development, and contrary to previous studies, finds that Islam is not a 
drag on economic growth.164 Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott study the economic effects of 
religious practices by observing Ramadan fasting and find that religious practices affect 
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economic performance negatively.165 Some studies have investigated religion in its historical 
context and have found that the way religion evolved in certain societies contributed to the 
difference in development in societies.166 The studies with a microeconomic analysis are not 
spared from limitations either. One often-cited constraint is that these studies are most commonly 
based on a single country, making it impractical for generalization.  However, these studies add 
value to the literature as they identify an essential relationship between a given religion and 
certain economic performance or development difference.   
 From the brief overview of the literature on the topic, one can conclude that the debate on 
the effects of religion on economic performance is not yet complete. The existing studies 
encompass several problems due to the complex nature of religion as a system of beliefs. Future 
research is yet to resolve the issues surrounding the cross-country studies and their inability to 
capture a clear link between religion and economic outcomes. As suggested by Grier, and Barro 
and McCleary, a more thorough analysis of religious beliefs as practiced by individual religions 
is essential to establish a clear relationship. Moreover, future studies have the responsibility of 
narrowing the concept of economic performance to a variable that is narrower than economic 
growth, as economic growth in itself is an outcome that can be influenced by a wide range of 
factors.  
I propose that these challenges are resolved by first, thorough analysis of the norms, 
rules, institutions, and practices of individual religions in relation to economic behavior, 
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similarly to what Weber has done with the analysis of the Protestant work ethic. Henceforth, a 
collection of data on adherents’ economic attitudes is needed to establish to what extent the 
analyzed religious peculiarities are practiced by adherents of the same religion and reflected in 
the economic sphere. Ideally, the data collection would be done across countries to eliminate the 
possible interfering factor of country-specific differences. However, this issue can be eliminated 
by controlling for exogenous events. I would also argue that comprehensive analysis of 
individual religions is essential as it permits examination of traits that are peculiar to different 
religions; as Grier suggested, performing such analysis can assist in establishing a clear link 
between the two phenomena. I also agree with Guiso et al. that considering economic attitudes 
instead of economic growth allows for a reduction of the effect of potential spurious factors; 
therefore, indicators of economic attitudes should be the dependent variable in the analysis.167 
Using the logic of these arguments, I construct the study design used in field research for 
contribution to this thesis.  
The previous section provided a brief literature review on the economic consequences of 
religious beliefs, aiming to outline the already established relationships and detect the gap in the 
topic. The review concluded by establishing that there is no definitive resolution to the current 
debate on religious beliefs and economic attitudes. In the same section, I introduced the study 
design that I utilize in the thesis, anticipating that its implementation will resolve some of the 
issues for the gap in the literature. In continuation, I also discuss and present the findings of the 
first step of the study, defining Christian Orthodox norms and work ethic, thriftiness, and general 
Christian Orthodox guidelines in leading one’s economic life. I find that Christian Orthodox 
doctrine in this regard is similar to other traditionalistic religions. However, I argue that the 
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emphasis of the Christian Orthodox Church on ‘sacrifice' instead of Protestant’s ‘calling' in 
world affairs is the factor that could be the explanatory factor in the different normative behavior 
in the economic domain. Also, my initial argument that these practices may not still be as vital in 
the society but are effective due to their norm fortification in the society is yet to be empirically 
tested, but doing so will add to the existing debate in the constructivist literature on whether 
norm-conformation occurs due to the actor’s choice or the influence of social structures. I 
provide this claim after conducting an empirical test in the continuation of this chapter.  
Christian Orthodoxy, Moral Principles, and Rules in Economic Secular Matters  
 
 Christian Orthodoxy is one of the three main Christian denominations, and it is estimated 
to have approximately 200 million followers worldwide.168 Christian Orthodoxy consists of a 
large number of Churches, some autocephalous and some autonomous.169 Even though all of the 
churches are united in their beliefs, the theology, and the way of worship, they are different in 
the cultural traditions they represent. For instance, it is said that “[the churches] draw on 
elements of Greek, Middle Eastern, Russian and Slav culture”.170 This difference has given the 
separate Orthodox churches their geographical distinction, and as such, today there is the Greek 
Orthodox Church, the Russian Orthodox Church, the Georgian Orthodox Church etc.  
One could argue that the distinction is not only in the different geographic regions they 
represent, but as I mention above, they are also a reflection of the different cultural traditions, 
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historical developments, and societal values in their respective regions. Nevertheless, for the 
purpose of the analysis in this thesis, I account for all Christian Orthodox institutions as sharing 
the same norms in regard to economic activity as it has been recognized that the only difference 
between the Orthodox churches in one region, Eastern Christian Orthodoxy in this case, is the 
difference in their geography and not in their theology, worship, or beliefs.171 Whether there is a 
difference in forming and practicing norms within the Christian Orthodox population due to the 
influence of country-specific developments in their respective geographies is outside of the scope 
of this thesis, but nonetheless, an intriguing topic to explore in the future. In this thesis, I present 
findings on the topic as studied and observed in Macedonian Christian Orthodoxy.  
 In the literature, there is a limited focus on the Christian Orthodox religious norms 
specifically and its economic ethics. Some scholars have analyzed Christian Orthodox principles 
and economic ethics, but mainly in the context of Russia and Greece. Nevertheless, I already 
established that for the purpose of this investigation the geographical differences will not 
significantly skew the analysis and the findings from these studies will contribute to the general 
account of Christian Orthodox norms. Next, I summarize the Christian Orthodox moral 
principles and rules in economic activity as found in studies of Russian, Serbian, and Greek 
Christian Orthodoxy.  
 Among the studies on Russian Christian Orthodoxy and its economic ethics, there are 
scholars that have studied Russian Orthodoxy before the Soviet period, and some that have 
studied the economic ethics of contemporary Russian Orthodox Christianity.172 The studies that 
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focus on Russian Orthodoxy before the Soviet period provide historical overviews of the Russian 
Orthodox Church and its integration in the patrimonial state that contributed to the difference in 
church-state relationship from the Western world, but also to the importance of religious 
principles in the Russian society.173 These studies traced the development of the Russian Church, 
its practices, and theological discourse and characterized Russian Orthodoxy as magical-
traditional, ritual, and mystical.174  
The magical and mystical characteristics of Orthodoxy have had several effects on the 
society. Mysticism is explained by Weber as opposite of “the calling” that emerged from the 
Reformation; while “the calling” is the idea of salvation through work and proving one’s 
religious merit through activity and material success, mysticism, in contrast, is understood as 
earing an eternal award by “passive contemplation and quite repose to God”.175 The practice of 
“obedience and humility” is often mentioned in Christian Orthodox doctrines, and this 
characteristic of mysticism can be the reason why such emphasis is given to obedience and 
humility. Moreover, the very definition of mysticism describes an experience that is 
characterized by unknowns, or something that is beyond one’s intellect. Unsurprisingly, 
Christian Orthodoxy perceives God as transcendental and unknowable, believing that “it is 
possible to say what God is not, but it is impossible to say what He is”.176 Christian Orthodoxy 
also strongly refutes predestination, and instead believes that one’s salvation is dependent on 
whether or not one’s conduct of life resembles the principles by which Jesus lived, exhibited in 
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the Christian Orthodox doctrines. Therefore, it is possible that the mysticism, the unknown, and 
the directives of the Christian Orthodox Church that one’s salvation is achieved by following the 
Christian Orthodox doctrines have affected the adherents’ psychology in a way that makes them 
obedient and humble in the economic sphere as well.  
To Orthodox Christians, the highest authority is given to the Church, unlike the Catholic 
Christians and the Protestants who place the highest authority in the Pope and the Scriptures.177 
The Church in turn is perceived “as a communal group united in love,” which brings together the 
“Christian brotherly love that will lead to unity of all things”.178 Hence, the importance that 
Christian Orthodox give to the Church and the communion it bestows have perhaps influenced 
the emphasis that Christian Orthodoxy places on community and brotherly behavior.  
The aforementioned characteristics, among others, led the authors of the pre-Soviet 
studies of Christian Orthodoxy to summarize the following implications of Christian Orthodox 
norms on economic ethics: (1) Christian Orthodox believers should be indifferent towards 
worldly activities as salvation is achieved by acting “against the world and worldly activities, not 
in and by them,” (2) Adherents should disregard vocational activity, but appreciate the 
“anchoretic life-style of monasticism, the perfection of human life,” (3) the Church does not 
offer a rational innerworldly ethic of conduct, and (4) Christian Orthodox believers should be 
aware that the non-brotherly reality of the economic world is in contradiction to the communal 
needs of Christian Orthodoxy.179  
 The goal of the studies of contemporary Russian Christian Orthodoxy was to observe 
whether the descriptions of the practices and principles of pre-revolutionary Orthodoxy in Russia 
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are similar to those practiced in modern Orthodoxy in Russia. After conducting field research, 
the author of one such study, Ivan Zabaev, finds that economic practices of modern Orthodoxy in 
Russia “show the same motivational pattern which is implemented in practice and described by 
ethics [as in pre-revolutionary Orthodoxy]”.180 Namely, after examining doctrinal texts, pastoral 
and popular Orthodox literature, and his own account of interviews with monks and priests, he 
finds that “for an Orthodox Christian, ‘good action’ in the economy (or his ‘utility function’) is 
action which aids his humility and obedience, not which aids his success”.181 The author uses 
evidence from multiple source in the Russian literature and theology to support his observation 
that the findings by the scholars of pre-Soviet Russian Orthodoxy, as described above, still hold 
true in modern Russian society.   
In December 2002, the 7th World Russian People’s Council presented “A Code of Moral 
Principles and Rules in Economic Activity,” which is a document that establishes moral norms in 
dealings in the economic and social life.182 The Council claimed that the document is not a 
regulation of the economic process, but rather “a moral message of the biblical tradition as it has 
been experienced by the Orthodox Church and other traditional religious communities”.183 This 
document seems to be an evolution from the pre-revolutionary Christian Orthodoxy in Russia, 
which as I noted in the previous paragraph, did not offer a guide in the rational inner worldly 
ethic of conduct. Although the document, “A Code of Moral Principles and Rules in Economic 
Activity,”  is said to reflect the assimilation of the ten commandments of the Mosaic Law by 
Christianity and “other religions traditionally confessed in Russia,” taking in consideration the 
prevalence of the Christian Orthodox Church, as well as the fact that the document was 
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predominantly endorsed by Christian Orthodox leaders such as the Patriarch Alexy II, one can 
argue that this document is mainly a reflection of the Russian Christian Orthodox norms. The 
document highlights the following traits in regard to moral ethics in economic activity:  
(1) The document attempts to “establish an economic order as to help realize in a harmonious 
way both spiritual aspirations and the material interests of both the individual and the 
society”. Therefore, the guidance that the document gives in regard to accumulation of 
wealth, owning property, and handling wealth is that “the accumulation of wealth for the 
sake of wealth will lead the individual and his business and the national economy to an 
impasse...the use of property in economy should not be of narrow egoistic nature and should 
not contradict the common interest...It is a duty of a wealthy person to do good to people 
without expecting public recognition”.184  
(2) Another perspective that the document provides is their instructions in Section IV of the 
Code that the worker needs to have a time for “rest and intellectual, spiritual, and physical 
development”.185  
(3) The rest of the Code instruct businesses and individuals in handling economic activity while 
espousing the ten commandments. Therefore, the commandments “do not steal,” “do not 
commit adultery,” etc., and their implementation in the economic activities and business 
operations are outlined in the Code. Section VII, VIII, and IX instruct that there should be no 
tolerance for “morally abject methods” in competition, no tolerance towards criminal and 
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immoral practice, and fairness in the distribution of fruits of work among partners and 
workers.  
 Although limited in quantity, similar analyses have been done on the Serbian Orthodox 
Church. In these studies, authors argue that historically the Serbian Orthodox Church has also 
had significant influence in the political and economic developments of the state. As such, they 
also argue that the religious influences on people’s values and attitudes in the political and 
economic spheres are substantial. These studies characterize Christian Orthodoxy as “immersed 
in mystical spiritual discipline,” and that in economic matters, “[its] emphasis is in self-
sufficiency, ideally promoting a solid ‘middle class,’ neither seeking existence at the level of 
mere subsistence, nor enjoying excess”.186 This balance between spirituality and materialism, 
between self-interests and solidarity, between wealth accumulation, spending, individualism and 
social justice is a reoccurring characteristic in the literature of Serbian Christian Orthodox 
principles; in the analysis of the interaction between Serbian Christian Orthodoxy and the 
modern neoliberal political economics, Churich likewise finds that Christian Orthodoxy has 
significantly contrasting values with neoliberalism.187  
 In the sense of theological and liturgical tradition, Greek Christian Orthodoxy is the same 
as other Eastern European Christian Orthodox philosophies.188 Investigation into the core 
concepts of Greek Orthodoxy yield similar results as the ones I observed above in Russian and 
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Serbian Orthodoxy. Namely, studies find that Greek Orthodox principles in relation to economic 
activity are mainly “respect for the world and the others, rejecting their exploitation for egoistic 
purposes,” “inter-relatedness and wholeness,” and “otherworldliness and nearness”.189 These 
characteristics, an interwoven combination of mysticism and brotherhood, are reflected in the 
principles of obedience, humility, and communion of the Orthodox doctrine. One study theorizes 
that based on these traits, a Greek Orthodox follower should be highly ethical in the conveyance 
of economic activities, devoted to serving others rather than egoistically pursuing self-serving 
deeds, and finally, revealing communal affinities in the wider community.190  
 The above overview of the Christian Orthodox denomination and its core principles in 
relation to economic activities and modernization through the studies found in the literature on 
Russian, Serbian, and Greek Orthodoxy aimed to provide an inclusive account of the reoccurring 
themes of Christian Orthodox principles that could guide and influence the economic ethics of its 
followers. While some churches endow their followers with explicit codes and documents on the 
appropriate economic behavior, others embed these principles in the messages they share with 
the followers through church services and informal channels. Regardless of the means of 
communication, the above overview revealed recurring principles across the different 
geographical institutions of Christian Orthodoxy. Characterization of the religion as mystical and 
magical has created the sentiment of otherworldliness when one is thinking of God. This 
sentiment, in turn, compels followers to act in obedience and humility and live in the image of 
God in order to be accepted in the afterlife. The Christian Orthodox Church professes that such 
life is one that is, at most, indifferent towards the world activities, or at least, well-balanced 
between self-enrichment and solidarity, or accumulation of wealth and social justice.  
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 The next section is dedicated to the Macedonian Christian Orthodoxy. To my knowledge 
and perusal of the literature, the findings in this thesis is among the first efforts of this nature in 
regard to Macedonian Christian Orthodoxy. Although numerous studies have been written about 
the history of the Church, the role of the Church, and the relationship of the Church and the state, 
there are limited to no studies that have investigated the core principles of Macedonian 
Orthodoxy in regard to economic activities. Additionally, the sections following the next provide 
something that the studies reviewed above have identified as gap in their research¾ assessing 
the practice and effects of the economic ethics of Christian Orthodoxy on its followers.  
Macedonian Christian Orthodoxy and Economic Affairs 
 
The following dissection of rules, principles and codes of Macedonian Orthodoxy is a 
result of field interviews conducted in the Summer of 2017 in Macedonia. The interviews were 
conducted in person, with an exception of one priest who chose the interview to be conducted 
over the telephone. I interviewed a total of ten religious leaders, the majority of whom were 
priests and one monk. Out of the ten interviewees, nine of them were Christian Orthodox and one 
of them was Catholic. I interviewed the Catholic priest to be able to make a comparison in 
certain aspects. The priests were selected by contacting local churches and inquiring to speak 
with a representative from the Church or someone that would be knowledgeable on the topic. 
Upon the priests’ consent to be interview, I conducted the interview. There were six priests that 
were from the city of Skopje and the main Macedonian Christian Orthodox Church 
(Македонска Соборна Црква) and four that were from other cities and villages in Macedonia. 
Out of the twenty inquiries I made during the one-month investigation, I managed to conduct ten 
interviews. During the same period, I also visited academic institutions where I discussed the 
topic with academics from the Macedonian University, I gathered periodicals and other archival 
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documents from the institutions of the Church, and I attended assemblies where religious leaders 
were addressing the citizens. Next, I present my findings:  
A) Interviews with Religious Leaders  
In interviews with religious leaders during my field research, when asked about the 
Church’s position on work ethic, economic affairs, and material wealth, the majority of the 
interviewees answered by quoting the following excerpt from the Bible: “It is easier for a camel 
to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of God.”191 
However, they all qualified the statement by stating that being rich is not a sin in itself, but the 
temptations that come with wealth is what makes it hard for a wealthy person to live by the 
standards of the Church and Christ himself. One priest defined the temptations that come from 
wealth as inclinations towards opportunism and greediness, while another as a trap towards 
rapaciousness. 
While there is a certain stigma about wealth in the Orthodox Church, the Church 
acknowledges that one cannot lead a completely ascetic life and it suggests that wealth should be 
accumulated as much as it is enough for meeting the basic needs of life. If one's wealth is more 
than that needed for a rudimentary life, then the wealth should be handled with care and purpose. 
One priest quoted a precept ‘your hand should sweat three times before you give money 
somewhere,’ suggesting that if one is fortunate enough to have more than needed, it should be 
spent wisely towards good deeds.192  
None of the interviewed Christian Orthodox priests proposed that work should be 
neglected, but instead that rewards from hard work should be wisely consumed. Moreover, the 
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majority of the interviewees argued that one should practice firm balance in their pursuit of 
wealth and spiritual peace. Namely, they argued that there have been some beliefs circulated in 
the society in the past that financial equality is the right way to live a Christian life and to 
achieve this, people have completely abandoned work; even though these people have professed 
such beliefs in the name of Christianity, the Christian Orthodox Church, they argued, is a strong 
supporter of hardworking people. However, the key to leading a righteous Christian life is that 
the followers do not get lost in the material world and the path to wealth accumulation, but to 
remember that even in work, there are distractions that can lead one in the wrong path. As long 
as one learns how to balance work for his or her sustainability and to help one another, work is 
justified and encouraged. 
One priest also criticized the notion of competition, a recognizable attribute of capitalism 
that has become the leading characteristic of working people in the modern society. He said: “In 
the world today, there is a huge battle going on, a battle between people. It is all due to this 
concept of competition, but what we need to know is that this competition creates a status quo 
and a generation of people that are slaves to the material”.193 
Both the Catholic, and more so the Christian Orthodox priests, spoke against capitalism 
as "the greatest evil.”194 Citing the disproportion of wealth and economic inequality, one of the 
priests, stated that capitalism is gaining wealth on account of the other, while another went as far 
as to argue that the pressure of capitalism and its contradiction with the values of Eastern 
religions causes people’s suicides around the world.195 “These neoliberal values take a person 
outside of its comfort zone, on an unchecked pathway that diminishes ‘the natural’ in a person,” 
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maintained a priest when talking about the modern times and capitalism.196 These claims from 
religious leaders that religion serves as “a comfort zone” and that it represents “the natural” in a 
person bring us back to the argument I initially made about the reason why religion is enacted in 
critical and changing times. I would also argue that in the economic sphere, the challenges that 
competition and the race to wealth (or one may argue it is rather a race to survive) makes it more 
tempting for people to revert to religious principles to guide them in the process. Although this 
may be a rather elusive process to study on an individual level, one could argue that the backlash 
that neoliberal economic policies have faced since the 1990s on a national level is a way to scale 
back on the societal repercussions that competition has brought.  
One other intriguing and recurring observation in the interviews was the Orthodox 
Church position towards the organized economy. One priest stated that “Jesus does not recognize 
borrowing on credit, and the Church does not believe in interest, and the banking industry,” for 
the Church believes that we should help our brothers and sisters without a personal stake in the 
process. Influences of both socialism and Islam can be noted in this statement as both socialist 
and Ottoman structures were highly critical of financial capitalism. The priest continued by 
stating that although the integration in the economic institutions, among other factors, make 
countries better off, the Christian Orthodox Church should remain an advocate for investing 
inward, towards the person rather than outwards, towards the material. Another echoed the same 
remarks by stating that Christian Orthodox adherents should be striving towards inner spiritual 
peace, rather than accumulation of wealth on the account of other people.197  
                                               
196 Interview with a Christian Orthodox priest from the Macedonian Christian Orthodox church, June 11, 2017. 
197 Interview with a Christian Orthodox priest from a local Orthodox church, June 15, 2017. 
96 
 
Finally, I was curious whether Christian Orthodoxy is unique in its perspective, or 
perhaps the Catholic faith holds the same views. To this question, the Catholic priest provided 
rather similar sentiments towards work and material wealth. He talked about sharing the wealth 
that God has enabled for people as sharing enriches the soul spiritually.198 He spoke about the 
many humanitarian activities the Church has organized, but he spoke of them very humbly, as 
“the left hand should not know when the right hand gives,” he said while arguing that a person 
should give but not tell and brag about it; bragging about the good deeds one commits cancels 
the good deed.  
 Generally speaking, there are key differences between the Catholic Church and the 
Eastern Orthodox Church in their somewhat different theologies. While the Catholic Church is 
known to be more practical, the Eastern Christian Orthodox Church is more theoretical and 
mystical in its practices. This difference is reflected in the way the institutions worship, hold 
their liturgy, and in the physical structures of their institutions. Christian Orthodox churches and 
monasteries have a mysterious look to them, and their architecture is built in a similar way, 
mystic and numinous. The worship at the Christian Orthodox Church is usually a sung or 
chanted service, accompanied by a litany of prayers and burning incense. Moreover, in contrast 
to the Catholic pragmatism, Christian Orthodox mysticism may differently impact people 
perceive and perform in the world. Namely, if Christian Orthodoxy portrays the divinity as 
mystic and distant, it may also create the feeling of otherworldliness, and as such, prompts 
people to be more fearful, more obedient and humble in their actions in the world. I asked my 
interviewees about this claim, and they agreed that "Christian Orthodoxy belongs to the Eastern 
religions, which are those mystic religions that are oriented internally, towards the person itself 
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rather than externally, towards the material world.”199 One priest also argued that if Marxists 
believed that by changing the world, we change the person, the Christian Orthodox Church 
believes that we should change the person, to change the world— a viewpoint that aligns with 
the "internally-oriented" doctrines of Christian Orthodoxy.200 The next section presents the 
results from my perusal of the doctrinal text of the Macedonian Orthodox Church and the 
popular Christian Orthodox literature in Macedonia. Many of the principles discussed in the 
following texts align with the accounts of the interviewed religious leaders.  
B) Doctrinal Text of the Macedonian Orthodox Church and Popular Christian Orthodox 
Literature in Macedonia 
The Macedonian Orthodox Church issues a number of official newspapers. One of them 
is the Official Newspaper of the Macedonian Christian Orthodox Church (Службен Лист на 
Македонската Православна Црква) that is being distributed as a hard copy to the local 
churches. In addition to informing the religious community of news about the Church, the 
newspaper is abundant with essays that address the Christian Orthodox outlook on modern social 
issues.  During my field research, I was able to peruse the newspaper issue for the month of June. 
Among the essays, there was an excerpt from Kekaumenos, an eleventh-century writer with 
momentous influence in the Orthodox church, where he addressed the concept of work. It states: 
“Be careful that your life doesn’t pass by without sweat. But, don’t forget about God and the 
church-going...and limit yourself in the race for wealth, so the wealth doesn’t become your 
unsatisfying thirst.”201 In continuation, Kekaumenos warns his followers to not let wealth 
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become their “unassuaged thirst, because the power is not in the money, but in the serving and in 
one’s mind”.202 
One other newspaper, also available electronically, is a newspaper by the Skopje 
Eparchy, The Orthodox Path (Православниот Пат). Similar to the Official Newspaper of the 
MOC, this newspaper also covers modern topics in relation to Christian Orthodoxy. One of the 
newspaper issues covered a topic called “Preconceptions and incorrectly disseminated beliefs 
about Christianity and its doctrines”. One of the preconceptions the article addressed is the 
notion that a good Christian Orthodox practices asceticism to a point that he or she gives up 
every kind of life pleasures, material ones included. The author argues that contrary to this 
common belief, Christian Orthodoxy does not believe that ascetic behavior should restrict 
personal freedom and life pleasures that one enjoys, as long as any behavior is characterized by 
well-balanced choices. Namely, Christian Orthodoxy advocates for a balance between an 
obsessive avoidance of every Earthly pleasure and an indulgence of passions that can regress the 
spiritual well-being.203 This was one of the principles I discovered in the studies of Serbian 
Orthodoxy revealed as well.  
A number of churches in Macedonia have priests who try to spread the message of the 
Macedonian Orthodoxy through publishing on churches’ blogs and websites. In my scrutiny of 
such websites and blogs, I have found some that address the Orthodox ethics in relation to 
economic activity and modernization. For instance, a prominent priest and a theology professor 
in an inner city in Macedonia, Prilep, writes the following on his church’s blog website: “The 
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person thrives towards the earthly wealth thinking that it will comfort him, but he does not notice 
that it is exactly the wealth that causes him to worry and makes his life harder. The Christian 
should know that the material wealth does not do him any good unless it is God that gives him 
eternal life.”204 In a different post, the same priest writes about the Christian Orthodox attitudes 
towards work. He uses excerpts from the Bible to justify his argument that work should be done 
with two primary moral motivations, sustain ourselves and help those that have a need from 
us.205 Only by working and having those two motivations in mind would one person achieve 
discipline of the mind and the body.206 
When it comes to the attitudes of the Church towards modernization and the capitalist 
society, the popular Orthodox literature shares the same concerns as the religious leaders I 
interviewed.  They define the modern society as “a structure based on individualism, personal 
interests, indifference towards others or complete rejection of the others”.207 Moreover, they 
argue that the deregulation of the economic system has relished an immense power for people to 
rule over other people, forgetting about the weaker and the needier ones in the process.208  They 
are highly critical of the emerging order of the society and they vow to utilize the Church and 
everything that the Church stands for to bring people back in community and unity.209  
Taking in consideration the traditionalist nature of Christian Orthodoxy, it should not 
come as a surprise that the observations made through interviews and perusal of the popular 
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literature are conflicting with the values of capitalism and modernization. Max Weber himself 
notes that traditionalism is the most significant opponent of capitalism.210 Weber claims that “the 
chances of overcoming traditionalism are greatest on account of religious upbringing...and long 
and arduous process of education.”211 He finds that ‘the calling,’ meaning “the valuation of the 
fulfillment of duty in worldly affairs as the highest form the moral activity of the individual 
could assume,” is a product of a religious education during the Reformation. This concept of 
‘calling’ has become a characteristic of the social ethic of capitalistic culture, creating a sense of 
obligation toward one’s success in professional sense or material possessions.212  
In contrast, the Christian Orthodox education has not utilized the concept of ‘the calling’ 
in such sense, and instead, it has retained its traditionalistic outlooks. Additionally, in the history 
of Christian Orthodox education, religious leaders have instead exploited the concept of 
‘sacrifice’ in worldly affairs. For instance, the official website of the church St. Annunciation 
(Свето Благовештение) in Prilep, Macedonia, writes about the Christian sacrifice in giving up 
their land and material possession for the building of monasteries and churches. The author 
writes that the sacrifice of the Christian followers in this regard contributes to the spiritual unity 
of the followers, and it was also “economically effective.”213 To support such deeds, the Church 
professes Acts 4:32 that states: “All the believers were one in heart and mind. No one claimed 
that any of their possessions was their own, but they shared everything they had.”214 This 
attitude, as well as some of the ones I gathered from the Russian Orthodoxy principles, provide 
an adequate contrast of the Protestant ethic and the concept of “the calling” and Christian 
Orthodoxy’s concept of “sacrifice,” “servitude,” and “passive contemplation”. Weber argues 
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these differences affect the psychological development in individuals, and subsequently, their 
attitudes and behavior towards world activities.     
 The above observations capture the essence of Christian Orthodox norms regarding 
economic behavior in Macedonia. The extent to which these norms are embedded in a 
predominantly Christian Orthodox society and practiced by self-proclaimed Christian Orthodox 
adherents is an elusive phenomenon to capture, however, I attempt to do this with the results of 
the surveys, the second step of my study design I present in the next section. The survey 
examined the respondents’ attitude towards material wealth, economic integration, and other 
values that are characteristic of the capitalistic system. The question and the answer that is 
sought after is whether these adherents practice the Christian Orthodox norms of sacrifice, inner 
peace, wealth distribution in their economic lives, or they are also motivated by self-interest and 
success in the capitalistic world as conventional rational economics have led us to believe.   
The Link Between Religious Principles and Economic Activity 
To understand the link between religion and economic development, one must understand 
first how religious norms are formed and circulated in the society, and second, how these norms 
affect the economic behavior on individual and communal level. The formation and circulation 
of religious norms was discussed in Chapter I. To reiterate, I concluded that religious norms are 
enacted in times of instability, at times when the existential security of a person or a group is 
under threat. Religion serves as a stability factor, one that provides existential answers and 
eternal ‘truths’. Another seminal finding in regard to the conformation to religious norms is the 
fact that religion provides hope that something that is bigger than them, and something that is 
unexplainable will eventually provide relief of the tension they undergo during times of 
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insecurity. They are accepted and circulated by a group in the society as they are a factor of 
unity, they provide a feeling of belonging and acknowledgement.  
In the economic sphere, the challenges that modernization and the capitalist system 
brought contributed to another kind of tumult in societies. There is growing evidence that 
economic inequality, as well as the “materialistic and image-conscious times,” in developed and 
developing societies alike have contributed to increased levels of anxiety.215 While conditions 
like “status anxiety” and “image anxiety” are common among people as young as 15 years old in 
the developed countries and certainly a big issue, more traditional societies are facing with an 
additional layer of issues. Despite the efforts to move from labels such as “traditional” and 
“modern” societies, the current global economic system is unquestionably supportive of 
neoliberal practices that divide the societies into traditional and modern; contrary to many 
neoliberal and modernization theorists, this division is not inherently problematic on its own, 
however, it becomes problematic when societies are forced to abandon their traditional outlooks 
in order to fit in the global economic order. This “forced” transformation from traditional to 
modern societies, from the known to the unknown, creates anxiety, agitation, and confusion 
among people.216 These conditions in turn create fertile grounds for people’s increased reverence 
of religion and religious norms.  
When in times of crisis, instability or discomfort, people conform to religious norms, one 
could hypothesize that the conformation to religious norms somehow affects the behavior of 
religious adherents; naturally, we first ought to know what are the norms that adherents follow, 
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and then observe what their effects are. Weber was the first to introduce the idea that the 
rationally structured ideas about salvation affect the individual’s psychology and motivate their 
behavior in world activities.217 I use a similar conceptual argument: Religious norms about one’s 
conduct of life in order to be rewarded by God have historically and robustly circulated in the 
Macedonian society ever since the establishment of Christian Orthodoxy. These norms in turn 
have guided their attitudes, behavior and practices in economic activities. Next, I propose two 
ways, one on an individual and one on a communal level, in which the Orthodox religious 
principles can affect economic attitudes and behavior.  
A) The Individual Level  
The examination of the historical and popular literature, as well as academic studies and 
field interviews regarding Christian Orthodox principles revealed that, historically, the Christian 
Orthodox Church has emphasized indifference towards world activities and has professed that 
world activities should be approached in a way that aids obedience and humility. In economic 
activities particularly, Christian Orthodoxy guides adherents to use vocational activities and 
wealth attainment as long as they are used for a mere subsistence of the person, and as long as 
any excess is used towards the common good and not towards the success of one over the other. 
The finding that these principles have been found through the literature in the past and in modern 
times points to a conclusion that Christian Orthodox institution have retained these principles 
even in changing times of prevailing modernizing and capitalistic values in societies.  
The question that I seek to answer is whether the abovementioned principles have been 
adopted as norms in a society with a predominantly Christian Orthodox population and are 
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subsequently practiced and reflected in economic attitudes and behavior. I postulate the 
following hypotheses about Christian Orthodox adherents’ economic attitudes and behavior:  
H1: A Christian Orthodox is more likely to choose participating in Church, practicing 
religious activities, and humility and obedience over acquiring wealth and working.  
H2: A Christian Orthodox is instructed to treat the Church as the highest authority, and as 
such, one can expect that a Christian Orthodox places trust in the Church and the Bible above 
trust in the government, the market, international organizations and other secular counterparts to 
the Church.  
H3:  A Christian Orthodox is less likely to place value in market mechanisms than employ 
wealth-multiplying techniques, instead chooses more conservative mechanisms of investing and 
saving excess wealth and borrowing money.  
B) The Communal/Organizational Level 
Considering the emphasis Christian Orthodoxy places on the notion of “brotherly love,” and 
“community,” and the evidence I found that religious leaders are distrustful and critical of the 
individualism and egoism that has spread with capitalism, one could hypothesize that, 
H4: A Christian Orthodox is more likely to choose the community (friends, neighbors, the 
poor) over individual gain.  
The questionnaire that I distributed in Macedonia during my field research was designed 
in a way that included questions that test the hypotheses above. The complete questionnaire is 
provided in Appendix I.  In the following section, I present the data obtained via the 
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questionnaire. In the same section, I provide a connection between the questions and the 
hypotheses.   
Data 
 
The data for the study was collected from a 53-question survey. The surveys were distributed in 
the Macedonian population using a convenience sampling methodology and two types of 
surveys, in-person surveys and online surveys. The in-person surveys were given to people 
selected by convenience in three cities (survey sites included schools, bus stations, parks, and 
neighborhoods), while the online surveys were dispersed through social media and channels 
designated for survey distributions. All of the surveys were anonymous and completed by the 
respondents themselves. The respondents either completed the in-person surveys in privacy at 
the time of distribution or returned the surveys at a designated location if they chose to complete 
the survey at a later time. The online surveys were collected with the survey system Qualtrics. 
From the distributed surveys, there were a total of 619 collected responses, both hard and 
electronic copies. The demographic characteristics of the respondents are presented in Table 1. 
The demographics reveal that female respondents dominate the sample (92.28% of the Christian 
Orthodox sample is female); I account for this sampling characteristic in more detail later in this 
chapter where I include a table with coefficients for male and female respondents separately and 
I find that, in fact, male respondents show higher propensities for religiosity and religious 
influence. Therefore, the lack of male respondents should not significantly influence the findings 
in this thesis as a larger number of male respondents would likely only strengthen the findings. 
Additionally, another sampling characteristic is the large number of urban dwellers with high 
education. These respondents are likely to be among the least religious people in the country, 
therefore, a more representative survey with a larger number or rural dwellers would likely 
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strengthen the findings in the thesis." To provide more context to my sample, I also include a p-
value column with measures that determine the differences across the demographic 
characteristics between the Christian Orthodox and non-Christian Orthodox samples are real or it 
is a chance difference. I find that there is a significant difference in several categories: (1) it is 
significantly more likely that a person that belongs in the first age category, 18 to 25 and the 
second age category, 26 to 50 to be a Christian Orthodox, (2) it is significantly more likely that a 
respondent that is single, married or widow/er to be a Christian Orthodox, and (3) it is 
significantly more likely that a student respondent is a Christian Orthodox. The p-values for each 













Table 1. Demographic Characteristics of Survey Respondents 
Variable Christian Orthodox Non- Christian Orthodox p-v 
Age Frequency  Percent Frequency Percent  
18-25 87 16.3 27 27.55 0.012 
26-50 383 74.08 60 61.22 0.009 
51-65 40 7.74 10 10.20 0.413 
65+ 7 1.35 1 1.02 0.790 
Sex      
Male 40 7.72 12 12.24 0.140 
Female 478 92.28 86 87.76 0.140 
Marital status      
Married 353 68.28 52 53.61 0.005 
Single 135 26.11 40 41.24 0.002 
Divorced 20 3.87 1 1.03 0.159 
Separated 2 0.39 0 0 0.540 








Employed 381 73.55 67 69.07 0.363 
Unemployed 73 14.09 16 16.44 0.538 
Student 43 8.30 10 4.12 0.051 















Rural 54 10.42 4 4.12 0.051 








Low  71 14.23 20 21.28 0.082 
Middle  372 74.55 59 62.77 0.019 
High  56 11.22) 15 15.96 0.195 
Education      
PhD 7 1.36 2 2.04 0.608 
Masters 71 13.79 10 10.20 0.338 
College 262 50.87 55 56.12 0.341 
High School 173 33.59 30 30.61 0.566 
No High School 2 0.39 1 1.02 0.421 
N 518
** 100  
*Low (below 200 euros/month); Middle (between 200 and 600 euros a month), and High 
(above 600 euros a month) 





Independent Variable: Religiosity  
To test the hypotheses posed above, I treat religiosity as an independent variable in the 
analysis of the data. Similarly to Guiso et al., in constructing the variable religiosity, I do not use 
only religious affiliation and self-identified religiosity, but I also include measures of religious 
practice and religious influence in order to capture different degrees of respondents’ 
religiosity.218 Therefore, the independent variable religiosity in my study is constructed of 
measures of (1) religious affiliation, (2) religious practice, and (3) religious influence. I use the 
measure of religious affiliation to extract a sample of religious respondents who are Christian 
Orthodox. I use the measures of religious practice and religious influence to control for degree of 
religiosity in my analysis.  
A) Religious affiliation  
Religious affiliation is determined based on the responses to two questions: (1) Do you 
consider yourself a religious person, and (2) Do you identify yourself with a religion? If yes, 
which one. The purpose of these two questions is to acquire respondents’ self-reported religiosity 
and affiliation with religion. Religiosity as a concept is multidimensional and can be a subject to 
different interpretations. In the survey, religiosity was defined as “belief in God and devoted to 
organized religion or religious practices”. The variable for religiosity and affiliation with 
religious denomination is moderately and positively related (the correlation coefficient is 
0.5175). The variable for religiosity is also moderately and positively correlated with the index 
for religious practice (the correlation coefficient is 0.6490). The relatively high and positive 
                                               
218 Luigi Guiso et al., “People’s Opium? Religion and Economic Attitudes,” Journal of Monetary Economics 50, no. 




correlation between these two sets of variables indicate that respondents have utilized the 
established definition of religiosity in their response to the survey questions.  
The breakdown of respondents according to their self-reported religiosity reveals that 
75.08% of the respondents have declared themselves as religious, and 87.62% of the respondents 
have identified themselves with a specific religion. One would expect that the percentage of 
respondents that have identified themselves as religious would be the same or higher than the 
respondents that have declared affiliation with certain religion. However, in the case of my pool 
of respondents, there are more people that have identified themselves with a religion than there 
are religious respondents. After checking for missing observations, I note that there are no 
respondents that have responded to the question of religious denomination and have not 
responded on the question of religiosity. Therefore, I conclude that the difference between these 
two variables is perhaps attributed to respondents who are not religious but identify themselves 
with a religious denomination as part of their national identity, or as part of their personal or 
family history. Chapter II examined this phenomenon in the Macedonian society. For instance, 
the findings from my sample reveal that out of the 518 respondents who have identified 
themselves as Christian Orthodox, 90 of them have declared themselves as non-religious. This 
means that 17% of my Christian Orthodox sample only views religion as part of their national 
and/or personal identity. Below, I present a table with the breakdown of the responses to the 





Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Religious Affiliation Variable 
Religious Affiliation Frequency Percent 
Are you religious? 
  
Definitely Yes/Yes 461  75.08  
No 153  24.92  
Do you identify yourself with a religion?  
  
Yes 538 87.62 
No 76 12.38 
Religion?  
  
Christian Orthodox 518 94.70 
Catholicism 5 0.91 
Islam 18 3.29 
Protestantism 0 0 
Buddhism 2 0.37 
Other* 4 0.73 
Total (N) 615 
       *Agnostic or otherwise not defined; ** N varies between 547 and 615        
 
B) Religious Practice  
I included religious practice as one of the measures of religiosity as logically, one would 
expect that the more frequently a person is practicing religious beliefs, traditions, and customs, 
the more religious the person is. The correlation between the respondents’ religiosity of my 
survey and their reported religious practices confirms the claim as well (the correlation 
coefficient is 0.6490). Consequently, one would expect that the same person is influenced by 
religion more in his or her daily, and world, activities. The measure of religious practice is based 
on three questions from the survey: (1) How often do you pray, (2) How often do you attend 
religious services (aside from weddings and funerals), and (3) How often do you donate to your 
religious institutions? The responses to the questions varied on a 6-point scale from a point 
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indicating highly intensive practices to no practices at all.  In order to compose one variable from 
the responses of the three questions, I used a principal component analysis (pca), and I also 
created an index with the weighted average of practice variable to assess which analysis more 
effectively captures the responses. Both indices were highly correlated with one another, 
indicating that either of these methods are arguably defensible for the analysis (the correlation 
coefficient is 0.9977); I have chosen to use the weighted average index construct for the 
remainder of the analysis in this chapter.219 Below I present the summary of the responses to the 
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deviation is .1864022. The minimum index is .1666667 and the maximum is 1. There are four respondents that have 
scored the maximum of 1 on the weighted average index scale for religious practice.  
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Religious Practice Variables 
Religious Practice  Frequency Percent 
How often do you pray?   
A few times a day 59 11.39 
Every morning/night 110 21.24 
Only when attending church 154 29.73 
Only at religious services/weddings/funerals 18  3.47 
Not very often 144 27.80 
Never 33 6.37 
How often do you attend religious services?  
  
Once a Week 31 5.98 
Several times a month 100 19.31 
Several times a year 256 49.42 
Only for important religious holidays 86 16.60 
Less than once a year/Hardly ever 43 8.30 
Never  2 0.39 
How often do you donate to your religious 
institution?  
  
Once a Week 12 2.33 
Once a Month 38 7.38 
On religious holidays 118 22.91 
Per need 195 37.86 
On special occasions 78 15.15 
Never 74 14.37 
Total (N) 518* 




C) Religious Influence  
Finally, with the variable religious influence, I wanted to capture the importance of 
religion in respondents’ lives as they perceive it. I argue that incorporating this measurement in 
the analysis is important as it allows for an assessment of whether indicating that religion is 
important in one’s life is correlated to and has a significant relationship with one practicing and 
implementing religious norms in world activities, such as economic attitudes and behavior. This 
measurement is based on four questions from the survey: (1) How important is it/would be that 
your child/children are religious, (2) Have you/would you baptize your children, (3) How 
important is God in your life, and (4) How much would you say that your religion influences 
your life and everyday activities? Examining people’s attitudes and choices in regard to their 
children is a powerful way to examine their true attitudes, hence the reason for including 
questions (1) and (2) in the construction of the religious influence measurement.220 
Similar to the measurement of religious practice, I used a principal component analysis 
(pca) and an index of weighted averages for each of the questions. As in the case of the religious 
practice measurement, both indices of religious influence measurement were highly correlated 
with one another as well, indicating that either of these methods are arguably defensible for the 
analysis (the correlation coefficient is 0.9994); I have chosen to use the weighted average index 
construct for the remained of the analysis in this chapter.221 Below I present a summary of the 
responses to the four questions. 
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scored the maximum of 1 on the weighted average index scale for religious influence. 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Religious Influence Variables 
Religious Influence Frequency Percent 
How important is it to you that your children 
are/would be religious?  
  
Extremely Important/Important 296 57.48 
Somewhat important 151 29.32 
Not important at all  68 13.20 
Have you/would you baptize your children?  
  
Yes 464 90.27 
Maybe 36 7.00 
No  14 2.72 
How important is God in your life?  
  
Extremely Important/Important 434 84.11 
Somewhat important 66 12.79 
Not important at all  16 3.10 
How much would you say that religion has 
influence in your everyday life?  
  
Extremely a lot/A lot 93 17.95 
Somewhat influential 285 55.02 
Not at all 140 27.03 
Total (N) 518* 
*N varies from 514 to 518 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables are constructs of the investigation of Christian Orthodox 
principles presented earlier in the chapter. Based on the discovered principles, I constructed 
questions in the survey that should reveal whether the principles found in Christian Orthodoxy 
are adopted and practiced among the Macedonian people. Equally, these questions examine the 
115 
 
economic attitudes and behavior of the respondents; the responses will later be used to analyze 
whether the Christian Orthodox followers portray attitudes and behavior in their economic lives 
that are peculiar to Christian Orthodoxy.  
First Hypothesis  
 To assess the veracity of the first hypothesis, which aims to test whether a Christian 
Orthodox adherent chooses participating in Church, practicing religious activities, and humility 
and obedience over acquiring wealth and working, I used the following three questions:  
(1) Please rank the following factors based on the importance they have in your life: 
Church/other religious institution, Bible/other religious text, Work & Money, Peace, 
Family, Friends;  
(2) Identify the top three characteristics from the following list that you want/would want 
your children to respect: unselfishness in helping others, obedience & humility, 
participation in Church/other religious object and religious activities, reading and 
studying the Bible/other religious text, effort in education and work, independence, 
financial thriftiness, and determination;  
(3) Choose one of the listed choices in each row based on personal importance: (1) Peace and 
having little or (2) busy life and having more;  
(4) Choose one of the listed choices in each row based on personal importance: (1) Work 
more and pray less, or (2) work less and pray more. 
The first question was intended to capture what percent of Christian Orthodox followers 
chose Church and Bible over work and money. I constructed a new variable that grouped the 
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respondents in two groups, one that was composed of respondents who ranked Church or Bible 
over Work and Money in terms of personal importance in their lives, and one that chose the 
opposite. In my sample, 74.02% of the Christian Orthodox respondents belonged in the first 
group; this means that 74.02% of the respondents in my sample chose Church and Bible over 
Work and Money.   
As previously stated, there are studies that show asking questions about respondents’ 
attitudes and choices for their children more clearly elicits their true attitudes. For this reason, I 
included the second question above. 222 The second question aimed to capture whether 
respondents would teach their children to respect principles that are close to the Christian 
Orthodox values over principles that are related to work and material achievements. Similarly to 
the previous question, I constructed a new variable that assembled respondents in two groups; 
one group represented respondents that chose any of the first set of values (unselfishness in 
helping others, obedience and humility, participation in Church and religious activities, and 
studying the Bible as top three principles they would teach their children) over the second set of 
values (work, independence, financial thriftiness, and determination). The second group was 
composed of respondents that chose the opposite. The findings from my sample of Christian 
Orthodox revealed that 78.19% of the sample chose values from the first set of values as the top 
three priorities that parents teach their children over values from the second set of values.  
Finally, the third and fourth questions directly measure whether a respondent adopts the 
basic principles of the Christian Orthodox Church in regard to economic ethics and inquires 
whether peace and praying more is more important to them than busy life and having more 
                                               
222 I used and modified a question from the World Values Survey that aimed to capture whether parents, or would-be 
parents, choose unselfishness in helping others obedience & humility, participation in Church and religious 
activities, reading and studying the Bible over work, independence, financial thriftiness, and determination. 
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wealth. A new variable was created that shows the percentage of respondents that chose the first 
over the latter. The findings show that 78.69% chose peace and having little as more important 
than busy life and having more. However, only 21.29% chose praying more as more important 
than having more wealth. There could be several explanations to the difference in these two 
outcomes; one is that adherents display Christian Orthodox norms, but do not fervently follow 
religious practice. Another is that peace is generally a desired state of mind, not necessarily 
peculiar to Christian Orthodoxy; as such, perhaps asking a respondent to rank peace over work 
and money is not a strong measure of the Christian Orthodox norms conformation. I take the 
nuance of this question in consideration when interpreting the results in later analysis.   
Second Hypothesis 
 The second hypothesis claims that a Christian Orthodox respondent places the Church 
and the Bible as superior in the social hierarchy. Therefore, one would expect that a Christian 
Orthodox respondent will also place trust in the Church and the Bible over their secular 
counterparts. I used the following question from the survey to asses this hypothesis:  
(1) Please rank the following based on your trust in them: Church/other religious object, 
Bible/other religious text, government institutions, market, police, international 
organizations?  
Similar to the variable in question one, I then constructed a new variable that shows the 
percentage of Christian Orthodox followers that have ranked their trust in Church and Bible 
above the trust in government institution, the market, the police or international organizations. 
46% of my Christian Orthodox sample ranked trust in the Church or the Bible over the 




 The third hypothesis states that a Christian Orthodox is not likely to value market 
mechanisms that grow wealth, and because of that, a Christian Orthodox employs more 
conservative method of investing and saving excess wealth, and of borrowing money. I employ 
several questions to test this hypothesis:  
(1) Rank your preference of ways to invest your money: Trading market, New business, Real 
estate investment, Buying gold/silver, Savings account; 
(2) Rank your preference of ways to save your money: In a bank, with a family member, at a 
personal location, I’d rather spend them now than save; 
(3) Rank your preference of ways to borrow money: The bank, a neighbor/a family member, 
sell personal property, a pawnshop, an informal lender. 
In all three questions, the options were constructed in a way that they range from market 
mechanisms that are riskier and serve as wealth-multipliers to market mechanisms that are more 
conservative. In my sample of Christian Orthodox, 32.35% ranked investment by buying 
gold/silver over investment by trading in the market, opening a new business, or investing in real 
estate; 35.42% chose saving with a family member or at a personal location, and spending the 
money rather than saving them over saving them in a bank; finally, 76.13% would rather borrow 
from a neighbor or a family member, would rather sell property or borrow from a pawnshop or 
informal lender over borrowing from a bank.223 
                                               
223 One potential argument is that the undesirability of the followers to facilitate more progressive ways to save their 
money has less to do with their values and norm conformation, and more to do with the performance of the formal 
economy and the viability of the economic mechanisms. While this is certainly a reasonable argument, the key 




Finally, the fourth hypothesis reflects the Christian Orthodox doctrines that profess and 
continuously reinforce the notion of community and togetherness. To assess the pertinence of 
this norm in the society, I use several questions:  
(1) What do you think. Choose one: Competition is good because it stimulates people to 
work hard or competition is harmful because it brings the worst in people;  
(2) Choose one of the listed choices in each row based on personal importance: Cooperating 
in team or working alone;  
(3) Choose one of the listed choices in each row based on personal importance: Giving to the 
poor and homeless or saving for the future. 
 The options in the three questions aim to measure whether the respondent finds the 
importance of a community to be higher of that of individual gains. By inquiring whether 
competition is harmful in their opinion, I intended to capture their attitudes towards competing 
against members from the community; only 13.81% of my Christian Orthodox sample find 
competition to be harmful, and the rest believe competition is stimulating. 58.73% of the 
Christian Orthodox sample would rather work in team over working alone; this question was 
meant to assess to what extent cooperation with community members is important to Christian 
Orthodox adherents. Finally, 46.28% of the sample answered that they would rather give to the 
community over saving for their future.  
                                                                                                                                                       
measurements such as the rate of inflation and price stability, gross domestic product, the stock market index, and 
the currency exchange rate have been performing well in the past five years. Macedonia was also one of the Western 
Balkan countries that was essentially unaffected by the Greek Financial Crisis due to its effective monetary policies. 




 The tables with descriptive statistics for each of the questions above is included in 
Appendix I. In the next section, I present the empirical strategy I employ to assess the 
relationship between religiosity as an independent variable and respondents’ attitudes and 
behavior in the economic sphere.  
Empirical Strategy 
 
To observe the relationship between religiosity and the attitudes of the respondents’ in 
their economic lives and their practice of the Christian Orthodox norms, I use the following OLS 
estimate:  
Attitudesi= a + bi religiosityi + g Ci + ei 
where i is indicating the individual’s response to questions about attitudes and behavior, 
b is the coefficient of interest on the measure of religiosity where religiosity is defined as a 
combination of religious practice and religious influence, and as religious practice and religious 
influence separately depending on the regression model. Ci are a set of controls including age, 
sex, marital status, employment status, geographical area, socioeconomic status, and education. I 
ran the regressions with and without the controls in each panel to observe the effects of those 
control variables.  
I apply the OLS estimate for each of the eleven dependent variables presented in the 
previous section. To check for robustness of the model, I also use a binary logistics estimate to 
observe the relationship. I run both estimates by regressing the eleven dependent variables on the 
religiosity index. The religiosity index, depending on the model I use, is either an index of both 
religious practice and religious influence measures, or a measure of religious practice and a 
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measure of religious influence separately. The reason I use the indices separately is to test for 
joint significance.  
Findings 
After running the regression estimates, both the OLS and the binary logistic estimates 
reveal same results. For simplicity purposes, I present only the logistic regressions in this 
section, however, I have included the OLS regressions in Appendix III. The binary logistic 
regression results predict the odds of the dependent variable being a case based on the values of 
the independent variable. Therefore, in interpreting the regression results, I look to examine what 
are the odds that the respondent would choose the first set of values over the second one in each 
of the questions based on his or her response to religious practice and/or religious influence, 
bearing in mind that the religious practice and the religious influence indices are both 
constructed in a way that a higher index means higher religiosity (in terms of self-reported 
practice and influence).  
The results from the logit regressions are displayed in the following manner: There are 
four tables (Table 5 through Table 9). Each of the tables present the odds ratio of the questions 
used to test the hypotheses. In addition, each question is tested through three models: the first 
model tests the practice index on the respondent’s behavior/attitude, the second model tests the 
influence index on the respondent’s behavior/attitude, and finally the third one performs a joint 
test for both the practice and influence index on the respondent’s behavior/attitude. There are 
four panels presented in the tables below (Panel A through Panel D for each hypothesis). Panel A 
and Panel C present the odds ratio for each of the questions used to test the individual 
hypothesis, while Panel B and D include the effect of control variables on the odds ratio. As 
previously mentioned, I use age, sex, marital status, employment status, geographical area, 
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socioeconomic status, and education as control variables. I do not include the control variables 
individually on the tables in this chapter, but the robustness table in Appendix II presents the 
control variables separately.  
Regressions Results for the First Hypothesis  
 Table 5 presents the regression results for the four questions/variables that I have selected 
to test the first hypothesis. The results from the logit for the first question reveal a somewhat 
contradictory relationship between religiosity and the propensity of a Christian Orthodox 
adherent chooses participating in Church, practicing religious activities, and humility and 
obedience over acquiring wealth and working. However, due to the insignificance of the results 
across all models, I choose to omit that question. An exception to the overall insignificant 
findings is Model 2. In Model 2, I regress the choices of question one to the religious influence 
index alone; the results show negative and significant relationship on the first level. This means 
that the higher the index of religious influence is, the less likely it is for a Christian Orthodox to 
choose participating in Church, practicing religious activities, and humility and obedience over 
acquiring wealth and working.  
The results from the logit for the second question reveal findings that are significant 
across almost all models. Namely, Model 4 reveals that the odds for a respondent to choose the 
first group of attitudes over the latter increases by 9.9 times (890%) with one unit increase of 
religious practice; in other words, the results reveal that the respondent is 9.9 times more likely 
to choose teaching his or her children to respect principles that are close to the Christian 
Orthodox values over principles that are related to work and material achievements.224 The effect 
                                               
224 For simplicity, I choose to present the odds ratio as “times more likely,” however, the same coefficient can be 
presented as percentage by subtracting 1 from the odds ratio and multiplying it by 100.  
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is reduced after including the control variables; however, this effect is still significant on the 
third level (the odds coefficient is 7.9 after controlling for individual characteristics). Model 5 
also reveals a positive and significant relationship between the religious influence index and the 
respondents’ responses to the second question; this means that with every one unit increase of 
the religious influence index, the respondent is 7.8 times without controls, and 7.06 times with 
controls, more likely to choose any of the first set of values (unselfishness in helping others, 
obedience and humility, participation in Church and religious activities, and studying the Bible 
as top three principles they would teach their children) over the second set of values (work, 
independence, financial thriftiness, and determination). The findings are significant on the third 
and second level, respectively. When the religious practice and the religious influence indices are 
jointly tested in the model, the effects decrease, and the religious influence loses its significance. 
However, the religious practice index retains its significance and a positive relationship.  
The regressions with the responses to question three as dependent variable also reveal 
significant and positive results across almost all models. Model 7 is significant on the third level, 
both without and with controls; for every unit of increase of religious practices, a respondent is 
9.12 and 9.57 times more likely to choose peace and having little over busy life and having more. 
The same is true when I use the religious influence index as an independent variable, however, 
the effect is reduced to 8.98 and 8.58, without and with controls respectively (Model 8). The 
effect of the religious influence index also decreases and loses its significance when used jointly 
with the religious practice index, in both without and with controls models. The effect of the 
religious practice index is reduced to 4.89 (without controls) and 6.42 (with controls), however it 
is still significant on the first and second level, respectively (Model 9).  
124 
 
The coefficients generated from the regressions on question five are relatively high and 
significant on the third level across all models. Models 10, 11, and 12 in Panel B present the 
coefficients for all models. Recalling from the previous section when descriptive statistics 
revealed a substantial difference between the percentage of respondents that chose peace over 
work and money (78.69% chose the first over the latter), as opposed to the percentage of 
respondents that chose prayer over work and money (21.29 chose the first over the latter), it is 
not surprising that the regression analysis of the second question exhibits a high coefficient 
across all models; even though small percentage of respondents chose prayer over work and 
money, their responses are meaningful and highly indicative of how the extent of one’s 
religiosity (practicing it and claiming it influences one) influences his or her attitude towards 
work and money. Thus, even if I choose to omit the third question due to its nuanced inquiry, I 
would still argue that the responses to the fourth question are sufficient in establishing the 
response to the first hypothesis. 
Table 5. Regression Results for Variables testing Hypothesis 1 
 Q1 Q2 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
practice 0.484  0.985 9.905***  5.925** 
influence  0.222* 0.221  7.471*** 2.396 
Panel B (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
practice 
w/controls 0.521 
 1.064 7.941***  4.928* 
influence 
w/controls 
 0.248* 0.235  7.063** 2.566 
 Q3 Q4 
Panel C (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
practice 9.124***  4.896* 108.9801***  12.049*** 
influence  8.989*** 3.037  10684.69*** 2270.71*** 
Panel D (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
practice 
w/controls 9.575*** 
 6.425** 226.661***  25.101*** 
influence 
w/controls 
 8.583*** 2.521  14775.66*** 2177.134*** 




Based on the regression results from Table 5, and the significant and positive relationship 
that I find in three of the four questions I used to test the first hypothesis, I argue that there is 
sufficient evidence to confirm the first hypothesis. Therefore, a Christian Orthodox does choose 
religious services and practicing religious activities over working and acquiring wealth, humility 
and obedience over financial thriftiness, as more important when asked to choose between those 
two sets of values. This propensity increases with the degree of influence the respondent claims 
religion to have in his or her life, and it also increases with the degree of religious practice the 
respondent claims.   
Regressions Results for the Second Hypothesis  
Based on the Christian Orthodox belief in the Church as an institution with the highest 
authority, as well as the importance of the Bible in the Christian Orthodox worship, I posed the 
second hypothesis, which claims that a Christian Orthodox places trust in the Church and the 
Bible above its secular counterparts, i.e. the government, the market, the police or international 
organizations.  
The results from the regressions are presented in Table 6. Model 1 shows that when I 
regress the responses to question five on the index of religious practice, the results reveal 
positive and significant relationship between the two, meaning that with every unit of increase of 
the religious practice index, the respondent is 5.42 times more likely to choose trust in the 
Church and the Bible over its secular counterparts. The coefficient does not considerably lose its 
effect or its significance once I control for individual characteristics. Model 2 reveals that the 
significance of the model and the coefficient decrease when I consider religious influence as 
independent variable, however there is still significance on the first level and the relationship is 
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still positive; every one unit increase in the respondent’s religious influence results in 3.34 and 
3.43 times higher likelihood that the respondent will choose trusting the Church and the Bible 
over the government and its institutions, the market, and international organizations. The effect 
of this independent variable decreases and loses its significance when it is jointly tested with the 
religious practice variable in Model 3. The effect of religious practice and the significance of the 
relationships are both reduced, however, it is still significant on the second level.  
Table 6. Regression Results for the Variable Testing Hypothesis 2 
Panel A Q5 
  (1) (2) (3) 
practice 5.425***   4.528** 
influence   3.335* 1.215 
practice w/controls 5.168***   4.476** 
influence w/controls   3.428* 1.275 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; N of observations varies by specification from 458 to 
486 
  
Taking in consideration that individuals are more likely to report more correctly the 
intensity of their religious practices, such as attendance, donation, and praying, rather than their 
self-perception of how much religion influences them, it is not surprising that the effects of 
religious influence are smaller compared to the effects of religious practice. This is evident in the 
regression results in both Table 5 and Table 6.  
 Based on the regression results in Panel A, I confirm the relationship posed in the second 
hypothesis. The results reveal that a Christian Orthodox does indeed show high propensity of 
trusting the Church and the Bible over the government, the market, the police or international 
organizations. This propensity is intensified with the increase of religious practice and religious 
influence. Therefore, the evidence above supports the claim of the second hypothesis as well.  
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Regressions Results for the Third Hypothesis  
 The third hypothesis posited that if a Christian Orthodox follows the Christian Orthodox 
doctrine and its skepticism of the mechanisms of the formal economy that are designed to grow 
wealth, then the Christian Orthodox respondent is likely to avoid integrating in the formal 
economy and is likely to avoid utilizing the mechanisms that are designed for wealth 
multiplication.  
 The results from the regressions on the variables that tests the third hypothesis are 
presented in Table 7. All three models yielded mainly negative, but insignificant relationship 
between the respondents’ choices in question six and their religiosity. The only positive, but still 
insignificant relationship, is observed between religious influence, without and with controls, and 
the respondents’ choice of market mechanisms for investment. The relationship stays the same in 
Model 3 where I jointly test religious influence and religious practice.  
I found similar results for question 8. There were no significant relationships between the 
independent variables and the respondents’ choices of borrowing market mechanisms in the three 
different models. All of the relationships yielded negative relationships, but once again, with no 
significance in their p-values.  
Regressions results from question 7, however, yielded significant results across almost all 
models. The coefficients in Model 4 are relatively high and significant. They reveal positive and 
significant relationship at the third level between the religious practice index and the 
respondents’ choice of market mechanisms for saving. A Christian Orthodox individual is likely 
to choose a family member, a personal location or spend than save money over saving money in 
a bank; this likelihood increases 11.77 times with each unit increase of religious practice. The 
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coefficient experiences slight decrease once we control for individual characteristics, however 
the relationship is still significant and positive at the third level. The same can be observed for 
the religious influence index in Model 5; the coefficient is 10.50 and 10.54, without and with 
controls respectively. The effect of the religious influence index significantly decreases and loses 
the significance once we jointly test the indices of religious practice and religious influence. 
However, the index of religious practice retains significance at the second level and yields a 
coefficient of 6.56 (without controls) and 6.14 (with controls).  
    Table 7. Regression Results for the Variables Testing Hypothesis 3 
 Q6 Q7 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
practice 0.839  0.651 11.773***  6.564** 
influence  1.216* 1.614  10.505*** 2.919 
Panel B (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
practice 
w/controls 0.655 
 0.506 11.453***  6.137** 
influence 
w/controls 
 1.086 1.685  10.544*** 3.067 
 Q8 
Panel C (13) (14) (15) 
practice 0.523  0.689 
influence  0.432 0.562 






 0.540 0.999 
    note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Number of Observations (N) varies by specification from 473 to 515 
Based on the regression results in Table 7, I find insufficient evidence to support the third 
hypothesis, which claimed that a Christian Orthodox is likely to choose more conservative 
mechanisms of investing, saving and borrowing money. However, I find no evidence to 
completely reject the hypothesis since two questions, despite the negative relationship, exhibited 
insignificant relationship. The only relationship I can explain with certainty is the relationship 
between the religiosity of Christian Orthodox and his or her attitudes towards savings 
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mechanisms. To this extent, a Christian Orthodox is likely to choose saving through more 
conservative manners such as saving with a family member or at a personal location over saving 
in a bank. This relationship can be further explained by the observation that with every unit 
increase of religious practice, a Christian Orthodox is almost 12 times more likely to choose 
more conservative ways to save. The previous two questions can be a subject of further research, 
where the claim in the third hypotheses can be tested with perhaps different survey questions or 
more data points. 
Regressions Results for the Fourth Hypothesis 
Considering the strong emphasis the Christian Orthodox doctrine places on “brotherly 
love” and “communion,” as well as the Christian Orthodox contempt for egoism, the fourth 
hypothesis claimed that a Christian Orthodox will choose the community over his or her own 
individual gain.  
Table 8 presents the results from the regression tests ran on three questions that attempted 
to test the fourth hypothesis. The results from the regression of the responses from question nine 
on the respondents’ religiosity reveal positive, but insignificant relationship. The only significant 
coefficient is the one between respondents who find competition is harmful and the index of 
religious influence, however, once I control for individual characteristics, the relationship loses 
significance. Therefore, I find no evidence of a relationship between respondents’ attitudes 
towards competition and religiosity.  
Question ten captures the Christian Orthodox respondent’s choice of working in team 
over working alone. The relationship between the responses to this question and the index of 
religious practice is positive and significant at the first level; a Christian Orthodox is likely to 
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choose working in team over working alone, and it is 3.05 times more likely to do so with every 
unit increase of religious practice (Model 4). The magnitude of the coefficient increases once we 
control for individual characteristics, and once we perform a joint test with the index of religious 
influence (Model 6). The same is not observed for Model 5 and testing the index of religious 
index. Even though the model yields a positive relationship, this is not a significant one. 
Moreover, the coefficient loses its magnitude and turns negative once we perform a joint test in 
Model 6.  
The regression tests with responses from question eleven and religiosity are positive and 
significant across all models. Even though the coefficients decrease in Model 9, they retain their 
positive and significant relationship. The results show that a Christian Orthodox is likely to 
choose giving to the community over saving for the future, and he is 17.43 times more likely to 
do so with every unit increase of religious practice, and 32.72 times more likely to do so with 
every one unit increase of religious influence. The coefficients decrease to 17.1822 and 
27.36406, with controls for both indices respectively (Model 7 & 8). The coefficients decrease 
further to 5.75 and 9.59 with controls once I joint test them in Model 9, however the relationship 
is significant at the third level as in the previous two models. One limitation to these effects is 
the fact that I cannot compare respondents’ self-reported values towards giving to the community 
with their actual behavior. A follow-up survey is needed to assess the levels of charitable giving, 






    Table 8. Regression Results for the Variables Testing Hypothesis 4 
 Q9 Q10 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
practice 3.465  1.496 2.777  4.536** 
influence  6.119* 4.694  1.205 0.457 
Panel B (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
practice 
w/controls 3.670 
 2.996 3.056*  5.315** 
influence 
w/controls 
 6.517 2.275  .750 .154 
 Q11 
Panel C (13) (14) (15) 
practice 17.433***  4.838** 
influence  32.728*** 11.468*** 






 27.364*** 8.598** 
    note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Number of Observations (N) varies by specification from 473 to 515 
Based on the evidence from Table 8, I have relatively strong evidence to confirm the 
fourth hypothesis. The fact that a Christian Orthodox is likely to choose giving to the community 
over choosing to save for his or her future, and that a Christian Orthodox would rather work in a 
team over working alone, and we can claim so with certainty as these relationships were 
significant, can be attributed to the Christian Orthodox preference of community over individual 
development. The evidence for supporting the hypothesis would have been stronger had I found 
that Christian Orthodox respondents find competition harmful, as that would have strengthened 
the argument made with the fourth hypothesis. However, due to the insignificance of the 
relationship, I cannot claim the latter with any certainty.  
Discussion 
 
 In the previous two sections, I provided descriptive analysis of the survey data, as well as 
the regression analysis with which I attempted to explain the relationship between Christian 
Orthodoxy and the attitudes and behavior in the economic sphere. The descriptive data simply 
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exhibited the percentage of Christian Orthodox that follow certain Christian Orthodox norms or 
captured their attitude and behavior towards different market mechanisms. The results from the 
descriptive statistics of the survey data were suggestive, however, the regression analysis helped 
me in explaining the Christian Orthodox attitudes and behavior in the economic sphere based on 
the intensity of their religiosity.  
Based on the results from the both analysis, I have sufficient evidence to respond to the 
previously established hypotheses to some extent and with some degree of certainty.  
I can confirm the first hypothesis as I am confident in the significance that three out of 
the four questions showed. Therefore, the positive relationship reveals that a respondent that 
declares him or herself as Christian Orthodox exhibits propensity to choose participating in 
Church, practicing religious activities, and humility and obedience over acquiring wealth and 
working; this relationship remains significant across models that employ both religious practice 
and religious influence as indicators.  
The second hypothesis can also be confirmed; a Christian Orthodox respondent is likely 
to place trust in the Church and the Bible above trust in government institutions, the market, and 
international organizations. A Christian Orthodox that has higher religious practice index is more 
likely to portray this attitude. The same can be concluded for a Christian Orthodox with a higher 
self-declared religious influence, however, with less significance in this relationship.  
The results that sought to test the third hypothesis are not suggestive or predictive to the 
extent of the previous two. Only one of the questions, the question that inquired Christian 
Orthodox respondents’ practice of saving money yielded significant and explanatory results. 
Based on these results, I can confirm the hypothesis that a Christian Orthodox shows a 
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propensity to choose more conservative mechanisms to save money, and this is true and 
significant in models where I test for intensity of religious practice and religious influence. Due 
to the insignificant results of the questions on investing and borrowing, I cannot make a 
definitive claim on the hypothesis for investment and borrowing.  
Finally, only one of the questions that test the fourth hypothesis produced results that are 
robust and significant across all models. The results disclosed that a Christian Orthodox chooses 
to give to the community over saving for the future; this effect remained significant for the 
intensity of Christian Orthodox practices, and religious influence. I would argue that the 
robustness and the significance of the results, as well as the content of the question is sufficient 
in confirming the fourth hypothesis.  
Overall, across all panels and models, the index of religious practice proved to be more 
robust than the index of religious influence. This effect is expected, as responses to intensity of 
religious influence are highly subjective, while the index of religious practice tends to be a more 
objective measure. Nonetheless, in the majority of questions, both indices proved to yield 
significant results in the analysis. In the model where I used joint test for the two indices, the 
significance and effect of the coefficient decreased; this outcome is likely due to the moderately 
high correlation between the two indices, therefore the model explains less of the variance in the 
dependent variables when the both indices are considered jointly. For this reason, I do not 
believe that this outcome from the joint model is problematic to the analysis.  
Generally taken, the analysis so far supports my argument that Christian Orthodox 
adherents reveal more conservative attitudes and behavior in their economic activities. However, 
there are limitations to the study that do not allow for a causal statement to be established yet. 
134 
 
Next, I address the limitations of my study and I propose some ways that my study can be 
improved with future research.  
Limitations and Future Research 
 
 One limitation to my study is the prevalent number of female respondents in my sample; 
the ratio of male to female respondents is one to eleven. Taken that the majority of my sample is 
women (nearly 90% of the sample), the findings can be regarded as a representation of Christian 
Orthodox women’s attitudes and behavior in the economic sphere. Despite the efforts to target 
more male respondents, the response rate from men was significantly lower. Male respondents 
either refused to fill out a survey or partially filled it out, which required discarding the response 
completely. In Appendix II, I include a robustness table where I present coefficients separately 
for the male and female respondents for the questions used in the analysis. I find that when the 
odds ratio for the male sample yields significant results, the odds are higher than when the same 
analysis is performed on the female sample. The fact that the odds ratios for the male sample are 
higher than those of the female sample suggests that the religious influences I found in the 
analysis would be further strengthened with additional male respondents. Additionally, such 
surprising finding calls for further research on this topic.  
 Another limitation is that part of the survey was distributed via social media and other 
internet channels, and therefore my sample is limited to respondents that have access to a 
computer and the internet. I attempted to mitigate for this limitation by also distributing hard 
copies of my survey and conducting in-person surveys, nonetheless, the ratio of hard-copy 
survey to online survey is one to nine. However, I would argue that this limitation is not 
detrimental to the findings as a survey that included more low-income and rural respondents is 
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likely to discover an even stronger relationship between religiosity and economic behavior, 
which would have resulted in strengthening the findings.  
I would argue that the predictive analysis is highly suggestive of the relationship between 
Christian Orthodox religiosity and attitudes and behavior in the economic sphere, I still cannot 
claim any causal relationship. This limitation is mainly due to my analysis being done on a 
sample of Christian Orthodox respondents, and the lack of non-Christian Orthodox respondents 
as comparative units. In future research, I focus on conducting analysis that will show whether 
the case of a respondent being a Christian Orthodox predicts his or her attitudes and behavior in 
economic activities and practices. My data is limited by a large sample of Christian Orthodox 
adherents, and a relatively smaller sample of non-Christian Orthodox respondents. To conduct a 
more comprehensive analysis, my study needs more data. 
There is also the issue of external validity, as the data was gathered within one country 
and the findings cannot be generalized to other countries. The attitudes and behavior that the 
respondents display can be attributed to cultural factors and country-specific developments. In 
future research, I plan to control for this issue by collecting data across countries. One way to do 
this is to compare the World Value Survey data collected from similar questions answered by 
Christian Orthodox respondents from different countries. Another way is to extend my field 
research to other predominantly Christian Orthodox countries like Serbia and Bulgaria.  
Regarding factors such as country-specific developments, one apparent factor is the effect 
of socialism on the attitudes and behavior of respondents; one can notice that some of the 
Christian Orthodox norms align with the characteristics of a socialist society. Macedonia 
functioned as a socialist society until the succession from Yugoslavia in 1991; after 1991, 
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Macedonia underwent significant reconstruction in order to transform to a capitalist society. To 
test for the influences of socialism on the sample’s responses, I plan on dividing my sample on 
respondents who were born and lived during the socialist era, and respondents who were born 
after 1991. Technically, respondents who were born after 1991 were not exposed to the socialist 
mechanisms in the society, thus this should reduce the effect of socialism on the respondents’ 
attitudes and behavior. 
Finally, one issue that is inherent in social science surveys is the probability of 
respondents’ lack of transparency in answering survey questions. There is the possibility that a 
respondent is not comfortable providing answers that may present them in an unfavorable 
manner i.e. selfish, self-centered, greedy etc. I attempted to address this issue by ensuring 
respondents that the survey is anonymous and confidential. Moreover, there is a risk of my 
sample not being representative of the overall Macedonian population due to the utilization of 
convenience sampling rather than random sampling as a survey methodology. There is a 
possibility of over- or under-representations of the attributes, attitudes, and behavior of the 
Macedonian population. Future work will focus on weighting the sample from this study to the 
national consensus in order to address this limitation.   
Conclusion 
 
 At the beginning of this chapter, I posed an argument that the historical presence of 
Christian Orthodoxy and the interconnectedness of religion and secular affairs in Macedonia 
have created and fostered religious norms that influence people’s attitudes toward economic 
activity. To provide evidence for my argument, I first investigated Christian Orthodox norms as 
observed in other predominantly Christian Orthodox countries; I did this in order to isolate the 
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possibility that the Christian Orthodox norms I find in the investigation of the Macedonian 
society are peculiar to the Macedonian society alone.  
The following section provided evidence of the Christian Orthodox norms, specifically 
those devised to regulate economic behavior, in the Macedonian society. I analyzed MOC 
doctrinal texts and popular Christian Orthodox literature, and I utilized evidence from primary 
resources, my interviews with religious leaders, to delineate several reoccurring Christian 
Orthodox norms across all resources. I found that Christian Orthodoxy shows a strong preference 
towards a well-balanced life and is generally distrustful of market mechanisms that are meant to 
multiply wealth. Consequently, Christian Orthodox leaders advise against egoistic behavior such 
as saving in excess and multiplying wealth.  They believe in salvation through following and 
practicing God’s words, provided in the doctrines.  
Based on the findings from the norm investigation, I postulated four hypotheses that I 
then tested with the results from the survey. I was able to confirm three of the hypotheses with a 
sufficient level of robustness and certainty. Recognizing that there are limitations to the analysis 
due to sample and endogeneity issues, I still find the study to be substantial and suggestive of the 
relationship between Christian Orthodox religiosity and economic attitudes and behavior.  
Specifically, I find the study significant as it revealed that a large percentage of Christian 
Orthodox attitudes align closely to the Christian Orthodox norms I outlined with the 
investigation. This suggests that the Christian Orthodox followers do adhere and conform to 
Christian Orthodox norms. Consequently, the effects of these norms, as observed through the 
behavior of the respondents in terms of their practices in the economic sphere, are reflected on 
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the followers. With some certainty, I was able to show evidence that these respondents are more 
likely to choose conservative mechanisms in saving their wealth over more progressive ones.  
 More broadly, the implication of this study is that it provides evidence that, contrary to 
the rational economic theory, not every human being acts of a self-interest, and not every human 
being exhibits egoistic tendencies when it comes to accumulating wealth. This study suggests 
that there are potentially social forces, such as religious norms, that shape the behavior of human 
beings in the economic sphere as well. The study adds to the emerging literature of studies that 
explore ethnic backgrounds, religious beliefs, upbringing, and other cultural differences that 
influence our conception of fairness, competitiveness, judgement, as well as our beliefs about the 
nature of the person. These differences are very often deeply engrained in people, and neither a 
government nor a market can (nor should) hastily change people’s attitudes and behavior in the 
world. Our different conceptualizations of every day concepts shape our actions and how we 
behave in worldly activities. The study presented in this chapter simply tried to capture the role 














In the previous chapter, I investigated the role of religious norms, rules, institutions, and 
social practices in political and economic developments in the case study of Macedonia. As the 
findings show, religion still plays a prominent role in the Macedonian society in both political 
and economic domains. Through the analysis, it was also illustrated what allowed for these 
religious forces to become effective in the society and how they influenced the various political 
developments in the country, as well as the different economic attitudes and behavior of 
Christian Orthodox adherents. I will briefly review and summarize the findings of both the 
political and economic domains, before discussing the significance of this thesis, the contribution 
to the constructivist approach and implications of this thesis for similar scholarship, and 
providing suggestions for future research.  
Review of Religion and Political Affairs 
 
 In the analysis of the relationship of religion and political developments, I chose to look 
specifically at the role of religion in two political developments, one is the building of a national 
identity, and the other one is nationalism.  
In the review of the literature that examines the first relationship, the relationship 
between religion and national identity, I first observed the significance of religion on the 
individual level. I discovered that religious values are enacted in times of crisis and instability, at 
times when the individual’s self-preservation is threatened and when the individual feels outside 
of his or her comfort zone. Religion then provides the psychological support, stability, and 
fundamental sense of safety because of its ability to provide existential answers based on rules 
set by God instead of the individual himself to have to seek and choose rules in uncomfortable 
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and perhaps overwhelming circumstances.225 Moreover, religion being a common myth, is 
inherently uniting and delivering of the “fellowship” feeling, where individuals bond under a 
common belief in something that collectively secures their existence. Therefore, on the 
individual level, it is the threat to existential security that makes individuals to cling to something 
that is known, stable, and continuous.  
Scaling up to the national level, I observed the same uniting propensities of religion for 
including religious norms, symbols, practices, and traditions in the building of a nation. In many 
ways, the constructs of nation and religion share similar characteristics; they are both factors for 
the creation of “imagined communities,” where the members of their communities have a 
common imagine of what unites them in their communion.226 Also like other uniting factors of a 
nation, such as language or a flag, an anthem, religion binds members of one nation together. 
However, we seldom observe revolutions in the name of an anthem or a language, but religion 
has erected revolutions and movements in past and modern times. I argued that the 
distinguishing reason lays in the abstract nature, the multiple interpretations, and most 
importantly, the psychological influences of religious beliefs on individuals. Therefore, religion 
becomes an enduring and sensitive part of the national identity of one country.  
The enactment of religious elements in nationalistic movements, however, is due to the 
belief of the actors in these movements that their existential security and their unity are under 
threat. Therefore, it is once again the ontological security that is of concern to the actors in these 
nationalistic movements. It is perhaps the ability of religion to psychologically and emotionally 
unite members of one nation that contributes to the prominent spot of religion in these 
                                               
225 Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism,” 759.  
226 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 49. 
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movements; it is the need for perseverance and security of the nation or society that the 
nationalistic movements seek to protect. In a way, religion invigorates these movements. 
The analysis becomes more intricate when we analyze different actors within these 
movements. The motivations behind enacting religion in these movements differ depending on 
the actor; the participation of civilians, religious groups, and government elites and their 
motivations and role in the utilization of religious elements in nationalistic movements differ 
based on the extent to which their ontological security is threatened.  
With the analysis in the case study of Macedonia, I found consistence between the 
findings of the literature and the empirical evidence. Macedonia served as an excellent case 
study for observing the role of religion in its nation building as the country gained its 
independence after long years of both occupation or control of other states in 1991. Therefore, 
the nation building of Macedonia is recent, and arguably still ongoing process where the role of 
religion can be compatibly studied. The empirical evidence revealed strong religious presence, 
predominantly of the Macedonian Christian Orthodox Church, in the building of the nation. In 
the perusal of the Macedonian Constitution, as well as numerous political, religious, and media 
statements, the empirical evidence proves that religion is used as a uniting factor in the building 
of a nation. One can argue, based on the evidence, that Christian Orthodoxy even holds a more 
prominent spot than the other elements of the nation.  
However, such a strong relationship between the Macedonian Christian Orthodox Church 
and the secular affairs in Macedonia creates tensions in a multiethnic and multireligious society 
such as the Macedonian society. Therefore, since its independence, Macedonia has been faced 
with many political crises that were partly influenced precisely due to the numerous ethnic and 
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religious cleavages in Macedonia and the prominent role given to religion in secular affairs. 
Nonetheless, these crises, and more specifically the crisis of 2001 allowed for me to observe the 
above theoretical claim that religion is vigorously enacted in times of crises and when the 
ontological security of different actors is threatened. Through statements by civilians, religious 
leaders, and government officials, I was able to observe the motivations and the extent to which 
these groups were able to enact religious elements in order to protect their ontological security, 
and/or the ontological security of their community or group.  
This analysis added to the overall argument that the political developments in one 
country cannot be analyzed from a uniform and standard set of assumptions as a country like 
Macedonia has had recurrent and historical struggles to establish itself as an independent nation. 
These characteristics, in combination with the historical pride in Christian Orthodoxy, makes for 
a nation that is sees religion as integral to its identity and that is especially prone to enact religion 
in order to secure its ontological identity. 
 
Review of Religion and Economic Affairs 
 
 In the analysis of the religion between religion and economic attitudes and behavior, I 
mainly draw from the Weberian model to construct the arguments on the relationship, and I also 
rely upon subsequent studies that have attempted to quantify and test Weber’s claims in the 
literature of religion and economic outcomes.  
 The two primary arguments that I drew from Weber’s work is his concerns with first, 
how religious ideas become effective forces in the society, and second, how forms of religious 
beliefs and religious movements correlate with practical morals and the material culture. In 
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regard to the first question, Weber himself provides an answer that I use as an argument 
throughout the thesis. Namely, the argument is that the individuals’ attitudes and behavior in the 
economic aspect of the society are a product of the psychological sanctions that are placed by a 
religious context as a whole and these psychological sanctions, in turn, influence people’s 
attitudes. One important contrast that I made between the Weberian analysis of the psychological 
sanction proposed by the Reformation and the Protestant denomination and the one that Christian 
Orthodox norms and institutions have proposed and professed is in the difference between the 
concept of the Protestant’s “calling” and the Christian Orthodox “obedience, sacrifice, and 
humility”.  
 Based on this difference, as well as other Christian Orthodox norms that I found with my 
investigation into Christian Orthodox norms and their message for appropriate attitudes and 
behavior in the economic sphere, I expected to be able to analyze the second question that is 
concerned with the correlation between normative forms of the Christian Orthodox faith and the 
material culture. To achieve this, I utilize the data I gathered during my field study where I 
surveyed Christian Orthodox adherents, questioned their adherence to Christian Orthodox norms 
and their attitudes and behavior in the economic sphere where I included questions that are 
reflective of the material culture that Weber outlines in his work.  
 The survey data analysis revealed that a significant portion of the Christian Orthodox 
population in Macedonia follows the principles that are promoted with Christian Orthodox 
norms. Some of these principles included church attendance and reading of the Bible over 
acquiring wealth and working; obedience, humility, participation in the Church over 
independence and financial thriftiness; choosing peace and praying more over busy life and more 
wealth; trusting the Church as the highest authority over the government; avoiding wealth-
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multiplying techniques and other questions that measured their conformation to Christian 
Orthodox norms.  
 Moreover, I used the survey data to regress the level of religiosity of Christian Orthodox 
adherents on their choices to adhere to Christian Orthodox norms and practice economic 
behavior and have economic attitudes that are in line with the Christian Orthodox teachings. I 
posed four hypotheses; the survey data yielded robust evidence to confirm three of the four 
hypotheses. Namely, I confirmed the hypothesis that claimed that a respondent that declares him 
or herself as Christian Orthodox exhibits propensity to choose participating in Church, practicing 
religious activities, and humility and obedience over acquiring wealth and working. I also 
confirmed the second hypotheses that posed that a Christian Orthodox respondent is likely to 
place trust in the Church and the Bible above trust in government institutions, the market, and 
international organizations. I was not able to confirm the third hypothesis that claimed that a 
Christian Orthodox shows a propensity to choose more conservative mechanisms to save money, 
and this is true and significant in models where I test for intensity of religious practice and 
religious influence. Due to the insignificant results of the questions on investing and borrowing, I 
was unable to make a definitive claim on the hypothesis for investment and borrowing. Finally, 
the fourth hypothesis that a Christian Orthodox chooses to give to the community over saving for 
the future was confirmed due to the robustness and significance of the results.  
 While the results of the study were able to confirm the question on correlation between 
Christian Orthodox norms and the material culture, the analysis also helped in confirming that 
there are social forces that also influence individuals’ behavior in the economic sphere other than 
the assumed self-interest. Additionally, the evidence suggests a validation of the overarching 
argument in this thesis that one can claim that certain economic policies are not well adapted and 
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enacted in Macedonia because the ideas and principles behind these policies are not compatible 
with the values presented in the culture; a reason why the historical, cultural, and societal context 
of one country is important when evaluating development.   
Now that I have reviewed the two principal questions in this thesis, I conclude the review 
by reiterating the argument of how these two seemingly different domains are tied together. In 
other words, while it seems that the two questions address dissimilar subjects, I argue that they 
have several traits in common. The first thing is that both questions address how something 
ecclesiastical such as religious norms, rules, institutions, and practices affect something that is 
the opposite of ecclesiastical, material and performed outside of the spiritual domain, i.e. politics 
and economics. Through the analysis, I found that both of these domains are affected by 
religious elements in the same way; in both domains the reasons for individuals’ enactment of 
religious elements is due to the power of religion to provide stability and security in times when 
the individual fears for his or her existence in earthly life and for salvation in the afterlife. In the 
political domain, it is the fear of the changing societies, of the unknown, and of the dissimilar. In 
the political domain, religion provides cohesion and unity that ostensibly shields and provides 
comfort to adherents in changing times. In the economic domain, it is perhaps the fear of the 
unknown in the afterlife, and it is the psychological need to know one will experience 
redemption in the afterlife; perhaps that is the reason why Christian Orthodox choose to be 
obedient and humble, instead of seeking their self-interest in the economic domain. Unarguably, 
while the fear of the unknown has certainly proven to be a motivating factor in obeying and 
enacting religious norms, people also adhere to religious norms simply because of their sincere 
belief in these norms. These two factors are certainly not identical nor mutually exclusive, but 
146 
 
instead, they both influence and guide the behavior of adherents at various points and 
circumstances of their lives. 
Naturally, as much as one can form opinions based on observable behavior, there is 
always the unobserved part, the human psychology in these processes that is harder to capture. 
Nonetheless, this study shed light on the fact that it is the fear of the unknown that empowers 
religious elements and binds these two domains together. Moreover, the findings of this study in 
both domains contributed to the argument that for newly introduced policies, political and 
economic included, to be effective in one society, there needs to a consideration of the existing 
ideologies of that society; ideologies, such as the Christian Orthodox ideology in Macedonia that 
has been in creation for centuries.  
Significance, Implications, and Contribution 
 The empirical findings in this thesis illustrate the effect that religious norms, rules, 
institutions, and practices can have in both the political and the economic domains of a country. 
The significance of the findings in the political domain is especially relevant for Macedonia; the 
findings suggest that the combination of intricate historical connections to religion, the emotional 
attachment to people and events that have led to the national emancipation of the country, and 
the multireligious and multiethnic society will make it difficult for the society to detach itself 
from religious sentiments. Understanding this heritage should assist policymakers in their 
decision making. Taking the historical developments in consideration, one would rightfully 
suggest that any radical changes that are imposed on the Macedonian society, especially by third 
parties as it was the case after the 2001 insurgency and the establishment of the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement, would be met with dissatisfaction from the majority of the public. The 
evidence that was included from statements by different actors is suggestive that there is an 
147 
 
existent sentiment that clings to traditional and religious values. This realization can also have 
policy implications for Macedonia. Whatever political changes are enacted in the country, they 
need to be enacted with consideration and open discussion where these values are recognized. As 
a young country with significant insecurity to its ontological identity and existence, political and 
policy changes that further exacerbate the fragile Macedonian identity may further infuriate and 
invigorate nationalistic movements. There needs to be a social representation of the traditional 
groups, in addition to the progressive parties, in order for the country to achieve a common 
ground peacefully. The current political situation in Macedonia shows the exact opposite.  
 In addition to the significance the findings have for Macedonia, the investigation into 
why religion is an enduring factor in building a nation and why religion is enacted in the 
nationalistic sentiments of members of a society has offered a more objective approach to 
religious movements worldwide. Often times, religious movements in modern times are 
perceived as inherently violent. While I do not claim that historical and cultural heritage of a 
society can be a justification for violence posed by certain religious movements, I would argue 
that enacting religious sentiments should not always be viewed with disdain as doing so further 
frustrates members of a religious society; as this thesis presented, these religious values provide 
comfort and security to people, unwillingly separating them from these values may irritate 
individuals and make them feel marginalized.  
 The significance of the findings in the economic domain are manifold. As the literature 
review of the studies that examine the relationship between religion and economic outcomes 
showed, there is a gap that a number of the authors detected — the need for quantifying the 
relationship between specific religious principles and the economic behavior of the adherents to 
be able to observe the direct relationship between them. The study in this thesis was designed 
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precisely to fill this gap. Moreover, I focused on the Christian Orthodox denomination as there is 
a limited number of studies that have included empirical evidence on Christian Orthodox 
adherents. Finally, there is significance in finding that an individual is not always a rational actor 
and does not always act of self-interest in her economic choices. There are social and cultural 
factors, such as religious contexts, that have influenced the psychological sanctions and in turn, 
the attitudes and behavior of adherents in the economic sphere as well.  
In regard to Macedonia, the suggestive findings in the economic realm that there are 
certain peculiarities in the way Christian Orthodox adherents interact with the material culture 
suggests that there should be certain consideration of this characteristics in policy 
implementation as well. While using cultural, and religious, explanation for the development 
economic status of Macedonia is limited, and seeking policy interventions that can potentially 
influence and change these cultural traits constraining, there needs to be an open discussion 
about these conflict of norms among Macedonians to ensure proper understanding of this 
relationship. A potential tactic would be a corroboration with representatives from religious 
institutions in addressing such challenges. For example, the Russian Christian Orthodox Church 
has proposed a code that mentors its adherents on dealing with the societal changes and 
modernity while also staying true to their faith and moral conduct. By doing so, religious leaders 
could provide the adjustment and comfort needed in a changing society, while also not changing 
the character of the faith.  
 Since the study revealed evidence that there are historical and societal factors in the case 
of Macedonia that have influenced the peculiar enactment of religious norms in nation building, 
nationalistic sentiments, and economic attitudes and behavior, this case study should serve as an 
example that every country has its own historical and cultural heritage that influences political 
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and economic developments in the country. Therefore, scholars and policymakers should devote 
more time in learning the peculiarities of countries’ development in societal and cultural context 
as well in order to be able to implement policies that are effective. To reiterate the argument I 
have made several times throughout the thesis, new ideas and policies are not independent of the 
existent ideological realities on the ground, and their effectiveness is conditional upon the 
reconciliation of new ideas with existent norms, rules, institutions, and practices.  
Suggestions for Future Research 
 
 The rise of reinvigorated religious movements and religious sentiments have weakened 
the arguments of the secularization theory and its prediction of a “slow and steady death of 
religion” with modernization. Therefore, the debate on the power of religion is not over yet.  
Unfortunately, some violent movements in the name of religion, such as the Islamic State 
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have prompted people to generalize and view religious movements and 
religious sentiments as inherently prone to violence, or perceive them as backward and in other 
negative context. I argue that we should make an effort to understand the power of religion in 
modern societies and establish ways in which religion can function in secular conditions. The 
literature on norm conflict tells us that different sets of norms are in conflict of at all times, and 
through these conflicts, the evolution and formation of norms continues. It is our task that we 
find a way that we respect the comfort, the security, and the stability that religious norms bring 
to some societies and not force sets of norms that is perceived as violation to their ontological 
identity by the members of those societies.   
The goal of this study was to shed a light on the increased religious sentiment in 
Macedonia and find the motivations and reason for this occurrence. Additionally, with the 
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analysis of religious norm conformation in the economic sphere, the study showed that the 
adherence to religion is threaded deep into the societies and the adherents’ behavior and attitude. 
I would argue that this kind of analysis can be broadened to capture similar effects in other 
societies as well, especially in those alike the Macedonian society where religion holds a 
prominent place.  
The analysis done in this thesis has yielded significant empirical evidence, nonetheless, 
the study design can certainly be improved with future research. In the analysis of the 
relationship between religion and political developments, a statistical qualitative analysis would 
enrich the findings. Although this study included a substantial number of statements from 
various actors in the political field, including a qualitative analysis such as perhaps a discourse 
analysis can assist in statistically depicting the pattern of religious sentiments from different 
groups of interest in the political field.  
In the analysis of the relationship between religion and economic behavior, I listed 
several limitations to the study in this thesis and suggested ways that it can be improved. Here, I 
echo what I suggested in the chapter and call for future research that would address causality in 
the relationship between religious principles and economic attitudes and behavior. In the chapter 
I proposed some techniques that can be used to assist with determining causality in the 
relationship. Furthermore, I would argue that the strength of the study design is in the connection 
it makes between specific principles (norms, rules, practices) of Christian Orthodoxy, as well as 
the intensity of belief and practice of these norms, and the attitudes and behavior of Christian 
Orthodox adherents. This kind of design predicts a more precise relationship, unlike other 
designs where studies use general variables such as religious affiliation and macroeconomic 
elements such as economic growth or economic performance indicators to depict the 
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relationship. I would suggest that studying the study design that was introduced in this thesis 
should be improved and implemented in other religious denominations and societies.  
Overall, despite the strengths that this study brought forward, there are certainly potential 
avenues for future research that should be explored as the relationship between religion and 
economic development especially is yet to be fully established. In the political domain, we 
certainly need to continue having a discussion on the role of religion in political affairs as 
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Appendix I: Survey Instrument 
 
Q1 What is your age?  
o 18-25  
o 26-50  
o 51-65  




Q2 What is your gender?  
o Male  




Q3 What is your marital status?  
o Married  
o Single  
o Divorced 
o Separated  




Q4 What is your current employment status?  
o Employed  
o Unemployed  
o Student  
o Retired   
o Recently fired  
o Recently voluntarily quit  
 
 





Q5 If employed, are you an employee at:  
o Public sector  
o Private Sector  
o Civil Organization  
o Self-employed   
 
 
Q6 What is your geographical area? 
o Rural  










Q8 What is your social status?  
o Low income (below $300/month)  
o Middle income (between $300-$600/month)  
o High income (above $600/month)  
 
 
Q9 What state would you say is your health in? (very good=no health problems in the past 6 
months; good=some health problems in the past 6 months; fair= sick rather regularly; 
poor=chronic illness)  
o Very good  
o Good  
o Fair  
o Poor  
 
 
Q10 Have you ever had a health scare or near death experience?  
o Yes  
o No  
 
 







Q11 What is the highest education you have completed? 
o PhD  
o Master's  
o College  
o High School  
o Middle School  
o Incomplete middle school  
 
 
Q12 Do you consider yourself a religious person?  
o Definitely Yes  
o Somewhat Religious  




Q13 Is your significant other a religious person?  
o Yes  
o Somewhat  
o No  






Q14 How important is it for you that your significant other is from the same religion?  
o Extremely important  
o Important  
o Slightly important  
o Not at all important  




Q15 How important is it for you that your children are religious?  
o Extremely important  
o Important  
o Slightly important  





Q16 Have you been baptized?  
o Yes  











Q17 Would you/have you baptized your children?  
o Yes  
o Maybe  




Q18 Do you identify yourself with a religion or a religious denomination?  
o Yes   




Q19 If yes, please check one:  
o Christian Orthodox  
o Christian Catholic  
o Islam   
o Protestantism  
o Buddhism  





Q20 How often do you attend church or religious services (apart from weddings and funerals)? 
o Once a Week  
o Several Times a Month  
o Several Times a Year  
o Only for Important Religious Holidays  
o Less than once a year  
o Hardly Ever  




Q21 Have you changed your religion since birth?  
o Yes  











Q22 What factor do you think has the largest influence on your moral values?  
o Bible or your religion's respective religious texts  
o Parents/family  
o God  
o Community/civil organizations/sport clubs  
o School   
o Friends  
 
 
Q23 How important is God in your life? 
o Extremely important  
o Important  
o Less important  






Q24 How often do you pray?  
o A few times throughout the day  
o Every morning/night  
o Only when attending church  
o Only at religious services/weddings/baptisms/funerals  
o Not very often  




Q25 Please rank the following according to the importance they have in your life.  
______ Family  
______ Church  
______ Friends/Leisure Time  
______ Work/Money  
______ Bible 
______ Peace  
 
 
Q26 Do you believe in afterlife? (not using for now) 
o Yes 
o No  






Q27 Do you believe in heaven and hell? (not using for now) 
o Yes  
o No  




Q28 How much does religion affect your everyday choices in marriage/at work/school/economic 
choices?  
o A great deal  
o A lot   
o A moderate amount  
o A little  











Q30 Identify the top three characteristics from the following list that you want your child to 
respect the most: 
▢    Hard work and education  
▢    Independence  
▢    Selflessness in helping others  
▢    Reading and obeying the Bible/Other respective religious text  
▢    Attending church/your respective religious place of worship and practicing 
religion 
▢    Thriftiness and financial security  
▢    Determination   




Q31 Please rank the following based on your confidence/trust in them (1 being the least 
confidence and 8 being the most confidence).  
______ Family  
______ the Church/other respective place of worship  
______ Neighbors and Friends  
______ the Bible/other respective sacred text  
______ Government Institutions  
______ the Market Economy and Banks  
______ Police  







Q32 How often do you donate money/goods to the Church?  
o Once a week 
o Once a month  
o On religious holidays  
o On occasions depending on need  
o On special occasions  






Q33 Choose one of the listed choices in each row based on personal importance 
 First Statement (1) Second Statement (0) 
1. (1) Peace and having little 
or (0) Busy life and having 
more   o  o  
2. (1) Owning a lot of 
property or (2) Having a lot 
of friends  o  o  
3. (1) Giving to the poor and 
homeless or (0) Saving for 
the future   o  o  
4. (1) Feeling controlled but 
secure or (2) Having freedom 
but stressed and unstable 
economic life   o  o  
5.  Work more and pray less 
or (0) work less and pray 
more (1)  o  o  
6. (0) Cooperating in team or 







Q34 Taking all things together, would you say you are...?  
o Very Happy   
o Somewhat Happy   
o Not Very Happy   
o Not Happy at All   
 
 
Q35 Do you think: 
o Your city needs more churches  




Q36 Do you think: 
o Your city needs more churches  






Q37 Do you agree, disagree or neither agree nor disagree with the following statements?  Don’t 
know how to code it, not using it for now.  
 
 
 Agree (1) Neither Agree nor Disagree (2) Disagree (3) 
When jobs are scarce, 
men should have 
more right to a job 
than women (1)  o  o  o  
If a woman earns 
more money than her 
husband, it’s almost 
certain to cause 
problems (2)  
o  o  o  
Having a job is the 
best way for a woman 
to be an independent 
person (3)  o  o  o  
When a mother works 
for pay, the children 
suffer (4)  o  o  o  
Being a housewife is 
just as fulfilling as 
working for pay (5)  o  o  o  
Poor people are poor 
because they are lazy 







Q38 What do you think should be Macedonia’s top priority?  
o Economic growth   
o Strong defense forces   
o Restoring and growing family and religious values  
o Joining the EU   
o Other (please specify below) ________________________________________________ 
 
 
Q39 What do you think? Choose one.   
o competition is good because it stimulates people to work hard  




Q40 If you have to complete a task in a governmental institution, would you rather: 
o Get it done more slowly, but still effectively, without connections   




Q41 Rank your preference of ways to invest your money:  
______ In the trading market  
______ Savings account in a bank  
______ Investing in real estate  
______ Opening a new business  






Q42 Rank your preference of ways to save your money: 
______ In a bank  
______ With a family member  
______ At a personal location  




Q43 Rank your preference of ways you would borrow money: 
______ A neighbor  
______ The bank 
______ A family member  
______ Sell personal property  
______ A pawnshop  





Q44 Do you have a stable savings plan for the future?  
o Yes  
o No  




Q45 Do you have a life insurance?  
o Yes   






Q46 Do you think having a saving plan is important? 
o Yes  




Q47 Are you concerned about your financial future?  
o Yes   




Q48 Should religion and politics be separated in Macedonia?  
o Yes  
o No  












Appendix II: Robustness Tables 
 
Appendix Table 1. Odds Ratio for Male vs. Female Sample 









Q1 .264** .127*** 47.524* 87.560 
Q2 11.055*** 6.461*** 5.513 33.387 
Q3 6.272*** 9.596*** 122.977** 3.904 
Q4 126.664*** 21608.67*** 47.594* 120.499 
Q5 4.102** 4.633** 34.312* .103 
Q6 .807 1.538 1.088 .077 
Q7 10.156*** 12.500** 102.397* 1.127 
Q8 .474 .389 1.644 .999 
Q9 5.635** 13.968** .133 .001* 
Q10 2.993* 1.371 2.868 .579 
Q11 17.894*** 26.311*** 14.574* 485.013** 

















Appendix Table 2. Odds Ratio with Controls 













Odds Ratio 6.372*** 6.671* 8.047*** 8.411*** 131.745*** 3657.896*** 
Geo (Rural) .824 .861 1.611 1.784 1.039 1.124 
Age (18-25) .632 .677 1.17 4.00 4734155 448496 
Age (26-50) .531 .537 3.07 1.04 3579077 3146800 
Age (51-65) .214 .220 6.85 2.29 1762604 1730663 
SocEco (Low) 1.804 1.93 2.844* 2.786** 2.376 2.562*** 
SocEco (Mid) 1.362 1.359 1.886 1.895 3.108 3.199*** 
Education (HS) 1.122 1.10 1.318 1.253 .643 .695 
Education 
(College) 
.929 .895 1.734 1.691 .487 .592 
Education 
(Master) 
.968 .907 .737 .731 .312 .404 









Odd Ratio 10.498 21.233*** 10.192*** 7.254 
Geo (Rural) .986 1.033 1.026 1.086 
Age (18-25) 774707.4 316616.9 .684 .646 
Age (26-50) 622140.8 235216.1 .978 .917 
Age (51-65) 647693.7 283446.1 1.140 1.037 
SocEco (Low) 5.937 6.2247*** 2.342* 2.463 
SocEco (Mid) 5.007 4.99613*** 1.135 1.206 
Education (HS) .852 .792 .582 .575 
Education 
(College) 
1.026 1.046 .599 .573 
Education 
(Master) 
.921 .846 .547 .562 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix III: Questions & Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables in 
Tables 
 
             Appendix Table  3. Questions & Descriptive Statistics for Hypothesis 1 
Dependent Variable (H1)  Frequency Percent 
Q1 Personal Importance in Respondents' Lives  
  
Ranked Church or Bible over Work and Money 
 
358 73.21 
Q2 Top Three Priorities that Respondents Teach 
their Children  
  
Chose unselfishness in helping others obedience & 
humility, participation in Church and religious 
activities, reading and studying the Bible over work, 
independence, financial thriftiness, and determination 405 78.19 
Q3 Respondents' Preferred Personal Importance  
  
Chose peace and having little as more important than 
busy life and having more  410 79.92 




                  * N for the Christian Orthodox sample varies between 489 and 518 
 
             Appendix Table  4. Questions & Descriptive Statistics for Hypothesis 2 
Dependent Variable (H2)  Frequency Percent 
Q4 Trust  
  
 
Ranked trust in Church or Bible over Government 
Institutions, Market, Police, or IOs 
 
224 46.00 








            Appendix Table  5. Questions & Descriptive Statistics for Hypothesis 3 
Dependent Variable (H3)  Frequency Percent 
Q5 Investment    
Buying gold/silver over trading market, new business, 
real estate  155 32.02 
Q6 Saving  
  
Family member, personal location, rather spend them 
than save over bank  156 36.36 
Q7 Borrowing  
  
a neighbor/a family member, sell personal property, a 
pawnshop, an informal lender over bank 364 75.83 
                 *N for the Christian Orthodox sample varies between 429 and 484 
 
 
          Appendix Table  6. Questions & Descriptive Statistics for Hypothesis 4 
Dependent Variable (H4)  Frequency Percent 
Q8 Competition and Cooperation   
Competition is harmful over stimulating 
 
71  13.81 
Working in team over working alone  296  58.73 
Q9 Community 
  
Giving to the community over saving for the future  235  46.17 









Appendix IV: Tables with OLS Regression Coefficients 
 
        Appendix Table  7. OLS Regression Results for Hypothesis 1 
 Q1 Q2 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
practice -0.142  -0.003 0.385***  0.289** 
influence  -0.277* -0.278  0.371*** 0.181 
Panel B (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
practice 
w/controls 
-0.115  0.003 0.330***  0.237* 
influence 
w/controls 
 -0.225 -0.229  0.347*** 0.191 
 Q3 Q4 
Panel C (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
practice 0.3534245***  0.2471896* 0.7013411***  0.3761216*** 
influence  0.3873978*** 0.2157331  .9012644*** .6438899*** 
Panel D (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
practice 
w/controls 0.3223693*** 
 0.2601235* 0.6996185***  0.400109*** 
influence 
w/controls 
 0.3326835*** 0.1533333  .8697639*** .5982002*** 
          note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Number of Observations (N) varies by specification from 457 to 515 
 
 
                Appendix Table  8. OLS Regression Results for Hypothesis 2  
Q5 
 Panel A (1) (2) (3) 
practice 0.413***  0.371** 
influence  0.294* 0.044 
practice w/controls 0.366***  .337* 
influence w/controls  0.276* 0.047 









             Appendix Table 9. OLS Regression Results for Hypothesis 3 
 Q6 Q7 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
practice -0.0382  -0.094 0.549***  0.428** 
influence  0.043 0.1046  0.502*** 0.2053 
Panel B (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
practice 
w/controls -0.086 
 -0.142 0.506***  0.395** 
influence 
w/controls 
 0.019 0.112  0.457*** 0.179 
 Q8 
Panel C (13) (14) (15) 
practice -0.118  -0.069 
influence  -0.149 -0.101 






 -0.101 -0.000035 
               note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Number of Observations (N) varies by specification from 473 to 515 
 
              Appendix Table 10. OLS Regression Results for Hypothesis 4 
 Q9 Q10 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
practice 0.146  0.049 0.246*  0.364** 
influence  0.191* 0.159  0.065 -0.188 
Panel B (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
practice 
w/controls 0.139 
 0.081 0.252*  0.391** 
influence 
w/controls 
 0.165 0.112  0.032 -0.239 
 Q11 
Panel C (13) (14) (15) 
practice 0.677***  0.373** 
influence  0.783*** 0.529*** 






 0.722*** 0.448** 
           note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Number of Observations (N) varies by specification from 473 to 515 
 
 
 
